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Drop and Astroport (Neutron)

September 22, 2026·Neutron·Governance Attack
$6.2M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Governance attack

A bought governance vote used Neutron's power to change any contract's admin.

What would have stopped it

  • Bar chain governance from changing the admin of contracts it does not own
  • Delay execution of passed proposals

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Drop and Astroport (Neutron) before this exploit.

An attacker took over ten Astroport, Drop and Neutron contracts by passing Neutron governance proposal 9, after buying the deciding vote with about $20,000 of cheap NTRN, and emptied them of about $6.24 million in ATOM, USDC, DYDX, ASTRO, NTRN and wrapped ETH. No smart contract bug was used: Neutron's governance was allowed to change the admin of any contract and executed the change instantly. Neutron and the Cosmos Hub both halted, and about $4 million (64%) was secured, including 1.23 million ATOM recovered on the Hub, then returned to the drained contracts in October. The unrecovered $2.2 million was sold through THORChain and bridged to Ethereum, where about 794 ETH sits idle.

Astroport on Terrasafe(only Neutron contracts were taken over)
Cosmos Hub userssafe(the Hub only received stolen ATOM)
Astroport Treasurysafe(taken over but never drained)
Astroport pools and stakingpartially affected(emptied, then refilled from recovered funds with a haircut)
Drop dATOM converter and withdrawal managerpartially affected(1.71 million ATOM taken, about 71% recovered)
Exploit anatomy

Using stake bought minutes before the close, the attacker wallet passed proposal 9 through Neutron governance, became admin of contracts such as Astroport Staking and the Drop dATOM converter, swapped in its own code and emptied them, then sent 1.72 million ATOM to its Cosmos Hub address and sold part of it into ETH held in a collection wallet.

The attack in 4 steps. Step 1, Bought vote: Neutron governance, proposal 9 (source). Step 2, Drain: Astroport Staking (source), Drop dATOM converter (source), Attacker wallet on Neutron (attacker), about $6.24M reached this step. Step 3, Bridge out: Attacker Cosmos Hub address (attacker), about $3.02M reached this step. Step 4, Cash out: Ethereum collection wallet (exit), about $2.18M reached this step.

  1. Step 1: Bought vote

    • Source
      Neutron governance, proposal 9
      11 admin changes, passed 22 Sep
      31.6M NTRN bought for 20,199 USDC
      neutron10d...7a68v5
  2. Step 2: Drain

  3. Step 3: Bridge out

    • Attacker
      Attacker Cosmos Hub address
      1.72M ATOM in
      1.23M ATOM recovered at restart
      cosmos1dd2...m96c4n
  4. Step 4: Cash out

Why each step worked

    • Governance can change the admin of any contractno message allowlist, no admin consent
    • Stake counted at the close of votingneutron1ekgfga6vv4zdrrjn3dux6f62fuzektfndgaehm
    • No timelock between passage and executionmissing controlmessages ran at the end of the vote
    • Contracts migrated to attacker codereplacement code uploaded an hour before the vote ended
    • Rate limiter held back USDC and WETHabout $1.7M stayed on Neutron
    • No outbound limit on ATOMmissing controlall 1.72M ATOM left before the halt
    • THORChain and CCTP exitsabout 496K ATOM and 1.18M USDC sold or bridged
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
The attacker wallet submitted expedited Neutron governance proposal 9, framed as an AI agent research experiment. Its payload was 11 admin-change messages handing the CosmWasm admin of six Astroport pools, Astroport Staking, the Astroport Treasury, the Drop dATOM converter, the Drop withdrawal manager and the Neutron investor vesting contract to the proposer. Two earlier versions of the same payload, proposals 5 and 7, had been rejected or withdrawn.
neutron10d...7a68v5MsgSubmitProposal
2.
A second wallet linked to the attacker spent 20,199 USDC on 31.6 million NTRN on Astroport and staked it 11 minutes before voting closed. Because votes are weighted by stake at the end of the vote, that stake made up 84.7% of the YES votes and carried the proposal past quorum. It passed at 02:24 UTC on 22 September with 37.31 million NTRN YES.
3.
The 11 admin changes executed immediately, with no timelock. From 02:38 UTC the attacker migrated each contract to replacement code it had uploaded an hour before the vote ended, then called a withdraw-all function on it. Astroport Staking went first and gave up 370.3 million ASTRO.
4.
The six Astroport pools were emptied between 02:40 and 02:56 UTC, including 2.22 million USDC and 849,316 dATOM from the USDC/dATOM pool. At 02:58 UTC the Drop dATOM converter gave up 1.59 million ATOM and 735,337 dATOM.
5.
At 03:00 UTC the Drop withdrawal manager gave up 115,878 ATOM, and at 03:02 UTC the investor vesting contract gave up 76.22 million NTRN. Ten contracts were emptied in 26 minutes, about $6.24 million in all at the post-mortem's prices. The Astroport Treasury was taken over but never drained.
6.
All 1,723,180 ATOM went over IBC to the attacker's Cosmos Hub address in two transfers, and the attacker began selling it for ETH through THORChain. About 1.18 million USDC went to Noble and on to Ethereum through CCTP. Neutron's ICS-20 rate limiter blocked further USDC and WETH transfers.
7.
Neutron validators halted the chain at 07:43 UTC, and Cosmos Hub validators halted the Hub at 11:18 UTC. The Hub restarted on 23 September with a one-time change that moved 1,227,121 ATOM from the attacker's address to a validator-held multisig. About 794 ETH from sold ATOM, USDC and wstETH sits untouched in an Ethereum collection wallet.

Root cause

Neutron's chain governance (the Cosmos SDK x/gov module it adopted in mid-2026) was authorized to change the admin of any CosmWasm contract on the chain, including contracts owned by independent protocols such as Astroport and Drop. There was no allowlist of permitted proposal messages, no requirement that the current admin consent, and no delay between a vote passing and its messages executing. Whoever controlled one passing proposal could therefore take over and rewrite any contract. Control was cheap: the deposit cost a few hundred dollars and was refunded, NTRN traded near $0.0008, turnout was low, and stake bought minutes before the close counted in full because votes are tallied at the end. The attacker bought the deciding 31.6 million NTRN for 20,199 USDC, passed proposal 9, migrated ten contracts to its own code and emptied them. No bug in Astroport, Drop, CosmWasm or Neutron consensus was used, per Neutron's post-mortem; the proposal used an authority governance legitimately held. Two earlier attempts with the same payload were defeated or withdrawn but did not lead to a restriction on admin-change proposals.

Prevention analysis

Bar chain governance from changing the admin of contracts it does not own

An allowlist of governance messages, or a rule that the current admin must consent, would have made proposal 9 unable to touch Astroport or Drop at all. Neutron's recovery release now limits governance to software upgrades and text proposals.

Delay execution of passed proposals

A timelock between passage and execution would have given Astroport, Drop and validators time to see the admin changes and respond before any contract was migrated.

Weight votes by stake held before the vote, not at its close

Stake bought 11 minutes before the close counted in full. A snapshot taken when the proposal was filed would have made the 20,199 USDC purchase worthless as voting power.

Outbound rate limits on bridged assets

Neutron's ICS-20 rate limiter already kept about 1.67 million USDC and 14 axlWETH on the chain. A matching limit on ATOM would have kept far more of the 1.72 million ATOM from reaching the Hub.

Similar incidents

Token of Power (2026)

A governance takeover where the attacker gained voting control and used a passed vote to seize privileged control of the protocol's contracts. Same class: the vote itself is the exploit.

Beanstalk (2022)

Voting power was acquired just in time to pass a malicious proposal that executed immediately and drained about $182 million. Same pattern of instant execution with no delay for the community to react.

Remediation

1.Neutron validators halted the chain on 22 September and restarted it on 25 September with a recovery release that restored all 11 contracts to their original code and admins, removed the purchased stake, locked both attacker accounts, froze new delegations and restricted governance to software-upgrade and text proposals.
2.Cosmos Hub validators halted the Hub and restarted on Gaia v28.3.0, moving 1,227,121 ATOM from the attacker's address to a 4-of-6 validator multisig. Hub proposal 1058 then sent it to the Neutron recovery multisig.
3.Neutron proposal 10 (passed 22 October) returned the recovered funds to the original contracts, with each contract taking the same pro-rata haircut per asset. Astroport ended tokenholder governance on Neutron and Terra.
4.Chains whose governance can rewrite third-party contracts should add a message allowlist, admin consent and an execution delay. Protocols deployed on such chains should treat chain governance as a holder of their admin keys.done

Timeline

2026-09-19Attacker submits expedited proposal 9 with 11 admin-change messages, fourteen minutes after cancelling proposal 7.
2026-09-22Voting wallet delegates its last 31.62 million NTRN, bought for 20,199 USDC, 11 minutes before voting closes.
2026-09-22Proposal 9 passes and executes. The attacker becomes admin of all 11 contracts.
2026-09-22First contract, Astroport Staking, is migrated to attacker code and emptied. Ten contracts are drained by 03:04 UTC.
2026-09-22Neutron validators halt the chain at block 61,635,573.
2026-09-22Cosmos Hub validators halt the Hub to stop the stolen ATOM from leaving.
2026-09-23Hub restarts on Gaia v28.3.0 and moves 1,227,121 ATOM to a recovery multisig.
2026-09-25Neutron resumes with a recovery release that restores the contracts and locks the attacker accounts.
2026-09-29Neutron's maintainers publish the post-mortem.
2026-10-22Neutron proposal 10 passes, returning the recovered funds to the original contracts.
Solva (Neutron security maintainer). Hadron. Astroport. Drop. Cosmos Labs. ZeroShadow. SEAL 911. Neutron and Cosmos Hub validators. GoPlus Security
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