Aztec 2.0
Why it happened
Attack class: Logic errorA soundness bug in the Aztec 2.0 escape-hatch circuit, per Aztec Labs' incident report.
What would have stopped it
- Constrain every public input to the value the circuit actually checks against.
- Keep a way to retire a verification key once the circuit behind it is withdrawn.
What the score saw
Our pre-hack assessment of Aztec looked at the current Aztec codebase, not the Aztec 2.0 rollup retired in 2022, so it never examined this contract. It did rate zero-knowledge circuit and bridge complexity as Aztec's weakest areas, and a circuit flaw in a forgotten bridge is that same kind of risk.
An attacker drained about $2.2 million from Aztec 2.0, a privacy payments rollup on Ethereum that Aztec shut down in 2022. A flaw in the rollup's emergency escape hatch let them prove ownership of funds in a ledger they made up themselves, and the contract paid out 1,158 ETH, 150,000 DAI and about 0.47 renBTC in three withdrawals over 16 minutes. The contract had no owner and could not be paused, so nobody could stop it, and a second actor swept the last 0.76 ETH the next morning. This was a separate attack from the Aztec Connect drain three days earlier; the live Aztec network and the AZTEC token were not affected. The stolen ETH was later split across many fresh wallets, with part of it sent through Tornado Cash.
The attacker's fresh wallet submitted forged escape-hatch proofs to the retired Aztec 2.0 rollup, starting with a 1,158 ETH withdrawal, then moved most of the proceeds into a consolidation wallet and peeled them off to fresh addresses over the following weeks.
Attack flow
All 5 on-chain stepsThe attack in 4 steps. Step 1, Forged escape: Aztec 2.0 rollup (source). Step 2, Withdraw: Attacker wallet (attacker), Copycat sweeper (hub), about $2.2M reached this step. Step 3, Consolidate: Consolidation wallet (hub), about $2.12M reached this step. Step 4, Disperse: Fresh wallets and Tornado Cash (exit).
Step 1: Forged escape
- SourceAztec 2.0 rollup1,158 ETH, 150,000 DAI, 0.47 renBTC~ $2.2M left after 2022 shutdown0x737901be...42A2ba
Step 2: Withdraw
- AttackerAttacker wallet3 forged withdrawals in 16 minutesdeposit 0, withdrawal 1,158 ETH0x6952d924...78E97F
- HubCopycat sweeperlast 0.76 ETH via operator pathdefault test account left as operator0xb6f89d12...d1bEa5
Step 3: Consolidate
- HubConsolidation walletabout 1,102 ETH plus DAI and renBTCgathered June 180x69923e52...A05f72
Step 4: Disperse
- ExitFresh wallets and Tornado Cashtranches June 19 to August 26at least 45 ETH into Tornado Cash
Why each step worked
- Escape-hatch circuit never tied the two ledger roots togethermembership proven against a fake ledger, real root shown to the contract
- Old verification key still liveflawed circuit removed from code, but the deployed contract kept accepting it
- No owner, no pause, no key rotationmissing controladmin and upgrade rights renounced in April 2024
- Leftover balances never swept at shutdownmissing controlfour years of residual deposits behind a frozen verifier
- No exchange freeze in timemissing controlGroom Lake engaged to flag funds after the drain
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
The root cause is a soundness bug in the Aztec 2.0 escape-hatch circuit, per Aztec Labs' incident report. The escape hatch lets users withdraw straight from the Ethereum contract if the rollup operator stops working, by proving they own notes in the rollup's ledger. The circuit used the same ledger fingerprint (a Merkle root) in two places, once for the membership check and once as the public value the contract compares with the live on-chain root, but it never forced the two to be equal. The attacker built a fake ledger with fabricated notes, proved ownership against it, and handed the contract the genuine on-chain root, so the contract's check passed. The proof claimed a deposit of zero and a withdrawal of 1,158 ETH, a combination an honest proof cannot produce. The verifier worked as designed and the trusted setup was not compromised: the flaw is in the verification key the contract was built with. The vulnerable circuit had since been removed from Aztec's code, but the deployed contract still carried the old key. Aztec 2.0 was deprecated in 2022, and in April 2024 Aztec Labs renounced all admin and upgrade rights, so nobody could pause the contract, rotate the key or sweep the roughly $2.2 million still inside. This is a different contract, flaw and entry point from the Aztec Connect drain three days earlier, although both are proof-binding failures in retired Aztec rollups.
Prevention analysis
One equality constraint between the membership root and the settlement root would have made a proof over a fabricated ledger impossible to generate, and the escape hatch would have paid out only real notes.
The flawed circuit had already been removed from Aztec's code, but the deployed contract kept accepting proofs for it. A key rotation or disable path, even one that only a timelocked multisig can trigger, would have closed the hole.
About 1,158 ETH, 150,000 DAI and some renBTC sat in a contract that had been shut down for four years. Returning those funds to users, or moving them behind a claim contract, before giving up admin rights would have left little to steal.
The follow-up sweep only worked because a public developer test account was still an authorized operator. Clearing operator lists before renouncing ownership would have blocked it.
Similar incidents
Three days earlier a different retired Aztec rollup was drained of about $2.18 million with forged proofs its genuine verifier accepted. Same family: a frozen, ownerless rollup whose proof checks did not bind what they were meant to prove.
A forged zero-knowledge burn proof passed Payy's on-chain verifier and released about 1.92 million USDC. Same class: the contract trusts whatever the verifier accepts, so a soundness gap becomes a direct withdrawal.
A mistake in a Groth16 verifier let an attacker forge proofs and drain about $2.26 million. Same root: a valid-looking proof for an action that should have been impossible.
Remediation
Timeline
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