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Allbridge Core

July 19, 2026·Solana·Logic Error
$1.6M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Logic error

The attacker used a flash loan to distort the pool ratio, then withdrew liquidity at the wrong rate.

What would have stopped it

  • Block same-transaction swap and withdraw
  • Apply the earlier fix on every chain

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Allbridge Core before this exploit.

On July 19, 2026, an attacker drained about $1.65 million of USDC and USDT from Allbridge Core's Solana stablecoin pools. They borrowed about $1.12 million USDC in a flash loan, swapped between USDC and USDT to distort the pool ratio, and withdrew liquidity at the inflated rate. Allbridge paused the protocol and told liquidity providers to withdraw. About $1.63 million was traced to an Ethereum address. Routes that do not use liquidity pools were resumed.

Routes that do not use liquidity poolssafe(resumed after the pause)
Other chains' poolssafe(not reported as affected)
Solana stablecoin poolsdrained(about $1.65 million in USDC and USDT)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker borrowed about 1.12 million USDC through a Kamino flash loan in one linked transaction, then swapped between USDC and USDT in Allbridge Core's Solana pools to distort the pool ratio. Liquidity was then withdrawn at the skewed rate and the loan was repaid in the same transaction, per CoinDesk.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Flash loan: Kamino flash loan (source). Step 2, Drain: Solana stablecoin pools (hub), about $1.65M reached this step. Step 3, Exit: Ethereum consolidation address (exit), about $1.63M reached this step.

  1. Step 1: Flash loan

    • Source
      Kamino flash loan
      about 1.12M USDC borrowed
      repaid in the same transaction
  2. Step 2: Drain

    • Hub
      Solana stablecoin pools
      liquidity withdrawn at the skewed rate
      ~ $1.65M
  3. Step 3: Exit

    • Exit
      Ethereum consolidation address
      about $1.63M traced there
      bridged from Solana

Why each step worked

    • Pool ratio can be pushedrapid USDC and USDT swaps skew the internal ratio
    • Borrowed capitalno own funds needed
    • Withdrawal uses the distorted ratiopayout priced off the manipulated state
    • No same-transaction guardmissing controlswap and withdraw allowed together
    • Fast bridge-outmissing controlfunds left Solana within the incident
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
The attacker took a flash loan of about 1.12 million USDC from Kamino, per CoinDesk and DeFiLlama.
2.
The attacker swapped rapidly between USDC and USDT in Allbridge Core's Solana pools to distort the pool's internal ratio.
3.
Liquidity was withdrawn at the distorted rate, taking about $1.65 million of USDC and USDT, and the flash loan was repaid.
4.
The funds were bridged from Solana to an Ethereum address, where Allbridge traced about $1.63 million.

Root cause

Allbridge Core's Solana pools let withdrawals be priced from a pool ratio that a single trader could push around inside one transaction. By swapping between USDC and USDT with borrowed money, the attacker skewed the ratio, then withdrew liquidity at the inflated rate and repaid the loan, per DeFiLlama's account and press coverage of the team's statements. The attacker needed no key and no own capital, only a flash loan that was large enough relative to the pools. The same pattern had hit Allbridge's BNB Chain pools in 2023, and press coverage reports that the team's earlier fix, which moved to a single pool per chain, had not reached Solana.

Prevention analysis

Block same-transaction swap and withdraw

Refusing to price a withdrawal off state changed earlier in the same transaction would have made the flash loan useless.

Apply the earlier fix on every chain

The 2023 hardening reached other chains but not Solana, per press coverage. A single shared review across chains would have caught the gap.

Pool-level limits on rate moves

Capping how far the ratio can move per transaction or pausing when it does would have stopped the withdrawal at the skewed rate.

Similar incidents

Allbridge BNB Chain (2023)

A flash loan skewed pool balances in one transaction and liquidity was withdrawn at the distorted rate.

Nostra NSTR (2026)

A thin pool's own state was pushed by trading and then used to price value that left the protocol.

Remediation

1.Allbridge paused Core, told liquidity providers to withdraw, and resumed routes that do not rely on liquidity pools, per press coverage of its statements.
2.Allbridge asked traders who profited from the distortion to return funds to compensate liquidity providers, per CoinDesk.
3.Other pool-based bridges should check that no withdrawal can be priced from state a caller changed in the same transaction.

Timeline

2026-07-19Exploit transaction on the Solana pools, per Allbridge's post-mortem as reported.
2026-07-19Allbridge pauses Core while it investigates.
2026-07-20CertiK and PeckShield flag the theft and CoinDesk reports about $1.65 million lost.
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