BlackHart
Go live
Hacks feed/Aztec 2.0

Aztec 2.0

June 17, 2026·Ethereum·Logic Error
$2.2M
total loss
StatusConfirmed
View the Aztec 2.0 score →

Why it happened

Attack class: Logic error

A soundness bug in the Aztec 2.0 escape-hatch circuit, per Aztec Labs' incident report.

What would have stopped it

  • Constrain every public input to the value the circuit actually checks against.
  • Keep a way to retire a verification key once the circuit behind it is withdrawn.

What the score saw

627Forged, scored May 16, 2026

Our pre-hack assessment of Aztec looked at the current Aztec codebase, not the Aztec 2.0 rollup retired in 2022, so it never examined this contract. It did rate zero-knowledge circuit and bridge complexity as Aztec's weakest areas, and a circuit flaw in a forgotten bridge is that same kind of risk.

An attacker drained about $2.2 million from Aztec 2.0, a privacy payments rollup on Ethereum that Aztec shut down in 2022. A flaw in the rollup's emergency escape hatch let them prove ownership of funds in a ledger they made up themselves, and the contract paid out 1,158 ETH, 150,000 DAI and about 0.47 renBTC in three withdrawals over 16 minutes. The contract had no owner and could not be paused, so nobody could stop it, and a second actor swept the last 0.76 ETH the next morning. This was a separate attack from the Aztec Connect drain three days earlier; the live Aztec network and the AZTEC token were not affected. The stolen ETH was later split across many fresh wallets, with part of it sent through Tornado Cash.

Live Aztec networksafe(separate, current system)
AZTEC tokensafe
Aztec Connectsafe(already drained in a separate attack on June 14)
Aztec 2.0 leftover depositsdrained(about $2.2 million in ETH, DAI and renBTC, drained in full)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker's fresh wallet submitted forged escape-hatch proofs to the retired Aztec 2.0 rollup, starting with a 1,158 ETH withdrawal, then moved most of the proceeds into a consolidation wallet and peeled them off to fresh addresses over the following weeks.

The attack in 4 steps. Step 1, Forged escape: Aztec 2.0 rollup (source). Step 2, Withdraw: Attacker wallet (attacker), Copycat sweeper (hub), about $2.2M reached this step. Step 3, Consolidate: Consolidation wallet (hub), about $2.12M reached this step. Step 4, Disperse: Fresh wallets and Tornado Cash (exit).

  1. Step 1: Forged escape

    • Source
      Aztec 2.0 rollup
      1,158 ETH, 150,000 DAI, 0.47 renBTC
      ~ $2.2M left after 2022 shutdown
      0x737901be...42A2ba
  2. Step 2: Withdraw

    • Attacker
      Attacker wallet
      3 forged withdrawals in 16 minutes
      deposit 0, withdrawal 1,158 ETH
      0x6952d924...78E97F
    • Hub
      Copycat sweeper
      last 0.76 ETH via operator path
      default test account left as operator
      0xb6f89d12...d1bEa5
  3. Step 3: Consolidate

  4. Step 4: Disperse

    • Exit
      Fresh wallets and Tornado Cash
      tranches June 19 to August 26
      at least 45 ETH into Tornado Cash

Why each step worked

    • Escape-hatch circuit never tied the two ledger roots togethermembership proven against a fake ledger, real root shown to the contract
    • Old verification key still liveflawed circuit removed from code, but the deployed contract kept accepting it
    • No owner, no pause, no key rotationmissing controladmin and upgrade rights renounced in April 2024
    • Leftover balances never swept at shutdownmissing controlfour years of residual deposits behind a frozen verifier
    • No exchange freeze in timemissing controlGroom Lake engaged to flag funds after the drain
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
The attacker funded a fresh wallet with about 0.13 ETH for gas from an exchange hot wallet, 13 minutes before the first withdrawal.
2.
The attacker submitted an escape-hatch withdrawal whose proof claimed a deposit of zero and a withdrawal of 1,158 ETH. Because of a flaw in the escape-hatch circuit, the rollup's verifier accepted it and the contract paid out 1,158 ETH.
0x737901be...42A2baescapeHatch(bytes,bytes,bytes)tx:0xab306cd2...59c2b5
3.
The attacker repeated the same forged escape-hatch withdrawal for the other two assets: 150,000 DAI at 18:49 UTC and the entire renBTC balance, about 0.47 renBTC, at 18:50 UTC. The whole drain took 37 minutes from gas funding.
0x737901be...42A2baescapeHatch(bytes,bytes,bytes)tx:0x5c196c37...4705c3
4.
About 14 hours later a second actor swept the last 0.76 ETH through the normal operator path, using a well-known default developer test account that had been left registered as an authorized operator during the 2024 decommissioning. The contract was then empty.
5.
The attacker split the ETH between two holding wallets (300 ETH and 56 ETH) and a relay wallet, then consolidated about 1,102 ETH, the DAI and the renBTC into one wallet on June 18. From there the funds were peeled off in tranches to fresh wallets between June 19 and August 26, and one holding wallet sent at least 45 ETH into Tornado Cash on July 1.

Root cause

The root cause is a soundness bug in the Aztec 2.0 escape-hatch circuit, per Aztec Labs' incident report. The escape hatch lets users withdraw straight from the Ethereum contract if the rollup operator stops working, by proving they own notes in the rollup's ledger. The circuit used the same ledger fingerprint (a Merkle root) in two places, once for the membership check and once as the public value the contract compares with the live on-chain root, but it never forced the two to be equal. The attacker built a fake ledger with fabricated notes, proved ownership against it, and handed the contract the genuine on-chain root, so the contract's check passed. The proof claimed a deposit of zero and a withdrawal of 1,158 ETH, a combination an honest proof cannot produce. The verifier worked as designed and the trusted setup was not compromised: the flaw is in the verification key the contract was built with. The vulnerable circuit had since been removed from Aztec's code, but the deployed contract still carried the old key. Aztec 2.0 was deprecated in 2022, and in April 2024 Aztec Labs renounced all admin and upgrade rights, so nobody could pause the contract, rotate the key or sweep the roughly $2.2 million still inside. This is a different contract, flaw and entry point from the Aztec Connect drain three days earlier, although both are proof-binding failures in retired Aztec rollups.

Prevention analysis

Constrain every public input to the value the circuit actually checks against.

One equality constraint between the membership root and the settlement root would have made a proof over a fabricated ledger impossible to generate, and the escape hatch would have paid out only real notes.

Keep a way to retire a verification key once the circuit behind it is withdrawn.

The flawed circuit had already been removed from Aztec's code, but the deployed contract kept accepting proofs for it. A key rotation or disable path, even one that only a timelocked multisig can trigger, would have closed the hole.

Sweep or return leftover balances before renouncing control of a retired contract.

About 1,158 ETH, 150,000 DAI and some renBTC sat in a contract that had been shut down for four years. Returning those funds to users, or moving them behind a claim contract, before giving up admin rights would have left little to steal.

Remove test and default accounts from operator roles at decommissioning.

The follow-up sweep only worked because a public developer test account was still an authorized operator. Clearing operator lists before renouncing ownership would have blocked it.

Similar incidents

Aztec Connect (2026)

Three days earlier a different retired Aztec rollup was drained of about $2.18 million with forged proofs its genuine verifier accepted. Same family: a frozen, ownerless rollup whose proof checks did not bind what they were meant to prove.

Payy Network (2026)

A forged zero-knowledge burn proof passed Payy's on-chain verifier and released about 1.92 million USDC. Same class: the contract trusts whatever the verifier accepts, so a soundness gap becomes a direct withdrawal.

FOOMCASH (2026)

A mistake in a Groth16 verifier let an attacker forge proofs and drain about $2.26 million. Same root: a valid-looking proof for an action that should have been impossible.

Remediation

1.Treat the loss as unrecoverable on-chain: the Aztec 2.0 contract is immutable, has no owner since April 2024, and is now empty.
2.Aztec Labs engaged its incident response provider, Groom Lake, to flag and block the stolen funds at exchanges.
3.Teams with retired rollups or bridges should audit every circuit's public inputs for values that are used twice but never forced to match, and keep a timelocked way to disable a verification key.
4.Before renouncing ownership of any retired contract, sweep or return residual balances and clear every operator and test account from privileged roles.

Timeline

2024-04-30Aztec Labs renounces ownership of the deprecated Aztec 2.0 rollup contract, leaving it immutable and unpausable.
2026-06-14A separate retired Aztec rollup, Aztec Connect, is drained of about $2.18 million.
2026-06-17The attacker funds a fresh wallet with about 0.13 ETH for gas.
2026-06-17First forged escape-hatch withdrawal releases 1,158 ETH.
2026-06-17Second forged withdrawal releases 150,000 DAI.
2026-06-17Third forged withdrawal releases about 0.47 renBTC, the contract's entire balance.
2026-06-18SlowMist founder Yu Xian publicly lists the three drain transactions.
2026-06-18A second actor sweeps the remaining 0.76 ETH through the operator path; the contract is empty.
2026-06-18The attacker consolidates about 1,102 ETH, the DAI and the renBTC into one wallet.
2026-07-01A holding wallet starts sending ETH into Tornado Cash, at least 45 ETH that day.
2026-08-26Last large tranche observed leaving the consolidation wallet for a fresh address.
Vishal Singh (first public flag). Yu Xian, SlowMist (listed the three drain transactions). CertiK. PeckShield. BlockSec Phalcon (technical analysis). MistTrack (holding addresses). Aztec Labs (incident report)
Continuous adversarial monitoring

Get your protocol scored across 12 dimensions, or request ongoing coverage.