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Fetch.ai FET converter (SingularityNET bridge)

September 19, 2026·Ethereum·Key Compromise
$1.5M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Access control

A stolen authorizer key signed one conversionIn message.

What would have stopped it

  • Put the same per-conversion and daily limits on inbound releases as on outbound ones.
  • Require threshold signatures from independent signers to release bridge inventory.

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Fetch.ai FET converter (SingularityNET bridge) before this exploit.

An attacker who stole the single signing key behind a FET token converter on SingularityNET's Ethereum to Cardano bridge used it to approve one fake conversion to their own wallet. That one approval released the converter's entire balance, about 8.72 million FET worth roughly $1.53 million, which was sold for about 513 ETH within minutes. Fetch.ai says its own contracts and FET holders were not affected, and it paused AGIX to FET conversions as a precaution. The same attacker also minted NuNet tokens and hit other SingularityNET bridge tokens, which are counted separately.

Fetch.ai contractssafe
FET token and holderssafe
Fetch.ai Ethereum bridgesafe(paused as a precaution)
SingularityNET FET converterdrained(8.72M FET, about $1.53M)
Exploit anatomy

With the stolen authorizer key, the attacker wallet emptied the FET converter in one transaction to a recipient wallet that sold the FET for ether.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: FET converter (source). Step 2, Release: Recipient wallet (hub), about $1.53M reached this step. Step 3, Swap: MetaMask swap router (exit).

  1. Step 1: Root control

  2. Step 2: Release

  3. Step 3: Swap

    • Exit
      MetaMask swap router
      FET sold for ~513 ETH
      about 2.5 minutes after the drain
      0x881d4023...8d300c

Why each step worked

    • Single authorizer key0x69e5446b07b23de0a76730062c3252152216c85c
    • No inbound limitmissing controloutbound was capped at 1M FET, inbound was not
    • No burn or lock proofmissing controlrelease not tied to the other chain
    • No time delay on large releasesmissing controlsold before anyone could react
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
The attacker obtained the private key of the single conversion authorizer for TokenConversionManagerV3, the FET converter on SingularityNET's Ethereum to Cardano bridge. One signature from that key was all the converter required to release FET. How the key leaked has not been disclosed.
2.
At 20:21:47 UTC on September 19, 2026 (block 26,013,913), the attacker wallet submitted a fresh conversion message signed with the stolen key, naming its own recipient and the converter's whole balance. The inbound conversion path had no per-transaction limit and no check that matching FET had been burned or locked on the other chain, so the converter paid out 8,721,530.40 FET, about $1.53 million, in one call.
0xab424a43...adf3a3conversionIn(address,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)tx:0xfe12c63b...ac69e2
3.
About two and a half minutes later the recipient wallet sold all 8.72 million FET through the MetaMask swap router for about 513 ETH. PeckShield counted 546 ETH across this sale and the attacker's sales of minted NTX.
4.
The same wallet cluster also received an unauthorized mint of about 408.5 million NTX from NuNet's deployer, and SingularityNET bridge tokens were hit hours later; those are separate losses. On September 20 Fetch.ai and SingularityNET deactivated the affected wallets and contract, paused AGIX to FET conversions, and paused Fetch.ai's Ethereum bridge as a precaution.

Root cause

The converter's inbound release path rested on a single externally owned key. TokenConversionManagerV3 releases FET on Ethereum when it sees a message signed by one conversion authorizer, and nothing else: no second signer, no proof from the other chain that the matching tokens were burned or locked, and no amount cap. The outbound path in the same contract did enforce minimum and maximum amounts per conversion (100 FET to 1 million FET), but the inbound path did not, so once the authorizer key was in the attacker's hands one valid signature could empty the contract. The contract's replay protection worked as designed; the attacker simply signed a new message. Per SlowMist and Fetch.ai's preliminary analysis, the root cause is the compromised signing key, not a code bug in the signature check. The missing cap and the single-key design are why the compromise cost the converter's entire 8.72 million FET balance at once instead of a bounded amount. The contract belongs to SingularityNET's Ethereum to Cardano bridge; Fetch.ai says its own contracts were not affected.

Prevention analysis

Put the same per-conversion and daily limits on inbound releases as on outbound ones.

The outbound path already capped a single conversion at 1 million FET. The same cap inbound would have held a stolen key to a fraction of the 8.72 million FET taken.

Require threshold signatures from independent signers to release bridge inventory.

With several independent signers, one leaked key would not have been enough to authorize a release.

Verify a burn or lock on the source chain before releasing tokens.

Tying each release to a provable event on the other chain would have made a self-signed message with no matching deposit worthless.

Similar incidents

Alephium token bridge (2026)

A bridge released tokens on the strength of signatures from compromised signing keys. Same class: off-chain authorization keys as the only gate on a bridge's inventory.

Kelp DAO bridge (2026)

A cross-chain release path trusted a message it could not independently verify against the source chain, and the whole bridged inventory was exposed at once.

Remediation

1.Fetch.ai and SingularityNET deactivated the affected wallets and the converter contract on September 20, 2026.
2.Fetch.ai paused AGIX to FET conversions and its own Ethereum bridge contract as a precaution, saying it found no vulnerability in that bridge.
3.Fetch.ai released a preliminary on-chain analysis tracing the attack from the compromised key to the attacker's cash-out wallets.done
4.Pending: a final report on how the authorizer key leaked, rotation of all related signing keys, and a redesign of the converter's release path before it reopens.pending
5.Other bridges and converters should cap releases per transaction and per day and avoid a single signing key as the only control.

Timeline

2026-09-19Attacker wallet sends 11.09 ETH to the wallet that will receive the FET.
2026-09-19One signed conversion releases 8,721,530.40 FET from the converter.
2026-09-19Recipient sells the FET for about 513 ETH through the MetaMask swap router.
2026-09-19Blockaid flags an ongoing exploit tied to the same wallet as a NuNet NTX mint.
2026-09-19PeckShield reports 8.7 million FET drained and 408.5 million NTX minted by the same exploiter.
2026-09-20SlowMist publishes the root cause: a single leaked authorizer key and no limit on inbound conversions.
2026-09-20Fetch.ai publishes a preliminary analysis and says the affected wallets and contract are deactivated.
2026-09-20Fetch.ai says its contracts are unaffected, the attack targeted the SingularityNET bridge, and AGIX to FET conversions are paused.
Blockaid. PeckShield. SlowMist. Fetch.ai. SingularityNET
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