Allbridge Core
Why it happened
Attack class: Logic errorThe attacker used a flash loan to distort the pool ratio, then withdrew liquidity at the wrong rate.
What would have stopped it
- Block same-transaction swap and withdraw
- Apply the earlier fix on every chain
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored Allbridge Core before this exploit.
On July 19, 2026, an attacker drained about $1.65 million of USDC and USDT from Allbridge Core's Solana stablecoin pools. They borrowed about $1.12 million USDC in a flash loan, swapped between USDC and USDT to distort the pool ratio, and withdrew liquidity at the inflated rate. Allbridge paused the protocol and told liquidity providers to withdraw. About $1.63 million was traced to an Ethereum address. Routes that do not use liquidity pools were resumed.
The attacker borrowed about 1.12 million USDC through a Kamino flash loan in one linked transaction, then swapped between USDC and USDT in Allbridge Core's Solana pools to distort the pool ratio. Liquidity was then withdrawn at the skewed rate and the loan was repaid in the same transaction, per CoinDesk.
Attack flow
All 4 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Flash loan: Kamino flash loan (source). Step 2, Drain: Solana stablecoin pools (hub), about $1.65M reached this step. Step 3, Exit: Ethereum consolidation address (exit), about $1.63M reached this step.
Step 1: Flash loan
- SourceKamino flash loanabout 1.12M USDC borrowedrepaid in the same transaction
Step 2: Drain
- HubSolana stablecoin poolsliquidity withdrawn at the skewed rate~ $1.65M
Step 3: Exit
- ExitEthereum consolidation addressabout $1.63M traced therebridged from Solana
Why each step worked
- Pool ratio can be pushedrapid USDC and USDT swaps skew the internal ratio
- Borrowed capitalno own funds needed
- Withdrawal uses the distorted ratiopayout priced off the manipulated state
- No same-transaction guardmissing controlswap and withdraw allowed together
- Fast bridge-outmissing controlfunds left Solana within the incident
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
Allbridge Core's Solana pools let withdrawals be priced from a pool ratio that a single trader could push around inside one transaction. By swapping between USDC and USDT with borrowed money, the attacker skewed the ratio, then withdrew liquidity at the inflated rate and repaid the loan, per DeFiLlama's account and press coverage of the team's statements. The attacker needed no key and no own capital, only a flash loan that was large enough relative to the pools. The same pattern had hit Allbridge's BNB Chain pools in 2023, and press coverage reports that the team's earlier fix, which moved to a single pool per chain, had not reached Solana.
Prevention analysis
Refusing to price a withdrawal off state changed earlier in the same transaction would have made the flash loan useless.
The 2023 hardening reached other chains but not Solana, per press coverage. A single shared review across chains would have caught the gap.
Capping how far the ratio can move per transaction or pausing when it does would have stopped the withdrawal at the skewed rate.
Similar incidents
A flash loan skewed pool balances in one transaction and liquidity was withdrawn at the distorted rate.
A thin pool's own state was pushed by trading and then used to price value that left the protocol.
Remediation
Timeline
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