Arcus Perps
Why it happened
Attack class: Logic errorA bug in subaccount transfers let a new account record more than it held, and the bridge paid real USDG against that inflated balance until the rate limit and a pause stopped it.
What would have stopped it
- Enforce a conservation check on every internal transfer.
- Compare withdrawals from new accounts with what they deposited.
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored Arcus Perps before this exploit.
An attacker exploited a bookkeeping bug in Arcus, a perpetuals exchange on Robinhood Chain, by moving funds between their own subaccounts in a way that left a brand-new account showing far more money than it held. They withdrew 2,234,391 USDG against that fake balance in under an hour, and the exchange's bridge rate limit held back a further $3 million that was later cancelled. Arcus covered the whole shortfall from its company treasury, so users' balances and positions were not affected. The stolen USDG was moved off the chain through the Relay bridge and has not been returned.
After inflating a new account's balance through subaccount transfers, the exploiter withdrew 2,234,391 USDG from the Arcus bridge contract, starting with a 500,000 USDG payout, and moved it into the Relay bridge to leave Robinhood Chain.
Attack flow
All 6 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Arcus bridge contract (bridge). Step 2, Withdraw: Exploiter address (attacker), about $2.23M reached this step. Step 3, Exit: Relay bridge depository (exit).
Step 1: Root control
- BridgeArcus bridge contractpays out exchange withdrawals2,234,391 USDG taken0x4fdbdaf4...4315a4
Step 2: Withdraw
- AttackerExploiter address4 x 500,000 USDG, then smaller payouts03:10 to 03:53 UTC0xeFbf4425...30b3Dd
Step 3: Exit
- ExitRelay bridge depositorynine depositsfunds leave Robinhood Chain0x4cd00e38...38bc31
Why each step worked
- Subaccount transfer bug inflates a balancea new account records far more than it holds
- No conservation check on internal transfersmissing controltotal recorded balance could rise on a transfer
- Bridge rate limitheld back a further $3 million, later reversed
- No review of large withdrawals from a new accountmissing controlpayouts cleared for an account opened that night
- Withdrawals paused an hour after the startfix deployed and exploiter blocked 30 minutes later
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
Arcus keeps each user's balances, including subaccounts, in its own exchange ledger and pays withdrawals out through a bridge contract on Robinhood Chain. Per Arcus's incident report, the code that moved funds between a user's own subaccounts did not keep the ledger balanced: under specific conditions a transfer could leave a newly created account with a recorded balance much larger than the funds behind it. Withdrawals were then honoured against that recorded balance, so the exploiter could take real USDG that no deposit backed. Nothing on-chain was broken and no key was stolen; the withdrawal path did exactly what the ledger told it to. What was missing was a conservation check that the sum of balances across a user's subaccounts never rises on an internal transfer, and a solvency check that compares withdrawals from a new account with what that account actually deposited. The bridge's rate limit is what kept the loss to about $2.23 million: it held back a further $3 million of requests, which Arcus later reversed. Arcus has not published code-level detail; it says the fix was reviewed by security partners along with related checks across the codebase.
Prevention analysis
If the ledger rejected any subaccount transfer that raised a user's total recorded balance, the inflated balance could never have been created and no withdrawal could have followed.
A brand-new account asking to withdraw millions after depositing a few hundred dollars is a clear signal. Holding such withdrawals for review would have stopped the payout before it reached the bridge.
The rate limit worked and held back $3 million. A tighter limit per account or per hour would have kept the loss closer to the first withdrawal than to $2.23 million.
Similar incidents
A sequence of actions inside one account left the protocol's internal bookkeeping in a state where it believed the account was solvent, and real funds were withdrawn against value that did not exist.
An accounting update restored a balance that had already been spent, and the attacker withdrew against it a second time. Same class: internal records drifting from the funds actually held.
Remediation
Timeline
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