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Cascade

July 15, 2026·Arbitrum·Price Manipulation
$1.3M
total loss
Statusrecovered

Why it happened

Attack class: Oracle manipulation

The attackers held the other side of the vault's shorts, pushed the mark price of thin markets up, and the vault was liquidated into their longs through auto-deleveraging.

What would have stopped it

  • Anchor the mark price to an external index, not the thin internal book.
  • Cap open interest per account and per market relative to real liquidity.

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Cascade before this exploit.

Attackers on Cascade, a perpetuals exchange on Arbitrum, built long positions in thin markets where the platform's own CLS liquidity vault held the short side, then pushed the mark price up until the vault's positions were liquidated against them. About 1.34 million USDC of vault money was booked to the attackers and withdrawn the same evening, then bridged through Solana and back to Ethereum as DAI. The loss fell on CLS depositors; nobody's wallet keys or approvals were involved. The attackers returned the funds ten days later, Cascade made CLS depositors 100 percent whole, and in September the company announced it was shutting down.

Wallet keys and token approvalssafe
Smart contract codesafe(no contract bug; the attack worked through market prices)
CLS depositor balancessafe(funds returned July 25; depositors made 100 percent whole)
CLS vaultdrained(about $1.34 million liquidated to the attackers)
Cascade platformdrained(ceased operations in September 2026)
Exploit anatomy

After the mark price was pushed up and the vault's positions were liquidated, the attacker pulled 1.34 million USDC from Cascade's withdrawal contract in one transaction to its wallet, moved it through a relay wallet into the Relay bridge, and later returned the funds to Cascade's recovery multisig.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: CLS vault positions (source). Step 2, Liquidate + withdraw: Cascade withdrawal contract (hub), Attacker wallet (attacker), about $1.34M reached this step. Step 3, Bridge + return: Relay bridge depository (bridge), Cascade recovery multisig (exit).

  1. Step 1: Root control

    • Source
      CLS vault positions
      main maker in thin markets
      short where the attackers were long
  2. Step 2: Liquidate + withdraw

    • Hub
      Cascade withdrawal contract
      vault shorts liquidated, longs deleveraged
      1.34M USDC paid at 22:34 UTC
      0x6b01ca28...be99ec
    • Attacker
      Attacker wallet
      receives the USDC
      about 90 minutes after depositing
      0x285996ba...0d9b55
  3. Step 3: Bridge + return

Why each step worked

    • Mark price set by a thin internal bookthe attackers could move the price that judged the vault
    • No open interest cap against the vaultmissing controltwo accounts built positions large enough to matter
    • No hold on fresh deleveraging profitmissing controlwithdrawal cleared at once for a brand-new account
    • Invite chain and exchange trailSEAL 911 traced activity to Polymarket and Binance
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
In Cascade's thinly traded perpetual markets, most resting orders came from the Cascade Liquidity Strategy (CLS) vault, which held pre-allocated deposits from the invite-only First Wave campaign. Two attacker accounts, which joined through the platform's invite chain and deposited funds at about 21:08 UTC on July 15, built long positions in those markets while CLS held the opposite short side.
2.
The attackers pushed the mark price of those thin markets upward. Measured against the inflated mark, the vault's short positions were liquidated or closed out, and because the attackers held the other side, their longs were auto-deleveraged and closed at the high mark price. Cascade put the resulting liquidations at about $1.34 million.
3.
At 22:34:15 UTC the attacker withdrew 1,343,921.82 USDC from Cascade's withdrawal contract to the wallet 0x285996ba0b464f841d3a63e88c7cc319d70d9b55, in a smart-account transaction bundled through the standard account-abstraction entry point.
0x6b01ca28...be99echandleOps((address,uint256,bytes,bytes,bytes32,uint256,bytes32,bytes,bytes)[],address)tx:0xcd801d24...578314
4.
Within eight minutes the wallet forwarded the USDC in five transfers to a second address, 0x5fa1fa848d25e2b65664869c2819db5e26b72cef, which deposited it into the Relay bridge depository in four deposits between 22:40 and 22:42 UTC. PeckShield traced the funds to Solana and then back to Ethereum through Relay, where they were swapped into DAI.
0x4cd00e38...38bc31depositErc20(address,address,uint256,bytes32)tx:0x37b92861...2e4535
5.
Cascade paused all trading and withdrawals and brought in SEAL 911, which traced the attackers' on-chain activity to Polymarket and Binance and flagged the theft wallets with exchanges. Cascade also reported the accounts and their invite chain to law enforcement.
6.
On July 25 the attackers returned the funds. About 1.22 million USDC reached Cascade's recovery multisig 0x8074583b0f9cfa345405320119d4b6937c152304 in seven transfers from the wallet 0x85841febc0e469f89d64f5848c2cde21efcec206, and Cascade said every CLS depositor would get back 100 percent of their value as of 21:08 UTC on July 15.

Root cause

The CLS vault was both the main liquidity provider in Cascade's thin markets and a leveraged counterparty in them, and the price used to judge its solvency was a mark price that could be moved inside those same thin markets. That combination let a trader who held the other side of the vault's positions also move the price that decided whether the vault was liquidated. Per Cascade's disclosure, the attackers accumulated longs where CLS was short, pushed the mark price up, and the vault's shorts were liquidated or closed out while the attackers' longs were auto-deleveraged at the inflated mark, turning the price move into about $1.34 million of realized profit that was withdrawn about 90 minutes after the attackers deposited. No contract was hacked, no key was stolen and no flash loan was used; the failure was market design. There was no cap on how much open interest one account could build against the vault in an illiquid market, no reference index outside the thin order book to anchor the mark price, and no hold on large, fresh profits from liquidation and deleveraging events before they could be withdrawn. Cascade said it was still investigating the exact mark price mechanism. Analysts had warned depositors in the weeks before, and vault liquidity reportedly fell by more than 95 percent before the attack, which left the remaining markets even thinner.

Prevention analysis

Anchor the mark price to an external index, not the thin internal book.

A mark price built from a median of outside venues, with a cap on how far it can stray from that index, cannot be pushed up by trading in a market where the vault is almost the only maker. The vault's shorts would not have been liquidated at the manipulated level.

Cap open interest per account and per market relative to real liquidity.

The attack needed one or two accounts to hold positions large enough to matter against the vault. Position limits tied to market depth would have kept the attackers' longs, and the profit available from deleveraging them, far smaller.

Hold large withdrawals of fresh liquidation and deleveraging profit for review.

The $1.34 million left about 90 minutes after the attackers deposited. A short delay on withdrawals of newly realized profit from new accounts would have let the team pause before the money was bridged out.

Similar incidents

Mango Markets (2022)

A trader moved the price of a thin market they were positioned in, and the protocol valued their position at the manipulated price and let them withdraw against it. Same root cause: a manipulable mark price used to settle real value.

Hyperliquid JELLY squeeze (2025)

A community liquidity vault inherited a large short in an illiquid perpetual market after an attacker squeezed its price, the same vault-as-counterparty exposure that cost the CLS vault here.

Remediation

1.Cascade paused all trading and withdrawals, engaged SEAL 911 and law enforcement, and released the attackers' invite chain and account details to investigators.done
2.The stolen funds were returned to a Cascade recovery multisig on July 25, 2026, and Cascade released a claim process paying CLS depositors 100 percent of their value as of 21:08 UTC on July 15.done
3.Cascade announced on September 12, 2026 that it was ceasing operations and directed users to claim remaining CLS and trading balances through its official claim portal.
4.Perpetuals venues that run a house liquidity vault should anchor mark prices to external indices, cap open interest in thin markets, and limit how much of the vault can be on one side of a single market.

Timeline

2026-07-15Attacker accounts deposit onto the platform; Cascade later uses this moment as the compensation snapshot.
2026-07-151,343,921.82 USDC withdrawn to the attacker wallet after the mark price manipulation.
2026-07-15Funds start moving into the Relay bridge depository; PeckShield later traces them through Solana to DAI on Ethereum.
2026-07-16Public alerts report the CLS vault loss; Cascade has already paused trading and withdrawals.
2026-07-16Cascade publishes what it knows: thin markets, mark price pushed up, CLS positions liquidated and the attackers' longs deleveraged at the high mark.
2026-07-25Last of seven transfers returning about 1.22 million USDC to Cascade's recovery multisig.
2026-07-25Cascade announces the funds were returned and that CLS depositors will be made 100 percent whole.
2026-09-12Cascade announces it is ceasing operations and opens claims for remaining balances.
Cascade (disclosure). PeckShield (fund tracing). SEAL 911 (tracing and exchange flags)
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