Balancer V1
Why it happened
Attack class: Precision loss / roundingRounding in the single-asset join paid out more than was deposited when a pool's reserve was nearly empty.
What would have stopped it
- Round in the pool's favour
- Minimum reserve checks on joins
What the score saw
Our pre-hack assessment of Balancer covered the current versions and counted the age of the first version as a strength. It did not examine the first version's single-asset join math, so this old attack surface was not assessed.
Score dimensions
- Maturitymissed
An attacker took about $234,000 from five legacy Balancer V1 pools on Ethereum in five transactions between 02:28 and 03:37 UTC on August 31. The pools rounded the math for single-asset deposits in a way that paid out too much when a pool's reserve was nearly empty. The five pools are now holding dust. Balancer told V1 liquidity providers to exit, and anyone still in a V1 pool should withdraw.
Per SlowMist and The Defiant, the attacker used rounding in the V1 single-asset join to drain five legacy pools in five transactions between 02:28 and 03:37 UTC.
Attack flow
All 4 on-chain stepsThe attack in 2 steps. Step 1, Root control: Five legacy V1 pools (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker (exit), about $234K reached this step.
Step 1: Root control
- SourceFive legacy V1 poolsnear-empty reserve~ $234K total
Step 2: Drain
- ExitAttackerfive transactions, 02:28 to 03:37 UTC~ $234K
Why each step worked
- Rounding in single-asset join mathpays out more than the deposit is worth
- Deprecated pools left openold pools still held value
- No wind-down of legacy poolsmissing controlliquidity was never moved out
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
Balancer V1 pools price a single-asset join with fixed-point math that rounds at each step. As the cited reports describe it, when a pool has a near-empty reserve, that rounding becomes large relative to the reserve, and the join can hand back more value than was put in. Repeating the operation drains what is left. The flaw is in the original V1 design, which predates the later versions. The pools were old and mostly forgotten, but they could still hold value, so anyone could use the flaw without any special access.
Prevention analysis
Rounding that always favours the pool would have returned less than the deposit was worth, making the operation unprofitable.
Refusing single-asset joins on near-empty reserves would have removed the condition the attack needed.
Moving liquidity out of deprecated pools would have left little to take.
Similar incidents
A second attacker repeated the same class of rounding attack on more V1 pools six days after this incident was public.
Remediation
Timeline
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