Bonzo Lend
Why it happened
Attack class: Oracle manipulationA forged price update with an all-zero signature passed Supra's verifier, so a few dollars of SAUCE counted as millions in collateral.
What would have stopped it
- Add a second independent price source for every collateral asset
- Cap or sanity-check price jumps before they are used for borrowing
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored Bonzo Lend before this exploit.
On July 11, 2026 an attacker drained about $9.05 million of USDC and wrapped HBAR from Bonzo Lend, the largest lending market on Hedera. They posted about $3 of SAUCE as collateral, then fed the market a forged SAUCE price that Supra's price verifier accepted without a valid signature. Bonzo's own lending code worked as designed. Bonzo Vaults, the bridge and staking were not affected, and the stolen funds were bridged to Ethereum and sent to a mixer. The Bonzo Finance Foundation has said it will fund recovery for affected positions.
The attacker used a Hedera account (alias attacker wallet) to deposit about $3 of SAUCE into Bonzo Lend, then submitted a forged price for SAUCE to Supra's pull-oracle contract with an all-zero signature and public key. Supra's verifier accepted it, so Bonzo's price adapter read a SAUCE price about twelve orders of magnitude too high. The attacker borrowed about 6.63 million USDC and 34.5 million WHBAR against it within seconds. The funds were later consolidated on Ethereum at this address.
Attack flow
All 5 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Forged price: Supra price update (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker wallet (attacker), about $9.05M reached this step. Step 3, Exit: Tornado Cash (exit).
Step 1: Forged price
- SourceSupra price updateall-zero signature acceptedSAUCE price off by 12 orders
Step 2: Drain
- AttackerAttacker walletborrows 6.63M USDCand 34.5M WHBAR0x9a496615...d6a494
Step 3: Exit
- ExitTornado Cashvia Base, Arbitrum, Ethereumper QuillAudits
Why each step worked
- Verifier skipped zero checksempty signature and key pass the pairing check
- No second source for SAUCE or WHBARmissing controlno fallback feed
- About $3 of collateral250 SAUCE at the forged price
- No price-jump limitmissing controlborrow allowed at any reported price
- Bounty excluded third-party contractsmissing controlthe verifier was out of scope
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
Bonzo Lend trusted a third-party price feed, and that feed's on-chain verifier could be fooled. Per Bonzo's preliminary incident report and the QuillAudits analysis, Supra's verifier accepted a price update whose signature and public key were both the all-zero placeholder value. The signature check is a pairing calculation, and with both inputs zeroed it returns true without proving anyone authorised the update. An out-of-range committee identifier returned an empty key instead of being rejected, and the verifier did not require the signature and key to be non-zero and valid before running the check. Bonzo's own lending contracts did what they were built to do: they read the price and honoured it. Two design choices in Bonzo made a single bad price fatal. SAUCE and WHBAR had no second price source to cross-check against, while HBAR and USDC had a fallback feed, and Bonzo's bug bounty excluded third-party contracts, so the verifier sat outside its scope. The attacker needed no signing key, no flash loan and only about $3 of collateral. Supra has since patched the verifier with range checks and rejection of zero or off-curve inputs, per its own report.
Prevention analysis
SAUCE and WHBAR had no fallback feed. A cross-check against a second provider would have flagged a price twelve orders of magnitude off and rejected the update.
A circuit breaker on how far a collateral price can move in one update would have stopped a forged value from supporting millions in loans.
Bonzo's bounty excluded third-party contracts. Covering the verifier would have given researchers a reason to report the missing zero check before an attacker used it.
Similar incidents
A manipulated price for a thinly traded token reached the lending market's price feed and was accepted as collateral value, with no second source to reject it.
An illiquid collateral token was given an inflated price and borrowed against until the lending market held bad debt.
A single price input for a low-liquidity asset was pushed up and used as collateral to drain the lending pool.
Remediation
Timeline
Get your protocol scored across 12 dimensions, or request ongoing coverage.