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BounceBit Chain

August 19, 2026·BounceBit·Access Control
$3.0M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Access control

An inherited Evmos vesting feature let a contract name another account as the funding source while checking authorization against the wrong account.

What would have stopped it

  • Check authorization against the account that is actually debited
  • Track and merge upstream security fixes in forked chain code

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored BounceBit Chain before this exploit.

An attacker moved about 286.5 million BB, worth roughly $3 million, out of nine accounts on BounceBit Chain on August 19 and 20 without holding any of their keys. A vesting and lockup feature the chain inherited from the Evmos stack let a smart contract name someone else's account as the source of funds without checking that the account had agreed. BounceBit halted the chain, retired it for good and reissued BB on BNB Chain from a snapshot taken just before the first theft, so the moved tokens do not exist in the new supply; its CeDeFi, Prime, vault and real-world asset products were not affected. Most of the moved BB was sent to deposit addresses at two exchanges, which BounceBit asked to freeze.

CeDeFi, Prime and vault productssafe(run mostly on BNB Chain, not affected)
Holder balances in the reissued BBsafe(restored from the pre-exploit snapshot)
Nine BounceBit Chain accountsdrained(286.5M BB, about $3 million, moved)
BounceBit Chain itselfdrained(halted and permanently retired)
Exchanges that credited the moved BBunknown(freeze requests sent, outcome not published)
Exploit anatomy

Through contracts calling an inherited Evmos vesting feature, the attacker named nine other accounts as funding sources and moved 286,543,148 BB out of them in 14 transactions, most of it to exchange deposit addresses. BounceBit retired the chain and reissued BB on BNB Chain as the new BEP-20 BB token, with balances taken from the pre-exploit snapshot and the moved BB left out.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Nine BounceBit Chain accounts (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker accounts and contracts (attacker), about $3M reached this step. Step 3, Exchanges: Exchange deposit addresses (exit), Consolidated attacker address (exit), about $2.76M reached this step.

  1. Step 1: Root control

    • Source
      Nine BounceBit Chain accounts
      286,543,148 BB
      ~ $3.0M
  2. Step 2: Drain

    • Attacker
      Attacker accounts and contracts
      14 transactions over about 5 hours
      two accounts, 15 contracts
  3. Step 3: Exchanges

    • Exit
      Exchange deposit addresses
      about 254M BB to one exchange
      almost 10M BB to another
    • Exit
      Consolidated attacker address
      about 18.5M BB
      stranded on the halted chain

Why each step worked

    • Funding-account check on the wrong accountinherited Evmos vesting feature let a caller name any account as the source
    • Unmaintained upstream codeEvmos fixed a matching flaw in 2024 and stopped maintenance in May 2026
    • No automated halt on abnormal debitsmissing controlchain stopped 42 minutes after the last transfer
    • No outflow limit on native transfersmissing controlnothing slowed large transfers from dormant accounts
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
Starting just after block 20,697,260 (21:02:35 UTC on August 19), the attacker's contracts called a vesting and lockup feature in a native module that BounceBit Chain inherited from the Evmos stack. Per BounceBit, the module let the caller name another account as the source of funds and did not check that the debited account had authorized it.
2.
Over 14 transactions ending at 01:54 UTC on August 20, the attacker moved 286,543,148 BB, about $3 million, out of nine mainnet accounts it did not control. BounceBit says no private key was stolen and no signature was forged.
3.
The attacker consolidated the BB and sent most of it to exchange deposit addresses: about 254 million BB to one major exchange and almost 10 million BB to a second, with about 18.5 million BB left in a consolidated address, per Protos. BounceBit asked the exchanges to freeze the specific deposit addresses involved.
4.
Block production stopped at block 20,702,857 at 02:36:37 UTC on August 20, about 42 minutes after the last unauthorized transfer.
5.
BounceBit retired the chain and reissued BB as a BEP-20 token on BNB Chain from the snapshot at block 20,697,260, which excludes every BB moved in the exploit. The public RPC and explorer now end at that snapshot block, so the exploit transactions are no longer publicly viewable.

Root cause

BounceBit Chain was an Evmos-based Layer 1, so a set of native modules, including one that creates and funds vesting and lockup accounts, came from the Evmos codebase. Per BounceBit's incident account, that feature let a smart contract caller name a different account as the source of funds, and the authorization check ran against the wrong account rather than the one being debited. The attacker needed no stolen key, no forged signature and no help from any account holder: calling the feature from contracts was enough to pull BB out of nine accounts in 14 transactions. BounceBit's description matches, point for point, a vesting funder authorization flaw that Evmos rated critical and fixed in its own code in July 2024; BounceBit has not said whether its fork carried that fix. Because Evmos stopped maintaining the stack in May 2026, BounceBit judged that moving its fork to a patched successor would not be a conventional upgrade and retired the chain instead. This is a different bug from the Cosmos EVM balance underflow that drained TAC, KiiChain and Nesa days later, but it sits in the same weak spot: vesting-account logic reachable from the EVM side that guarded other accounts' balances with a single check.

Prevention analysis

Check authorization against the account that is actually debited

If the vesting feature had required approval from the funding account rather than the caller, naming someone else's account as the source would have failed and none of the nine accounts could have been touched.

Track and merge upstream security fixes in forked chain code

Evmos published a critical fix for a funder authorization flaw of this exact description in 2024. A fork that tracks upstream advisories closes that gap long before an attacker finds it.

Restrict who can create or fund vesting accounts

Vesting accounts are a niche feature on most chains. Limiting their creation to genesis or governance removes the path the attacker used.

Automated halt on abnormal balance movement

The transfers ran for close to five hours before the chain stopped. A monitor that halts on large unexplained debits from dormant accounts would have cut the loss after the first transaction.

Similar incidents

TAC (2026)

Three days later an attacker moved TAC's entire staking pool through vesting-account logic in the shared Cosmos EVM module. A different bug, but the same family: EVM-reachable vesting code that let real tokens leave accounts the attacker did not own.

KiiChain (2026)

An attacker turned a contract address into a vesting account and drained 18 wallets on KiiChain. Same family of EVM-to-Cosmos vesting accounting flaws, no key compromise.

Nesa (2026)

Nesa confirmed a Cosmos EVM vulnerability exploited on its chain in the same week, with the stolen NES bridged out to Ethereum. Same vesting-account attack surface.

Remediation

1.BounceBit halted block production at block 20,702,857 and decided not to restart or upgrade the chain, citing the end of upstream Evmos maintenance.
2.BounceBit reissued BB as a BEP-20 token on BNB Chain from the pre-exploit snapshot at block 20,697,260, with the 286,543,148 BB moved in the exploit excluded; Bitget reported a completed 1:1 contract swap on September 2.
3.BounceBit submitted freeze and assistance requests to the exchanges that received the moved BB, and worked with them to correct customer balances.
4.Other chains built on older Evmos code should confirm their vesting and lockup functions check authorization against the debited account, and disable permissionless vesting account creation until they have.

Timeline

2024-07-05Evmos publishes a critical advisory for a vesting funder authorization flaw and fixes it in Evmos v19.0.0.
2026-08-19Block 20,697,260 is produced, the last block before the first unauthorized transfer and the later snapshot height.
2026-08-20Last of 14 unauthorized transfers; 286,543,148 BB moved from nine accounts.
2026-08-20Block production stops at block 20,702,857.
2026-08-20BounceBit says it has paused nodes while it deploys a fix and that its CeDeFi app, contracts and vaults are not affected.
2026-08-21BounceBit announces it will retire the chain and reissue BB on BNB Chain from the pre-exploit snapshot.
2026-09-02Bitget reports it has completed the 1:1 BB contract swap and reopened deposits and withdrawals.
BounceBit team (detection, halt and incident account). Protos (exchange flow reporting)
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