BonkDAO
Why it happened
Attack class: Governance attackProposal 76 passed on a low quorum and ran with no timelock, so a bought majority moved the treasury at once.
What would have stopped it
- Timelock between approval and execution
- Higher quorum and a turnout floor
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored BonkDAO before this exploit.
An attacker bought about $4.4 million of BONK, enough to meet the DAO's low quorum, and passed proposal 76, which sent 4.43 trillion BONK, about $20 million, out of the BonkDAO treasury. The proposal was described as a reward for yes voters but contained a hidden transfer clause, and with no timelock it executed as soon as voting closed. Holders' own wallets were not affected. Some tokens went to an exchange and the rest to an attacker-linked multisig, and exchanges paused BONK transfers. No contract bug was involved. Observers such as SlowMist's Yu Xian argued it was a bought vote rather than a hack.
The attacker bought BONK on centralized exchanges, then used it to pass proposal 76 in the DAO's governance vote. The proposal's text promised a reward to yes voters while a clause transferred 4.43 trillion BONK from the treasury to an attacker-controlled address. With no timelock, the transfer executed as soon as voting ended, per Halborn.
Attack flow
All 4 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Attacker buys votes (attacker). Step 2, Proposal: Proposal 76 executes (hub), about $20M reached this step. Step 3, Cash-out: Attacker multisig and exchange (exit).
Step 1: Root control
- AttackerAttacker buys votesabout $4.4M of BONK boughton centralized exchanges
Step 2: Proposal
- HubProposal 76 executes4.43T BONK leaves the treasury~ $20M
Step 3: Cash-out
- ExitAttacker multisig and exchangeabout $188K sent to an exchangerest moved to a multisig
Why each step worked
- Low quorumyes votes of about 1% of supply were enough
- Low turnoutattacker held about 99.88% of votes cast
- No timelockmissing controlexecuted as soon as voting closed
- Misleading descriptionframed as a reward for yes voters
- No chance to freezemissing controlno delay between approval and transfer
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
BonkDAO let a token vote move the whole treasury with almost no friction. A proposal needed yes votes equal to only about 1% of BONK supply to pass, and no timelock sat between a passed vote and execution. Because turnout was low, an attacker who spent about $4.4 million on BONK held roughly 99.88% of the votes cast and could approve a proposal alone. The proposal's text described a reward for yes voters while a clause in it transferred 4.43 trillion BONK, worth about $20 million, out of the treasury. No contract bug and no stolen key was involved, per Halborn and Blockhead coverage. The treasury was exposed by its governance settings, and a delay or a higher quorum would have given the community time to notice the hidden transfer.
Prevention analysis
A delay of a day or more would have let holders and the team spot the hidden transfer and cancel it before any tokens moved.
A quorum of about 1% of supply could be bought for a few million dollars. A higher bar would have raised the attack's cost well above what it could take.
Capping what one proposal can move, or holding the treasury in a multisig with veto power, would have kept a single vote from emptying it.
Similar incidents
An attacker borrowed enough voting power to pass a proposal that sent out the treasury in a single step, with no meaningful delay.
Another 2026 incident where governance control, not a code bug, gave an attacker access to funds.
Remediation
Timeline
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