Gnosis Pay
Why it happened
Attack class: Signature replay / forgeryThe Delay module's contract signature check did not confirm the call had succeeded, so a reverting attacker contract counted as an approval.
What would have stopped it
- Checking that the signature call succeeded
- Shipping the fix to every deployed module version
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored Gnosis Pay before this exploit.
Attackers took about $1.5 million, mainly GNO, EURe and USDC.e, from thousands of Gnosis Pay card accounts on Gnosis Chain. Per Gnosis Pay's post-mortem, a signature check in the Zodiac Delay module accepted a call that had failed, so crafted signatures passed as approvals. Gnosis Pay says it paused cards, replaced the affected accounts and refunded users in full. The flaw was in Gnosis Pay's own module stack, not in Safe's core contracts. CertiK's early estimate was lower, about $265,000.
The attacker deployed contracts such as this attack contract and queued transactions through the Delay module in one transaction. The attacker wallet then moved part of the funds off Gnosis Chain.
Attack flow
All 4 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Signature bypass: Gnosis Pay card accounts (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker wallet (attacker), about $1.5M reached this step. Step 3, Swap: Swap to Monero (exit).
Step 1: Signature bypass
- SourceGnosis Pay card accountstransactions queued with crafted signaturesGNO, EURe, USDC.e
Step 2: Drain
- AttackerAttacker walletreceived the stolen tokensbridged part to Hyperliquid0x81BA8A2b...8d4C6c
Step 3: Swap
- ExitSwap to Moneropart swapped to XMRper CertiK
Why each step worked
- Signature call result not checked for successrevert data read as an approval
- Fix not applied to the older module packagemissing controlnewer repository was fixed in February 2026
- No alert on mass queued transactionsmissing controldetected by the treasury manager's monitoring
- Funds left the chain before the pausemissing controlcooldown window already open
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
Gnosis Pay card accounts are Safe smart wallets with Zodiac modules (Delay and Roles) that queue and gate spending. Per the coverage of Gnosis Pay's post-mortem, the Delay module's check for contract signatures (ERC-1271) read the return data of a call without confirming that the call had succeeded. An attacker contract built to fail while still returning the approval value therefore passed as a valid signer, and a second weakness let the module read signature bytes from the extra calldata an attacker could append. This was a flaw in Gnosis Pay's own module stack, introduced in a Zodiac code change in October 2023, not in Safe's core contracts. CertiK and Verichains describe the same mechanism. Verichains adds that the same check was fixed in a newer Zodiac repository in February 2026 while the older package used on-chain stayed unpatched.
Prevention analysis
Rejecting any signature call that reverted would have refused the attacker's contracts at the first check.
The February 2026 fix existed in a newer repository. Applying it to the legacy package and live modules would have closed the hole before June.
Alerts on many accounts changing at once would have narrowed the window for queued transactions.
Similar incidents
An authorization check that should have rejected the caller accepted it, letting an outsider act as an admin.
A missing authorization check let an outsider trigger actions that move user funds.
Remediation
Timeline
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