Drop and Astroport (Neutron)
Why it happened
Attack class: Governance attackA bought governance vote used Neutron's power to change any contract's admin.
What would have stopped it
- Bar chain governance from changing the admin of contracts it does not own
- Delay execution of passed proposals
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored Drop and Astroport (Neutron) before this exploit.
An attacker took over ten Astroport, Drop and Neutron contracts by passing Neutron governance proposal 9, after buying the deciding vote with about $20,000 of cheap NTRN, and emptied them of about $6.24 million in ATOM, USDC, DYDX, ASTRO, NTRN and wrapped ETH. No smart contract bug was used: Neutron's governance was allowed to change the admin of any contract and executed the change instantly. Neutron and the Cosmos Hub both halted, and about $4 million (64%) was secured, including 1.23 million ATOM recovered on the Hub, then returned to the drained contracts in October. The unrecovered $2.2 million was sold through THORChain and bridged to Ethereum, where about 794 ETH sits idle.
Using stake bought minutes before the close, the attacker wallet passed proposal 9 through Neutron governance, became admin of contracts such as Astroport Staking and the Drop dATOM converter, swapped in its own code and emptied them, then sent 1.72 million ATOM to its Cosmos Hub address and sold part of it into ETH held in a collection wallet.
Attack flow
All 7 on-chain stepsThe attack in 4 steps. Step 1, Bought vote: Neutron governance, proposal 9 (source). Step 2, Drain: Astroport Staking (source), Drop dATOM converter (source), Attacker wallet on Neutron (attacker), about $6.24M reached this step. Step 3, Bridge out: Attacker Cosmos Hub address (attacker), about $3.02M reached this step. Step 4, Cash out: Ethereum collection wallet (exit), about $2.18M reached this step.
Step 1: Bought vote
- SourceNeutron governance, proposal 911 admin changes, passed 22 Sep31.6M NTRN bought for 20,199 USDCneutron10d...7a68v5
Step 2: Drain
- SourceAstroport Staking370.3M ASTRO~ $75Kneutron1zl...5jgxsn
- SourceDrop dATOM converter1.59M ATOM + 735K dATOM~ $2.78Mneutron150...k4kqj9
- AttackerAttacker wallet on Neutron10 contracts emptied in 26 min~ $6.24M totalneutron1dd...l6n605
Step 3: Bridge out
- AttackerAttacker Cosmos Hub address1.72M ATOM in1.23M ATOM recovered at restartcosmos1dd2...m96c4n
Step 4: Cash out
- ExitEthereum collection wallet794.05 ETHuntouched0xef6c5a31...2a5d54
Why each step worked
- Governance can change the admin of any contractno message allowlist, no admin consent
- Stake counted at the close of votingneutron1ekgfga6vv4zdrrjn3dux6f62fuzektfndgaehm
- No timelock between passage and executionmissing controlmessages ran at the end of the vote
- Contracts migrated to attacker codereplacement code uploaded an hour before the vote ended
- Rate limiter held back USDC and WETHabout $1.7M stayed on Neutron
- No outbound limit on ATOMmissing controlall 1.72M ATOM left before the halt
- THORChain and CCTP exitsabout 496K ATOM and 1.18M USDC sold or bridged
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
MsgSubmitProposalMsgDelegateRoot cause
Neutron's chain governance (the Cosmos SDK x/gov module it adopted in mid-2026) was authorized to change the admin of any CosmWasm contract on the chain, including contracts owned by independent protocols such as Astroport and Drop. There was no allowlist of permitted proposal messages, no requirement that the current admin consent, and no delay between a vote passing and its messages executing. Whoever controlled one passing proposal could therefore take over and rewrite any contract. Control was cheap: the deposit cost a few hundred dollars and was refunded, NTRN traded near $0.0008, turnout was low, and stake bought minutes before the close counted in full because votes are tallied at the end. The attacker bought the deciding 31.6 million NTRN for 20,199 USDC, passed proposal 9, migrated ten contracts to its own code and emptied them. No bug in Astroport, Drop, CosmWasm or Neutron consensus was used, per Neutron's post-mortem; the proposal used an authority governance legitimately held. Two earlier attempts with the same payload were defeated or withdrawn but did not lead to a restriction on admin-change proposals.
Prevention analysis
An allowlist of governance messages, or a rule that the current admin must consent, would have made proposal 9 unable to touch Astroport or Drop at all. Neutron's recovery release now limits governance to software upgrades and text proposals.
A timelock between passage and execution would have given Astroport, Drop and validators time to see the admin changes and respond before any contract was migrated.
Stake bought 11 minutes before the close counted in full. A snapshot taken when the proposal was filed would have made the 20,199 USDC purchase worthless as voting power.
Neutron's ICS-20 rate limiter already kept about 1.67 million USDC and 14 axlWETH on the chain. A matching limit on ATOM would have kept far more of the 1.72 million ATOM from reaching the Hub.
Similar incidents
A governance takeover where the attacker gained voting control and used a passed vote to seize privileged control of the protocol's contracts. Same class: the vote itself is the exploit.
Voting power was acquired just in time to pass a malicious proposal that executed immediately and drained about $182 million. Same pattern of instant execution with no delay for the community to react.
Remediation
Timeline
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