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Hacks feed/Balancer V1

Balancer V1

August 31, 2026·Ethereum·Integer Overflow
$234K
total loss
StatusConfirmed
View the Balancer V1 score →

Why it happened

Attack class: Precision loss / rounding

Rounding in the single-asset join paid out more than was deposited when a pool's reserve was nearly empty.

What would have stopped it

  • Round in the pool's favour
  • Minimum reserve checks on joins

What the score saw

849Damascus, scored May 15, 2026

Our pre-hack assessment of Balancer covered the current versions and counted the age of the first version as a strength. It did not examine the first version's single-asset join math, so this old attack surface was not assessed.

Score dimensions

  • Maturitymissed

An attacker took about $234,000 from five legacy Balancer V1 pools on Ethereum in five transactions between 02:28 and 03:37 UTC on August 31. The pools rounded the math for single-asset deposits in a way that paid out too much when a pool's reserve was nearly empty. The five pools are now holding dust. Balancer told V1 liquidity providers to exit, and anyone still in a V1 pool should withdraw.

Current Balancer versionssafe(not named as affected in the sources)
Five legacy V1 poolsdrained(about $234,000 drained, now dust)
Other V1 poolspartially affected(same class of flaw; withdraw if you hold a V1 position)
Exploit anatomy

Per SlowMist and The Defiant, the attacker used rounding in the V1 single-asset join to drain five legacy pools in five transactions between 02:28 and 03:37 UTC.

The attack in 2 steps. Step 1, Root control: Five legacy V1 pools (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker (exit), about $234K reached this step.

  1. Step 1: Root control

    • Source
      Five legacy V1 pools
      near-empty reserve
      ~ $234K total
  2. Step 2: Drain

    • Exit
      Attacker
      five transactions, 02:28 to 03:37 UTC
      ~ $234K

Why each step worked

    • Rounding in single-asset join mathpays out more than the deposit is worth
    • Deprecated pools left openold pools still held value
    • No wind-down of legacy poolsmissing controlliquidity was never moved out
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
Starting about 02:28 UTC, the attacker targeted legacy V1 pools whose reserve of one token was nearly empty.
2.
The attacker used the single-asset join, where rounding in the math gave the attacker more pool value than the deposit was worth.
3.
Five attack transactions between 02:28 and 03:37 UTC drained five legacy V1 pools, now left holding dust.
4.
Balancer told V1 liquidity providers to exit their positions.

Root cause

Balancer V1 pools price a single-asset join with fixed-point math that rounds at each step. As the cited reports describe it, when a pool has a near-empty reserve, that rounding becomes large relative to the reserve, and the join can hand back more value than was put in. Repeating the operation drains what is left. The flaw is in the original V1 design, which predates the later versions. The pools were old and mostly forgotten, but they could still hold value, so anyone could use the flaw without any special access.

Prevention analysis

Round in the pool's favour

Rounding that always favours the pool would have returned less than the deposit was worth, making the operation unprofitable.

Minimum reserve checks on joins

Refusing single-asset joins on near-empty reserves would have removed the condition the attack needed.

Wind down legacy pools

Moving liquidity out of deprecated pools would have left little to take.

Similar incidents

Balancer V1 copycat (2026)

A second attacker repeated the same class of rounding attack on more V1 pools six days after this incident was public.

Remediation

1.Balancer told V1 liquidity providers to exit, per The Defiant.
2.Liquidity providers in any V1 pool should withdraw now, since deprecated pools may still be open.
3.AMM teams with deprecated pool contracts should drain or shut them down rather than leave them live.

Timeline

2026-08-31First of five attack transactions on legacy V1 pools.
2026-08-31Last of the five attack transactions.
SlowMist
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