BounceBit Chain
Why it happened
Attack class: Access controlAn inherited Evmos vesting feature let a contract name another account as the funding source while checking authorization against the wrong account.
What would have stopped it
- Check authorization against the account that is actually debited
- Track and merge upstream security fixes in forked chain code
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored BounceBit Chain before this exploit.
An attacker moved about 286.5 million BB, worth roughly $3 million, out of nine accounts on BounceBit Chain on August 19 and 20 without holding any of their keys. A vesting and lockup feature the chain inherited from the Evmos stack let a smart contract name someone else's account as the source of funds without checking that the account had agreed. BounceBit halted the chain, retired it for good and reissued BB on BNB Chain from a snapshot taken just before the first theft, so the moved tokens do not exist in the new supply; its CeDeFi, Prime, vault and real-world asset products were not affected. Most of the moved BB was sent to deposit addresses at two exchanges, which BounceBit asked to freeze.
Through contracts calling an inherited Evmos vesting feature, the attacker named nine other accounts as funding sources and moved 286,543,148 BB out of them in 14 transactions, most of it to exchange deposit addresses. BounceBit retired the chain and reissued BB on BNB Chain as the new BEP-20 BB token, with balances taken from the pre-exploit snapshot and the moved BB left out.
Attack flow
All 5 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Nine BounceBit Chain accounts (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker accounts and contracts (attacker), about $3M reached this step. Step 3, Exchanges: Exchange deposit addresses (exit), Consolidated attacker address (exit), about $2.76M reached this step.
Step 1: Root control
- SourceNine BounceBit Chain accounts286,543,148 BB~ $3.0M
Step 2: Drain
- AttackerAttacker accounts and contracts14 transactions over about 5 hourstwo accounts, 15 contracts
Step 3: Exchanges
- ExitExchange deposit addressesabout 254M BB to one exchangealmost 10M BB to another
- ExitConsolidated attacker addressabout 18.5M BBstranded on the halted chain
Why each step worked
- Funding-account check on the wrong accountinherited Evmos vesting feature let a caller name any account as the source
- Unmaintained upstream codeEvmos fixed a matching flaw in 2024 and stopped maintenance in May 2026
- No automated halt on abnormal debitsmissing controlchain stopped 42 minutes after the last transfer
- No outflow limit on native transfersmissing controlnothing slowed large transfers from dormant accounts
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
BounceBit Chain was an Evmos-based Layer 1, so a set of native modules, including one that creates and funds vesting and lockup accounts, came from the Evmos codebase. Per BounceBit's incident account, that feature let a smart contract caller name a different account as the source of funds, and the authorization check ran against the wrong account rather than the one being debited. The attacker needed no stolen key, no forged signature and no help from any account holder: calling the feature from contracts was enough to pull BB out of nine accounts in 14 transactions. BounceBit's description matches, point for point, a vesting funder authorization flaw that Evmos rated critical and fixed in its own code in July 2024; BounceBit has not said whether its fork carried that fix. Because Evmos stopped maintaining the stack in May 2026, BounceBit judged that moving its fork to a patched successor would not be a conventional upgrade and retired the chain instead. This is a different bug from the Cosmos EVM balance underflow that drained TAC, KiiChain and Nesa days later, but it sits in the same weak spot: vesting-account logic reachable from the EVM side that guarded other accounts' balances with a single check.
Prevention analysis
If the vesting feature had required approval from the funding account rather than the caller, naming someone else's account as the source would have failed and none of the nine accounts could have been touched.
Evmos published a critical fix for a funder authorization flaw of this exact description in 2024. A fork that tracks upstream advisories closes that gap long before an attacker finds it.
Vesting accounts are a niche feature on most chains. Limiting their creation to genesis or governance removes the path the attacker used.
The transfers ran for close to five hours before the chain stopped. A monitor that halts on large unexplained debits from dormant accounts would have cut the loss after the first transaction.
Similar incidents
Three days later an attacker moved TAC's entire staking pool through vesting-account logic in the shared Cosmos EVM module. A different bug, but the same family: EVM-reachable vesting code that let real tokens leave accounts the attacker did not own.
An attacker turned a contract address into a vesting account and drained 18 wallets on KiiChain. Same family of EVM-to-Cosmos vesting accounting flaws, no key compromise.
Nesa confirmed a Cosmos EVM vulnerability exploited on its chain in the same week, with the stolen NES bridged out to Ethereum. Same vesting-account attack surface.
Remediation
Timeline
Get your protocol scored across 12 dimensions, or request ongoing coverage.