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Across

July 17, 2026·Solana·Bridge Exploit
$4.5M
total loss
StatusConfirmed
View the Across score →

Why it happened

Attack class: Bridge exploit

Off-chain verification, not a smart contract.

What would have stopped it

  • Verify every deposit event against the program's real event marker and transaction status.
  • Cross-check deposits against token balance changes, not just logs.

What the score saw

776Damascus, scored May 16, 2026

Our pre-hack assessment of Across flagged cross-chain composition as its weakest area, with each chain connection a trust boundary, but it covered the on-chain contracts, not the relayer software that reads Solana deposits. The on-chain design it credited is why the loss stayed with the relayer and never reached users or liquidity providers.

Score dimensions

  • Compositional riskpartly flagged
  • Operational securitymissed
  • Adversarial resiliencepartly flagged

An attacker sent 1,627 fake deposits on Solana that Across's main relayer, run by Risk Labs, read as real, and the relayer paid out about 4.5 million dollars of its own money on 18 other chains before Solana was switched off. No user or liquidity provider funds were lost, and every genuine transfer was completed or refunded the same day. The remaining fake requests, worth about 37 million dollars, expired unpaid. On July 28 the attacker returned 1,728.6 ETH under a 10 percent bounty deal, reported as about 3.7 million dollars, and about 500,000 dollars of attacker funds stayed trapped in the protocol.

User fundssafe
Liquidity providerssafe
Across smart contractssafe
Risk Labs relayer capitalpartially affected(about 4.5 million dollars paid out, most returned)
Solana routingdrained(disabled, restored through CCTP the same day)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker's Solana wallet sent fake deposits that Risk Labs' relayer filled on 18 chains, paying a single recipient; the proceeds were swapped to ether, and 1,728.6 ETH came back to the Across multisig on July 28.

The attack in 4 steps. Step 1, Root control: Risk Labs relayer (source). Step 2, Fills: Across Protocol Exploiter 2 (attacker), about $4.5M reached this step. Step 3, Swap & bridge: Bridged and swapped to ether (bridge), about $4M reached this step. Step 4, Return: Across Hub Pool owner multisig (exit), about $3.7M reached this step.

  1. Step 1: Root control

  2. Step 2: Fills

    • Attacker
      Across Protocol Exploiter 2
      one recipient on every chain
      ~ $4.5M received
      0xA6fb971F...560189
  3. Step 3: Swap & bridge

    • Bridge
      Bridged and swapped to ether
      fills moved to Ethereum
      USDC swapped to ETH
  4. Step 4: Return

    • Exit
      Across Hub Pool owner multisig
      1,728.6 ETH returned July 28
      10% bounty agreed
      0xB5247353...F03715

Why each step worked

    • Event reader trusted look-alike dataSolana deposit events were not checked for authenticity
    • 1,627 fake deposits8bkoZToaTBBtAPczgHqD4XVxWtvBkiy4crtexEtYDYSL
    • No per-recipient fill limitmissing controlhundreds of fills to one address in an hour
    • No balance check before fillingmissing controlno USDC ever reached the Solana pool
    • Fast manual shutdownaddresses blacklisted in minutes, Solana paused within hours
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
From 05:07 to 06:14 UTC the attacker sent 1,627 transactions on Solana from single-use wallets that looked, to Risk Labs' relayer software, like USDC deposits into the Across Solana pool, with a face value of about 41.7 million dollars across 18 destination chains. No USDC was actually deposited. Every request named the same recipient, 0xA6fb971F3B7a9b9F76EdA76bc89268fe26560189.
2.
Risk Labs' relayer read these as genuine deposits and filled 581 of them with its own capital before the stream was cut off, paying out about 4.5 million dollars. One example: 9,941.60 USDC paid to the recipient on Ethereum at 05:14 UTC through the Ethereum pool.
3.
Attacker addresses were blacklisted at 06:16 UTC. Across disabled Solana in its API at 08:23, paused the Solana pool at 08:35 and deployed a fix at 10:26. The remaining 1,046 forged requests, about 37 million dollars, expired unfilled, and about 500,000 dollars of attacker funds stayed trapped in the protocol.
4.
The attacker bridged fills from other chains to Ethereum, swapped USDC to ether, and moved 810 ETH to 0xa0C0e9f307b5A26cA3FB5891c19154fc7A02BeF7 and 1,500 ETH to 0x50324E91622710A77bb440C7461593CE942f7039.
5.
After contacting the team on July 27 and agreeing to a 10 percent bounty, the attacker returned 1,728.6 ETH to the Across Hub Pool owner multisig on July 28 in three transfers, reported as about 3.7 million dollars returned in all.

Root cause

The root cause was off-chain verification, not a smart contract. Across relayers front their own capital to pay users on the destination chain, then get repaid later once the deposit is proven. To decide whether a Solana deposit is real, Risk Labs' relayer reads events from Solana transactions. Per the Across post-mortem, that reader accepted data aimed at the Solana pool as a genuine deposit event without checking the marker that only real events carry, so transactions that deposited nothing could pass as deposits. The attacker used that to submit 1,627 fake deposits from single-use wallets, all paying one EVM recipient, and the relayer filled 581 of them, about 4.5 million dollars, before Across cut Solana off. The on-chain design kept the damage contained: because relayers are only repaid for deposits that really happened, the loss stayed with Risk Labs' relayer, and no user or liquidity provider funds were lost. A related flaw in the same Solana event handling, where failed transactions could be read as deposits, had been disclosed and fixed in April 2026, which shows how fragile this off-chain reading layer is. Most of the money came back: the attacker returned 1,728.6 ETH on July 28 under a 10 percent bounty agreement, and about 500,000 dollars stayed trapped in the protocol.

Prevention analysis

Verify every deposit event against the program's real event marker and transaction status.

Checking that an event is a genuine one emitted by the pool, and that the deposit actually moved tokens, would have rejected every forged request before any fill.

Cross-check deposits against token balance changes, not just logs.

None of the forged deposits moved USDC into the pool. A relayer that confirms the pool balance rose before filling would have paid nothing.

Automatic anomaly limits on fills per recipient and per origin chain.

Hundreds of large fills to one address from fresh wallets in an hour is a clear pattern. A cap per recipient or per hour would have stopped the payout after the first few fills; Risk Labs says it is now building this.

Similar incidents

Wormhole (2022)

A bridge accepted a message that only looked authentic on the Solana side, and value was paid out on another chain for a deposit that never happened. Same class: missing authenticity check on cross-chain input.

Verus-Ethereum Bridge (July 2026)

Payouts on one chain were triggered without proper verification of the deposit on the other, the same week as the Across attack.

Nomad Bridge (2022)

A verification gap let anyone present an unproven message as valid, and many copycat requests drained the bridge. Same pattern of mass forged requests against one weak check.

Remediation

1.Risk Labs merged and deployed a fix to the Solana event reader within about five hours, disabled Solana as an origin and destination, and paused the Solana pool on-chain.done
2.Across restored Solana deposits the same day through Circle's CCTP route, and kept intent routing to and from Solana disabled while it re-audits its off-chain Solana event parsing.
3.Risk Labs is building anomaly detection to flag and halt coordinated forged-deposit patterns, and worked with SEAL 911 and US law enforcement to flag attacker addresses.
4.The attacker returned 1,728.6 ETH on July 28 under a 10 percent bounty agreement.
5.Other relayers and solvers that read Solana events should verify event authenticity and transaction success, and confirm real token movement before fronting capital.

Timeline

2026-07-16The future recipient wallet is funded with 0.1 ETH from Tornado Cash.
2026-07-17First forged Solana deposit; the relayer fills one on Base three seconds later.
2026-07-17Example fill: 9,941.60 USDC paid to the recipient on Ethereum.
2026-07-17Forged deposit stream ends after 1,627 requests.
2026-07-17First attacker addresses blacklisted by the relayer.
2026-07-17Solana disabled as origin and destination in the Across API.
2026-07-17Solana pool paused on-chain.
2026-07-17Across says it was attacked on Solana, user funds are safe, and only relayer funds are at risk.
2026-07-17Root-cause fix deployed across Risk Labs infrastructure.
2026-07-17Solana deposits re-enabled through Circle's CCTP route.
2026-07-24Across publishes its post-mortem: 581 fills, about 4.5 million dollars paid, net loss under 4 million dollars.
2026-07-28Attacker returns 331.84 ETH to the Across Hub Pool owner multisig.
2026-07-28Final return of 1,275 ETH; 1,728.6 ETH returned in all after a 10 percent bounty agreement.
Risk Labs and Across (detection, response and post-mortem), SEAL 911 (address flagging), Asymmetric Research (earlier disclosure of a related Solana event-handling flaw), PeckShield (return tracking), BlackHart (Across indexer and on-chain trace)
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