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Hacks feed/Bonzo Lend

Bonzo Lend

July 11, 2026·Hedera·Oracle Manipulation
$9.1M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Oracle manipulation

A forged price update with an all-zero signature passed Supra's verifier, so a few dollars of SAUCE counted as millions in collateral.

What would have stopped it

  • Add a second independent price source for every collateral asset
  • Cap or sanity-check price jumps before they are used for borrowing

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Bonzo Lend before this exploit.

On July 11, 2026 an attacker drained about $9.05 million of USDC and wrapped HBAR from Bonzo Lend, the largest lending market on Hedera. They posted about $3 of SAUCE as collateral, then fed the market a forged SAUCE price that Supra's price verifier accepted without a valid signature. Bonzo's own lending code worked as designed. Bonzo Vaults, the bridge and staking were not affected, and the stolen funds were bridged to Ethereum and sent to a mixer. The Bonzo Finance Foundation has said it will fund recovery for affected positions.

Bonzo Vaultssafe
Bridge and staking productssafe
Bonzo Lend core contractssafe(worked as designed; the bad price came from the verifier)
Bonzo Lend USDC and WHBAR liquiditydrained(about $9.05 million borrowed out)
Bonzo Lend depositorsdrained(withdrawals paused pending recovery)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker used a Hedera account (alias attacker wallet) to deposit about $3 of SAUCE into Bonzo Lend, then submitted a forged price for SAUCE to Supra's pull-oracle contract with an all-zero signature and public key. Supra's verifier accepted it, so Bonzo's price adapter read a SAUCE price about twelve orders of magnitude too high. The attacker borrowed about 6.63 million USDC and 34.5 million WHBAR against it within seconds. The funds were later consolidated on Ethereum at this address.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Forged price: Supra price update (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker wallet (attacker), about $9.05M reached this step. Step 3, Exit: Tornado Cash (exit).

  1. Step 1: Forged price

    • Source
      Supra price update
      all-zero signature accepted
      SAUCE price off by 12 orders
  2. Step 2: Drain

  3. Step 3: Exit

    • Exit
      Tornado Cash
      via Base, Arbitrum, Ethereum
      per QuillAudits

Why each step worked

    • Verifier skipped zero checksempty signature and key pass the pairing check
    • No second source for SAUCE or WHBARmissing controlno fallback feed
    • About $3 of collateral250 SAUCE at the forged price
    • No price-jump limitmissing controlborrow allowed at any reported price
    • Bounty excluded third-party contractsmissing controlthe verifier was out of scope
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
At 00:39 UTC on July 11 the attacker account deposited 250 SAUCE tokens, worth about $3, into Bonzo Lend as collateral. Hedera account 0.0.10633526 (EVM alias in the contract field) was used.
2.
At 00:51 UTC the attacker submitted a price update for the SAUCE/WHBAR pair to Supra's pull-oracle contract, carrying an all-zero signature and an all-zero public key. Supra's verifier accepted it and the on-chain SAUCE price became about twelve orders of magnitude too high, against a market price near 0.2 HBAR. Hedera transaction ID 0.0.995584-1783731093-686041919.
3.
Seconds later the same account borrowed about 6.63 million USDC and 34.5 million wrapped HBAR against the 250 SAUCE, valued at the forged price. Bonzo's headline loss is about $9.05 million.
4.
A second account that later identified itself as a white-hat responder also borrowed about $1 million while the bad price stood. Bonzo excluded that from its headline figure. At 01:36 UTC Supra's next scheduled price publication overwrote the forged value, and Bonzo paused Bonzo Lend at 01:41 UTC.
5.
Per QuillAudits, the stolen funds were bridged off Hedera to Base and Arbitrum through Stargate and Across, consolidated on Ethereum, and deposited into Tornado Cash.

Root cause

Bonzo Lend trusted a third-party price feed, and that feed's on-chain verifier could be fooled. Per Bonzo's preliminary incident report and the QuillAudits analysis, Supra's verifier accepted a price update whose signature and public key were both the all-zero placeholder value. The signature check is a pairing calculation, and with both inputs zeroed it returns true without proving anyone authorised the update. An out-of-range committee identifier returned an empty key instead of being rejected, and the verifier did not require the signature and key to be non-zero and valid before running the check. Bonzo's own lending contracts did what they were built to do: they read the price and honoured it. Two design choices in Bonzo made a single bad price fatal. SAUCE and WHBAR had no second price source to cross-check against, while HBAR and USDC had a fallback feed, and Bonzo's bug bounty excluded third-party contracts, so the verifier sat outside its scope. The attacker needed no signing key, no flash loan and only about $3 of collateral. Supra has since patched the verifier with range checks and rejection of zero or off-curve inputs, per its own report.

Prevention analysis

Add a second independent price source for every collateral asset

SAUCE and WHBAR had no fallback feed. A cross-check against a second provider would have flagged a price twelve orders of magnitude off and rejected the update.

Cap or sanity-check price jumps before they are used for borrowing

A circuit breaker on how far a collateral price can move in one update would have stopped a forged value from supporting millions in loans.

Extend the bug bounty to the third-party verifier contracts the lending market depends on

Bonzo's bounty excluded third-party contracts. Covering the verifier would have given researchers a reason to report the missing zero check before an attacker used it.

Similar incidents

Nostra Money Market (2026)

A manipulated price for a thinly traded token reached the lending market's price feed and was accepted as collateral value, with no second source to reject it.

Moonwell (2026)

An illiquid collateral token was given an inflated price and borrowed against until the lending market held bad debt.

Mango Markets (2022)

A single price input for a low-liquidity asset was pushed up and used as collateral to drain the lending pool.

Remediation

1.Supra deployed a patched verifier on Hedera mainnet that validates ranges and rejects zero or off-curve inputs, per Bonzo and Supra.done
2.Bonzo paused Bonzo Lend and Bonzo Points. Per QuillAudits, the Bonzo Finance Foundation announced on July 16 that it will fund recovery of affected positions, backed by a Hedera Foundation recovery facility.
3.Other lending markets that use a pull-style price feed should confirm their provider's verifier rejects empty signatures, add a fallback feed for every collateral asset, and bound how fast a collateral price can change.

Timeline

2026-07-11Attacker deposits 250 SAUCE as collateral.
2026-07-11Forged SAUCE price update is accepted by Supra's verifier.
2026-07-11Attacker borrows about 6.63 million USDC, then about 34.5 million WHBAR seconds later.
2026-07-11Supra's scheduled update restores SAUCE to its market price.
2026-07-11Bonzo pauses Bonzo Lend.
2026-07-16Per QuillAudits, the Bonzo Finance Foundation says it will fund recovery of affected positions.
Bonzo Finance team (preliminary incident report). Supra (verifier fix and report). QuillAudits (analysis)
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