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BonkDAO

July 6, 2026·Solana·Governance Attack
$20.0M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Governance attack

Proposal 76 passed on a low quorum and ran with no timelock, so a bought majority moved the treasury at once.

What would have stopped it

  • Timelock between approval and execution
  • Higher quorum and a turnout floor

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored BonkDAO before this exploit.

An attacker bought about $4.4 million of BONK, enough to meet the DAO's low quorum, and passed proposal 76, which sent 4.43 trillion BONK, about $20 million, out of the BonkDAO treasury. The proposal was described as a reward for yes voters but contained a hidden transfer clause, and with no timelock it executed as soon as voting closed. Holders' own wallets were not affected. Some tokens went to an exchange and the rest to an attacker-linked multisig, and exchanges paused BONK transfers. No contract bug was involved. Observers such as SlowMist's Yu Xian argued it was a bought vote rather than a hack.

BONK holders' own walletssafe
Solana networksafe(no base-layer exploit)
BonkDAO treasurydrained(about $20 million in BONK)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker bought BONK on centralized exchanges, then used it to pass proposal 76 in the DAO's governance vote. The proposal's text promised a reward to yes voters while a clause transferred 4.43 trillion BONK from the treasury to an attacker-controlled address. With no timelock, the transfer executed as soon as voting ended, per Halborn.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Attacker buys votes (attacker). Step 2, Proposal: Proposal 76 executes (hub), about $20M reached this step. Step 3, Cash-out: Attacker multisig and exchange (exit).

  1. Step 1: Root control

    • Attacker
      Attacker buys votes
      about $4.4M of BONK bought
      on centralized exchanges
  2. Step 2: Proposal

    • Hub
      Proposal 76 executes
      4.43T BONK leaves the treasury
      ~ $20M
  3. Step 3: Cash-out

    • Exit
      Attacker multisig and exchange
      about $188K sent to an exchange
      rest moved to a multisig

Why each step worked

    • Low quorumyes votes of about 1% of supply were enough
    • Low turnoutattacker held about 99.88% of votes cast
    • No timelockmissing controlexecuted as soon as voting closed
    • Misleading descriptionframed as a reward for yes voters
    • No chance to freezemissing controlno delay between approval and transfer
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
The attacker bought about $4.4 million of BONK on centralized exchanges, enough to meet the DAO's quorum of roughly 1% of supply, as reported by Halborn.
2.
The attacker submitted proposal 76 on June 30, described as a reward for yes voters, with a hidden clause moving 4.43 trillion BONK from the treasury to an attacker-controlled address.
3.
Turnout was low, so the attacker's tokens made up about 99.88% of the votes cast and the proposal passed after the voting period.
4.
With no timelock, the proposal executed as soon as voting closed and about $20 million of BONK moved to the attacker, with no window for the team to freeze it.

Root cause

BonkDAO let a token vote move the whole treasury with almost no friction. A proposal needed yes votes equal to only about 1% of BONK supply to pass, and no timelock sat between a passed vote and execution. Because turnout was low, an attacker who spent about $4.4 million on BONK held roughly 99.88% of the votes cast and could approve a proposal alone. The proposal's text described a reward for yes voters while a clause in it transferred 4.43 trillion BONK, worth about $20 million, out of the treasury. No contract bug and no stolen key was involved, per Halborn and Blockhead coverage. The treasury was exposed by its governance settings, and a delay or a higher quorum would have given the community time to notice the hidden transfer.

Prevention analysis

Timelock between approval and execution

A delay of a day or more would have let holders and the team spot the hidden transfer and cancel it before any tokens moved.

Higher quorum and a turnout floor

A quorum of about 1% of supply could be bought for a few million dollars. A higher bar would have raised the attack's cost well above what it could take.

Treasury limits per proposal

Capping what one proposal can move, or holding the treasury in a multisig with veto power, would have kept a single vote from emptying it.

Similar incidents

Beanstalk (2022)

An attacker borrowed enough voting power to pass a proposal that sent out the treasury in a single step, with no meaningful delay.

Drop on Astroport (2026)

Another 2026 incident where governance control, not a code bug, gave an attacker access to funds.

Remediation

1.BonkDAO said it was working with exchanges, bridges and the Solana Foundation on the fallout and had notified law enforcement, per press coverage.
2.Other DAOs should add a timelock, set quorum against realistic token prices, and cap what a single proposal can move.

Timeline

2026-06-30Proposal 76 is submitted for a six day vote, per Halborn.
2026-07-06Voting closes, proposal 76 executes and 4.43 trillion BONK leaves the treasury.
2026-07-07Upbit and Kraken pause BONK deposits and withdrawals and BonkDAO says it has notified law enforcement, per press reports.
Halborn. Blockhead. SolanaFloor
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