ether.fi Liquid
Why it happened
Attack class: Access controlA missing permission check in Veda's AtomicQueue, the older withdrawal queue that ether.fi Liquid used.
What would have stopped it
- Only let a queue move tokens from the caller, never from an address the caller names.
- Retire old queues with an active campaign to revoke approvals.
What the score saw
Our pre-hack assessment of ether.fi covered its core staking contracts, where withdrawals only pull tokens from the caller, and gave that pattern credit. It did not cover the older Veda-built withdrawal queue behind ether.fi Liquid, which lacked that protection, so this attack surface was missed.
Score dimensions
- Defense depthmissed
An attacker used a missing permission check in an old Veda-built withdrawal queue for ether.fi Liquid to move tokens out of 11 wallets that had left approvals to it open. About 14.45 liquidETH and 7 USDC, roughly 38,000 dollars, was taken in one transaction, swapped to ether and sent into Tornado Cash. eETH, weETH, current Liquid vault positions and every other ether.fi contract were not affected. ether.fi repaid the affected users in full the same day, and anyone who used the old queue should revoke their approval to it.
In one transaction, the attacker wallet used users' open approvals to the legacy withdrawal queue to take liquidETH from 11 wallets, swapped it to about 15.45 ETH and sent it into Tornado Cash; ether.fi repaid the victims from a team multisig.
Attack flow
All 4 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Victim wallets (source). Step 2, Swap: Attacker wallet (attacker), about $38K reached this step. Step 3, Mixer: Tornado Cash (exit).
Step 1: Root control
- SourceVictim wallets14.45 liquidETH, 7.05 USDC~ $38K from 11 wallets0x69da2912...e847D4
Step 2: Swap
- AttackerAttacker walletswapped on Uniswap~ 15.45 ETH0xa5CC6e49...3B64Ea
Step 3: Mixer
- ExitTornado Cash~ 15.5 ETH in07:23 to 07:28 UTC
Why each step worked
- Missing permission checklegacy queue with no owner or pause; ether.fi asks holders to revoke approvals to it
- Stale approvalsformer users never revoked the old queue
- Partner contract outside reviewmissing controlVeda-built queue not covered with the core protocol
- No revoke campaign for the old queuemissing controlopen approvals stayed live after users moved on
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
solve(...)tx:0x7cbe0b43...95599bRoot cause
The root cause was a missing permission check in Veda's AtomicQueue, the older withdrawal queue that ether.fi Liquid used. The queue did not confirm that the counterparty in a trade had agreed to take part, so any wallet that had once approved the queue to spend its tokens could have those tokens moved without its consent. Eleven Liquid users had left such approvals open, and the attacker used them in one transaction to take 14.45 liquidETH and 7.05 USDC, swapped to about 15.45 ETH, roughly 38,000 dollars at the time. DeFiLlama lists 43,260 dollars. Per one independent post-mortem, nine of the eleven victim addresses were smart accounts that did not reject the unexpected call, which removed a check that could otherwise have stopped it. No other ether.fi contract was involved, and eETH, weETH and current Liquid vault positions were not affected. The flaw sits in a shared design, so other deployments of the same queue carried the same exposure for any wallet with an open approval.
Prevention analysis
Tying every transfer to the account that sent the transaction is the pattern ether.fi's core contracts already use. Applied here, no other wallet's approval could have been spent.
The victims were users who had moved on but left approvals open. Prompting holders to revoke when a queue is deprecated, or capping approvals to the amount needed, would have left nothing to take.
The flaw sat in a contract built by a partner and still used by the product. Bringing those contracts into the same review as the core protocol would have surfaced the missing check.
Similar incidents
Veda built the AtomicQueue contract that was exploited here. Any vault stack that uses an older queue of this design carries the same exposure for wallets that still have open approvals.
A contract that users had approved could be made to move their tokens without their consent, draining about 3.3 million dollars from standing approvals. Same class: missing authorization on who can spend an approval.
Users' open approvals to a contract were turned against them because the contract did not check who it was acting for. Same lesson: old approvals are live risk.
Remediation
Timeline
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