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Fence Finance and Valinor Digital tranche pool

October 27, 2026·Avalanche·Logic Error
$1.0M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Logic error

The pool's daily settlement recorded debt as repaid with no money returned, so a self-made borrower could draw the same amount twice and take the depositors' USDC.

What would have stopped it

  • Only reduce recorded debt when repayment actually arrives.
  • Require approval before anyone can become a borrower.

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Fence Finance and Valinor Digital tranche pool before this exploit.

An attacker drained about $1.01 million in USDC from a tranche lending pool on Avalanche associated with Valinor Digital and Fence Finance. Using a flash loan, they set themselves up as a borrower on the pool, and when the pool's daily settlement wrongly marked part of that debt as repaid, they borrowed the same amount again, this time taking the depositors' money. The pool was emptied; no other product of either company has been reported affected, and neither firm had published a statement at the time of early reports. The USDC was moved to Solana through Circle's cross-chain transfer service within five minutes.

Aave flash loan liquiditysafe(repaid in the same transaction)
Avalanche and USDC itselfsafe
Other Valinor Digital and Fence productsunknown(none reported affected)
Tranche pool depositorsdrained(1,013,353.61 USDC, the whole pool)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker, through a borrower contract, drew the full balance of the tranche pool a second time in a drain transaction right after midnight UTC, then sent the USDC to Solana through Circle's transfer contract.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Tranche pool (source). Step 2, Double draw: Borrower contract (hub), Attacker wallet (attacker), about $1.01M reached this step. Step 3, Bridge: Circle cross-chain transfer (exit).

  1. Step 1: Root control

  2. Step 2: Double draw

  3. Step 3: Bridge

    • Exit
      Circle cross-chain transfer
      burned on Avalanche
      minted on Solana within 5 minutes
      0x28b5a0e9...68cf5d

Why each step worked

    • Settlement marks debt repaid without repaymentused drawing room reappears at the daily rollover
    • Anyone can become a borrowermissing controlno approval, whitelist or onboarding
    • Aave flash loansupplied the setup capital for one transaction
    • No solvency check against real USDC flowsmissing controlthe pool paid out more than was ever funded to the facility
    • No outflow delaymissing controlfunds left the chain before the first public alert
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
Minutes before midnight UTC on October 27, a contract controlled by the attacker 0x6ff1c3ffa622e1062168f3497a275be9cc2b1246 used an Aave flash loan of 1,013,353.61 USDC, the pool's whole balance, to set up a credit facility for itself on the tranche pool and draw it in the same transaction. The pool ended that transaction holding the same USDC it started with; the attacker paid about 507 USDC in flash loan fees.
2.
Just after midnight UTC, the pool's daily settlement treated a scheduled principal payment on that facility as received even though no USDC had been repaid. That restored drawing room the attacker had already used, and a second draw of the same size took 1,013,353.61 USDC, the depositors' entire balance, leaving the pool empty.
3.
Within five minutes the attacker burned the USDC through Circle's cross-chain transfer protocol in two transfers of about 250,000 and 763,375 USDC, minting it on Solana.
0x28b5a0e9...68cf5ddepositForBurnWithHook(uint256,uint32,bytes32,address,bytes32,uint256,uint32,bytes)tx:0x51bb85e1...b9f397
4.
Blockaid flagged the drain publicly that evening. Neither Valinor Digital nor Fence had published a statement at the time of the early reports; a later write-up says Fence sent the attacker an on-chain message offering a 10 percent bounty for returning 90 percent. No return has been reported.

Root cause

The pool's books drifted away from the money it actually held. At its daily settlement the pool recorded a scheduled principal payment on a credit facility as paid, although no USDC came back, and that bookkeeping change made drawing room that had already been used available again. Because opening a facility on the pool did not require any approval, whitelist or onboarding, the attacker could act as their own borrower, and a flash loan let them do it without capital of their own. The result was that the pool paid out its depositors' USDC against a debt it believed had shrunk. No key was stolen and no price was manipulated; the flaw is in the pool's settlement accounting and in letting anyone become a borrower. The pool contract is not verified on public explorers, so this reading rests on the on-chain transactions and independent replays published by researchers and summarised by SlowMist; neither Valinor Digital nor Fence has published a root cause. Which party operated the pool has not been established: Blockaid named Valinor Digital and Fence, and SlowMist also associated it with Oatfi.

Prevention analysis

Only reduce recorded debt when repayment actually arrives.

If settlement only lowered a facility's outstanding principal after USDC was received, no drawing room could reappear on its own and the second draw would have been refused.

Require approval before anyone can become a borrower.

A credit pool meant for vetted borrowers let an anonymous contract open a facility. Onboarding or a whitelist would have closed the door before any accounting flaw mattered.

Check pool solvency against real balances before every draw.

A draw that would take a facility's total drawn amount above what was ever funded to it, or empty the pool, is a clear signal. A hard check against actual USDC flows would have stopped the payout.

Similar incidents

Arcus Perps (2026)

An internal bookkeeping step credited value that was never deposited, and real withdrawals were paid against it. Same class: records that no longer match the funds held.

Thetanuts Finance (2026)

A vault credited value without a matching deposit, and a flash loan amplified it into a drain of real USDC.

Remediation

1.The pool was emptied, so no further loss is possible from it; Valinor Digital and Fence had not published a remediation plan or a statement on depositor losses at the time of writing.
2.Per a researcher write-up, Fence sent the attacker an on-chain offer of a 10 percent bounty for returning 90 percent of the funds; recovery is pending.pending
3.Depositors in credit or tranche pools with similar daily settlement logic should ask the operator whether borrowing is permissioned and whether recorded debt can fall without repayment, and withdraw if they cannot get a clear answer.
4.Operators of such pools should publish and verify their contract source, gate borrower creation, and reconcile recorded principal with actual repayments.

Timeline

2026-10-27Flash-loan-funded setup transaction; the pool's balance is unchanged afterwards.
2026-10-28Second draw takes 1,013,353.61 USDC, the pool's entire balance.
2026-10-28First of two transfers burning the USDC on Avalanche for minting on Solana.
2026-10-28Second transfer to Solana completes; all stolen USDC has left Avalanche.
2026-10-28Blockaid publicly flags the drain on a tranche vault related to Valinor Digital and Fence.
Blockaid (first public alert). SlowMist (analysis). DeFiHackLabs contributors and independent researchers (transaction replay)
Continuous adversarial monitoring

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