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ether.fi Liquid

September 11, 2026·Ethereum·Access Control
$38K
total loss

Why it happened

Attack class: Access control

A missing permission check in Veda's AtomicQueue, the older withdrawal queue that ether.fi Liquid used.

What would have stopped it

  • Only let a queue move tokens from the caller, never from an address the caller names.
  • Retire old queues with an active campaign to revoke approvals.

What the score saw

754Damascus, scored May 15, 2026

Our pre-hack assessment of ether.fi covered its core staking contracts, where withdrawals only pull tokens from the caller, and gave that pattern credit. It did not cover the older Veda-built withdrawal queue behind ether.fi Liquid, which lacked that protection, so this attack surface was missed.

Score dimensions

  • Defense depthmissed

An attacker used a missing permission check in an old Veda-built withdrawal queue for ether.fi Liquid to move tokens out of 11 wallets that had left approvals to it open. About 14.45 liquidETH and 7 USDC, roughly 38,000 dollars, was taken in one transaction, swapped to ether and sent into Tornado Cash. eETH, weETH, current Liquid vault positions and every other ether.fi contract were not affected. ether.fi repaid the affected users in full the same day, and anyone who used the old queue should revoke their approval to it.

eETH and weETHsafe
Current Liquid vault positionssafe
Other ether.fi contractssafe
Wallets with open approvals to the old queuedrained(11 wallets, about 38,000 dollars, repaid by ether.fi)
Exploit anatomy

In one transaction, the attacker wallet used users' open approvals to the legacy withdrawal queue to take liquidETH from 11 wallets, swapped it to about 15.45 ETH and sent it into Tornado Cash; ether.fi repaid the victims from a team multisig.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Victim wallets (source). Step 2, Swap: Attacker wallet (attacker), about $38K reached this step. Step 3, Mixer: Tornado Cash (exit).

  1. Step 1: Root control

  2. Step 2: Swap

  3. Step 3: Mixer

    • Exit
      Tornado Cash
      ~ 15.5 ETH in
      07:23 to 07:28 UTC

Why each step worked

    • Missing permission checklegacy queue with no owner or pause; ether.fi asks holders to revoke approvals to it
    • Stale approvalsformer users never revoked the old queue
    • Partner contract outside reviewmissing controlVeda-built queue not covered with the core protocol
    • No revoke campaign for the old queuemissing controlopen approvals stayed live after users moved on
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
At 07:20 UTC on September 11 a single attacker transaction took 14.45 liquidETH and 7.05 USDC from 11 wallets that still held open approvals to ether.fi Liquid's legacy withdrawal queue. The largest victim lost 12.37 liquidETH.
2.
In the same transaction the stolen liquidETH and USDC were swapped on Uniswap for about 15.45 ETH, about 38,000 dollars.
3.
Between 07:23 and 07:28 UTC the attacker wallet 0xa5CC6e490Bce9185fA47b421f2EaC677A83B64Ea sent about 15.5 ETH into Tornado Cash.
4.
About nine hours later, at 16:28 UTC, ether.fi began repaying the victims in liquidETH from a team multisig, starting with the full 12.37 liquidETH to the largest victim.

Root cause

The root cause was a missing permission check in Veda's AtomicQueue, the older withdrawal queue that ether.fi Liquid used. The queue did not confirm that the counterparty in a trade had agreed to take part, so any wallet that had once approved the queue to spend its tokens could have those tokens moved without its consent. Eleven Liquid users had left such approvals open, and the attacker used them in one transaction to take 14.45 liquidETH and 7.05 USDC, swapped to about 15.45 ETH, roughly 38,000 dollars at the time. DeFiLlama lists 43,260 dollars. Per one independent post-mortem, nine of the eleven victim addresses were smart accounts that did not reject the unexpected call, which removed a check that could otherwise have stopped it. No other ether.fi contract was involved, and eETH, weETH and current Liquid vault positions were not affected. The flaw sits in a shared design, so other deployments of the same queue carried the same exposure for any wallet with an open approval.

Prevention analysis

Only let a queue move tokens from the caller, never from an address the caller names.

Tying every transfer to the account that sent the transaction is the pattern ether.fi's core contracts already use. Applied here, no other wallet's approval could have been spent.

Retire old queues with an active campaign to revoke approvals.

The victims were users who had moved on but left approvals open. Prompting holders to revoke when a queue is deprecated, or capping approvals to the amount needed, would have left nothing to take.

Audit partner-built contracts that users of the product interact with.

The flaw sat in a contract built by a partner and still used by the product. Bringing those contracts into the same review as the core protocol would have surfaced the missing check.

Similar incidents

Veda

Veda built the AtomicQueue contract that was exploited here. Any vault stack that uses an older queue of this design carries the same exposure for wallets that still have open approvals.

Socket Gateway (2024)

A contract that users had approved could be made to move their tokens without their consent, draining about 3.3 million dollars from standing approvals. Same class: missing authorization on who can spend an approval.

Seneca (2024)

Users' open approvals to a contract were turned against them because the contract did not check who it was acting for. Same lesson: old approvals are live risk.

Remediation

1.ether.fi said the issue was resolved and reimbursed affected users in full, starting about nine hours after the attack from a team multisig.
2.Anyone who used ether.fi Liquid through the old AtomicQueue should revoke outstanding approvals to that contract now, for example with Revoke.cash.
3.Users of other vaults that relied on older AtomicQueue deployments should also revoke approvals to withdrawal queues they no longer use; the same weakness applies wherever an approval is still open.
4.Queue designs should only pull tokens from the account making the call, and deprecated queues should be retired with a revoke campaign.

Timeline

2026-09-11Attacker wallet receives 0.085 ETH from Tornado Cash.
2026-09-11One transaction takes 14.45 liquidETH and 7.05 USDC from 11 wallets and swaps it to about 15.45 ETH.
2026-09-11First Tornado Cash deposit of 10 ETH.
2026-09-11Last Tornado Cash deposit; about 15.5 ETH mixed in all.
2026-09-11SlowMist's report circulates; ether.fi's CEO says the issue is resolved and users will be reimbursed.
2026-09-11ether.fi starts repaying victims in liquidETH from a team multisig.
SlowMist (detection and private disclosure to ether.fi), ExVul (analysis), Olympix (post-mortem), pashov (revoke guidance), ether.fi (response and reimbursement), BlackHart (on-chain verification)
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