Balancer V1
Why it happened
Attack class: Precision loss / roundingThe same single-asset join rounding flaw, used again by a different attacker after it became public.
What would have stopped it
- Wind down deprecated pools quickly
- Round in the pool's favour
What the score saw
Our pre-hack assessment of Balancer covered the current versions and counted the age of the first version as a strength. It did not examine the first version's single-asset join math, so this old attack surface was not assessed.
Score dimensions
- Maturitymissed
A second attacker took about $250,000 from legacy Balancer V1 pools on Ethereum on September 6, six days after the first attack was made public. They used the same rounding flaw in the single-asset deposit math on pools with a nearly empty reserve. Per TokenPost, the whole episode reached about 120 pools and about $1.39 million. Anyone still in a V1 pool should withdraw.
A different attacker repeated the rounding attack on legacy V1 pools, with one representative transaction at tx.
Attack flow
All 3 on-chain stepsThe attack in 2 steps. Step 1, Root control: Legacy V1 pools (source). Step 2, Drain: Second attacker (exit), about $250K reached this step.
Step 1: Root control
- SourceLegacy V1 poolsnear-empty reserve~ $250K this wave
Step 2: Drain
- ExitSecond attackerdifferent attacker from the first~ $250K
Why each step worked
- Rounding in single-asset join mathsame flaw as the first attack
- Flaw public for six daysa second attacker copied the approach
- Deprecated pools still openmissing controlliquidity was not moved out after the first attack
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
This is the same flaw as the first Balancer V1 incident: rounding in the single-asset join math paid out more than was deposited on pools with a nearly empty reserve. The first attack was public on August 31, and a different attacker copied the approach on September 6. The pools were deprecated but still open and still held value, so publication of the flaw gave a second attacker what they needed. Per TokenPost, the whole episode reached about 120 pools and about $1.39 million.
Prevention analysis
Draining or closing old pools right after the first attack would have given a copycat nothing to take.
Rounding that always favours the pool would have made the repeat attack unprofitable.
A clear, early exit notice reaching all V1 depositors would have shrunk the pool of funds at risk.
Similar incidents
The original attack on five legacy V1 pools, using the same rounding flaw.
Remediation
Timeline
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