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Arcus Perps

November 10, 2026·Robinhood Chain·Logic Error
$2.2M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Logic error

A bug in subaccount transfers let a new account record more than it held, and the bridge paid real USDG against that inflated balance until the rate limit and a pause stopped it.

What would have stopped it

  • Enforce a conservation check on every internal transfer.
  • Compare withdrawals from new accounts with what they deposited.

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Arcus Perps before this exploit.

An attacker exploited a bookkeeping bug in Arcus, a perpetuals exchange on Robinhood Chain, by moving funds between their own subaccounts in a way that left a brand-new account showing far more money than it held. They withdrew 2,234,391 USDG against that fake balance in under an hour, and the exchange's bridge rate limit held back a further $3 million that was later cancelled. Arcus covered the whole shortfall from its company treasury, so users' balances and positions were not affected. The stolen USDG was moved off the chain through the Relay bridge and has not been returned.

User balancessafe(shortfall covered by the Arcus Labs treasury)
Open positionssafe
Robinhood Chainsafe(no flaw in the chain itself)
Withheld withdrawalssafe($3 million held by the rate limit, then reversed)
Arcus bridge reservesdrained(2,234,391 USDG withdrawn)
Exploit anatomy

After inflating a new account's balance through subaccount transfers, the exploiter withdrew 2,234,391 USDG from the Arcus bridge contract, starting with a 500,000 USDG payout, and moved it into the Relay bridge to leave Robinhood Chain.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Arcus bridge contract (bridge). Step 2, Withdraw: Exploiter address (attacker), about $2.23M reached this step. Step 3, Exit: Relay bridge depository (exit).

  1. Step 1: Root control

    • Bridge
      Arcus bridge contract
      pays out exchange withdrawals
      2,234,391 USDG taken
      0x4fdbdaf4...4315a4
  2. Step 2: Withdraw

    • Attacker
      Exploiter address
      4 x 500,000 USDG, then smaller payouts
      03:10 to 03:53 UTC
      0xeFbf4425...30b3Dd
  3. Step 3: Exit

Why each step worked

    • Subaccount transfer bug inflates a balancea new account records far more than it holds
    • No conservation check on internal transfersmissing controltotal recorded balance could rise on a transfer
    • Bridge rate limitheld back a further $3 million, later reversed
    • No review of large withdrawals from a new accountmissing controlpayouts cleared for an account opened that night
    • Withdrawals paused an hour after the startfix deployed and exploiter blocked 30 minutes later
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
A newly created address, 0xeFbf442599310E5CeE1A4EDd5c66334c5f30b3Dd, opened an Arcus account and from 01:36 UTC on November 10 made small deposits and withdrawals of USDG and tokenized SPY through the exchange's Robinhood Chain gateway, testing the deposit and withdrawal paths.
2.
At about 03:07 UTC (10:07 PM ET on November 9) the exploiter moved funds between its own subaccounts. Per Arcus, a bug in how the exchange handled these internal transfers let a new account, under specific conditions, record a balance far larger than it actually held.
3.
The exploiter requested withdrawals against the inflated balance. Arcus's bridge paid out four withdrawals of 500,000 USDG between 03:10 and 03:11 UTC, then its rate limit held back about $3 million of further requests while smaller payouts of 55,000 to 61,000 USDG kept clearing until 03:53 UTC. In total 2,234,391 USDG left the bridge contract.
4.
Between 03:13 and 03:57 UTC the exploiter deposited the USDG into the Relay bridge depository on Robinhood Chain in nine deposits, about 2.85 million USDG gross including round trips, moving the stolen funds off the chain.
0x4cd00e38...38bc31depositErc20(address,address,uint256,bytes32)tx:0x234c2ad2...952613
5.
Monitoring flagged the withdrawals at 03:15 UTC. Arcus paused platform-wide withdrawals at 04:07 UTC, deployed the fix at 04:37 UTC and blocked the exploiter's addresses from trading, transferring and withdrawing at 04:43 UTC. The exploiter's pending withdrawals held by the rate limit were reversed at 10:02 UTC.
6.
At 17:28 UTC on November 10 Arcus Labs covered the full shortfall from its company treasury, so user balances and positions were unaffected. Arcus published the exploiter's initial address and asked exchanges to flag funds from it. No funds have been reported returned by the exploiter.

Root cause

Arcus keeps each user's balances, including subaccounts, in its own exchange ledger and pays withdrawals out through a bridge contract on Robinhood Chain. Per Arcus's incident report, the code that moved funds between a user's own subaccounts did not keep the ledger balanced: under specific conditions a transfer could leave a newly created account with a recorded balance much larger than the funds behind it. Withdrawals were then honoured against that recorded balance, so the exploiter could take real USDG that no deposit backed. Nothing on-chain was broken and no key was stolen; the withdrawal path did exactly what the ledger told it to. What was missing was a conservation check that the sum of balances across a user's subaccounts never rises on an internal transfer, and a solvency check that compares withdrawals from a new account with what that account actually deposited. The bridge's rate limit is what kept the loss to about $2.23 million: it held back a further $3 million of requests, which Arcus later reversed. Arcus has not published code-level detail; it says the fix was reviewed by security partners along with related checks across the codebase.

Prevention analysis

Enforce a conservation check on every internal transfer.

If the ledger rejected any subaccount transfer that raised a user's total recorded balance, the inflated balance could never have been created and no withdrawal could have followed.

Compare withdrawals from new accounts with what they deposited.

A brand-new account asking to withdraw millions after depositing a few hundred dollars is a clear signal. Holding such withdrawals for review would have stopped the payout before it reached the bridge.

Keep the bridge rate limit, and size it to a smaller share of reserves.

The rate limit worked and held back $3 million. A tighter limit per account or per hour would have kept the loss closer to the first withdrawal than to $2.23 million.

Similar incidents

Abracadabra (2025)

A sequence of actions inside one account left the protocol's internal bookkeeping in a state where it believed the account was solvent, and real funds were withdrawn against value that did not exist.

Fence Finance tranche pool (2026)

An accounting update restored a balance that had already been spent, and the attacker withdrew against it a second time. Same class: internal records drifting from the funds actually held.

Remediation

1.Arcus paused withdrawals, deployed and reviewed a fix for the subaccount transfer bug, blocked the exploiter's addresses, and reversed the $3 million of withdrawals held by the bridge rate limit.done
2.Arcus Labs covered the 2,234,391 USDG shortfall from its company treasury, leaving user balances and positions unaffected, and re-enabled withdrawals the same morning.
3.Arcus is improving its risk systems for detecting and mitigating suspicious activity and is working with blockchain investigators to trace the funds; recovery is pending.pending
4.Exchanges that keep balances in an internal ledger should check that internal transfers conserve value and keep per-account and per-hour withdrawal limits on the bridge that pays users out.

Timeline

2026-11-10Newly created exploiter address makes its first deposit and withdrawal tests on Arcus.
2026-11-10Exploit begins with subaccount transfers that inflate a new account's recorded balance (10:07 PM ET, November 9).
2026-11-10First 500,000 USDG withdrawal paid by the bridge; the rate limit starts holding back further requests, about $3 million in all.
2026-11-10Monitoring flags the withdrawals and the team begins investigating.
2026-11-10Last withdrawal clears; 2,234,391 USDG has left the bridge.
2026-11-10Platform-wide withdrawals paused.
2026-11-10Bug fix deployed; exploiter addresses blocked six minutes later.
2026-11-10Withdrawals re-enabled for all users.
2026-11-10Exploiter's pending withdrawals reversed.
2026-11-10Shortfall covered from the Arcus Labs treasury.
Arcus (internal monitoring, incident report)
Continuous adversarial monitoring

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