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Gnosis Pay

June 1, 2026·Gnosis Chain·Signature Replay
$1.5M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Signature replay / forgery

The Delay module's contract signature check did not confirm the call had succeeded, so a reverting attacker contract counted as an approval.

What would have stopped it

  • Checking that the signature call succeeded
  • Shipping the fix to every deployed module version

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Gnosis Pay before this exploit.

Attackers took about $1.5 million, mainly GNO, EURe and USDC.e, from thousands of Gnosis Pay card accounts on Gnosis Chain. Per Gnosis Pay's post-mortem, a signature check in the Zodiac Delay module accepted a call that had failed, so crafted signatures passed as approvals. Gnosis Pay says it paused cards, replaced the affected accounts and refunded users in full. The flaw was in Gnosis Pay's own module stack, not in Safe's core contracts. CertiK's early estimate was lower, about $265,000.

Safe core contractssafe(flaw was in the Zodiac module stack, per Gnosis Pay)
Gnosis Pay user fundssafe(refunded in full per Gnosis Pay)
Card account balancesdrained(about $1.5 million across 5,281 wallets per coverage)
Card servicespartially affected(paused, over 99% restored within days)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker deployed contracts such as this attack contract and queued transactions through the Delay module in one transaction. The attacker wallet then moved part of the funds off Gnosis Chain.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Signature bypass: Gnosis Pay card accounts (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker wallet (attacker), about $1.5M reached this step. Step 3, Swap: Swap to Monero (exit).

  1. Step 1: Signature bypass

    • Source
      Gnosis Pay card accounts
      transactions queued with crafted signatures
      GNO, EURe, USDC.e
  2. Step 2: Drain

    • Attacker
      Attacker wallet
      received the stolen tokens
      bridged part to Hyperliquid
      0x81BA8A2b...8d4C6c
  3. Step 3: Swap

    • Exit
      Swap to Monero
      part swapped to XMR
      per CertiK

Why each step worked

    • Signature call result not checked for successrevert data read as an approval
    • Fix not applied to the older module packagemissing controlnewer repository was fixed in February 2026
    • No alert on mass queued transactionsmissing controldetected by the treasury manager's monitoring
    • Funds left the chain before the pausemissing controlcooldown window already open
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
Per Gnosis Pay's post-mortem as summarized in coverage, the attacker prepared contracts built to fail a signature check yet still return a value that looks like approval.
2.
The attacker queued transactions on Gnosis Pay card accounts through the Zodiac Delay module, using crafted signature data that passed the module's check.
3.
The module accepted the signature because it read the returned value without confirming the check had actually succeeded, so it treated the transactions as authorized.
4.
Funds, mainly GNO, EURe and USDC.e, left thousands of card accounts. Gnosis Pay paused card processing, replaced the affected accounts and says it refunded users in full.

Root cause

Gnosis Pay card accounts are Safe smart wallets with Zodiac modules (Delay and Roles) that queue and gate spending. Per the coverage of Gnosis Pay's post-mortem, the Delay module's check for contract signatures (ERC-1271) read the return data of a call without confirming that the call had succeeded. An attacker contract built to fail while still returning the approval value therefore passed as a valid signer, and a second weakness let the module read signature bytes from the extra calldata an attacker could append. This was a flaw in Gnosis Pay's own module stack, introduced in a Zodiac code change in October 2023, not in Safe's core contracts. CertiK and Verichains describe the same mechanism. Verichains adds that the same check was fixed in a newer Zodiac repository in February 2026 while the older package used on-chain stayed unpatched.

Prevention analysis

Checking that the signature call succeeded

Rejecting any signature call that reverted would have refused the attacker's contracts at the first check.

Shipping the fix to every deployed module version

The February 2026 fix existed in a newer repository. Applying it to the legacy package and live modules would have closed the hole before June.

Rate limits and spending monitors on card accounts

Alerts on many accounts changing at once would have narrowed the window for queued transactions.

Similar incidents

Astroport on Neutron (2026)

An authorization check that should have rejected the caller accepted it, letting an outsider act as an admin.

Crypto DAO Pro vault (2026)

A missing authorization check let an outsider trigger actions that move user funds.

Remediation

1.Gnosis Pay paused card transactions, authorization and onboarding within hours, per its post-mortem.
2.The vulnerability was patched on June 5 and every affected card account was replaced; Gnosis Pay says it refunded users in full.
3.Projects that use Zodiac Delay or Roles modules from the older package should check they run a version with the signature check fixed.
4.Any contract that accepts ERC-1271 signatures should confirm the call succeeded before trusting the returned value.

Timeline

2026-06-01Malicious transactions queued through the Delay module, per CertiK.
2026-06-01Gnosis Pay identifies the root cause and pauses card processing (about two hours after detection, time approximate).
2026-06-05Vulnerability patched.
2026-07-03Gnosis Pay publishes a detailed post-mortem.
NOCA, the treasury manager, detected the attack per Gnosis Pay. CertiK and Verichains (analysis)
Continuous adversarial monitoring

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