Harmony
Why it happened
Attack class: Signature replay / forgeryAlready-used cross-shard receipts were replayed because the record that marks them spent was keyed on unsigned fields.
What would have stopped it
- Key replay protection only on authenticated data
- Supply invariant checks and mint alerts at the node level
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored Harmony before this exploit.
An attacker exploited a flaw in how the Harmony blockchain moves ONE between its shards, replaying already-used cross-shard receipts to credit themselves with about 3 trillion ONE that had no source. They pushed billions of the forged ONE to exchanges within hours, crashing ONE's price by roughly 40%, and SlowMist estimates about $3.2 million was cashed out before exchanges froze the four exploiter wallets. Harmony patched the flaw the same morning and rolled the chain back to just before the attack, which erased the forged supply but also discarded every later transaction. The loss falls on exchanges and buyers who took forged ONE before the freezes; Harmony has since proposed retiring its mainnet and moving ONE to Ethereum.
Replayed cross-shard receipts credited forged ONE to wallets including exploiter wallet 1 and exploiter wallet 2, which moved 2.8 billion ONE to a relay wallet and then to a dispersal wallet feeding exchange deposits, before a rollback erased the forged supply.
Attack flow
All 6 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Forged mint: Replayed cross-shard receipts (source), Exploiter wallet 2 (attacker). Step 2, Dispersal: Relay wallet (hub), about $3.2M reached this step. Step 3, Cash out: Exchange deposit wallets (exit).
Step 1: Forged mint
- SourceReplayed cross-shard receiptsabout 3.01T ONE in six creditsempty, zero-gas blocks
- AttackerExploiter wallet 23B ONE at 01:01 UTCfirst wave0xed2fc1bf...bb08eb
Step 2: Dispersal
- HubRelay wallet2.8B ONE at 01:02 UTCmoved on at 01:05 UTC0x358a9734...659eb6
Step 3: Cash out
- ExitExchange deposit walletsforged ONE sold before freezes~ $3.2M per SlowMist
Why each step worked
- Spent-receipt record keyed on unsigned fieldsolder receipts not bound to the signed header
- Weak quorum check for older committeesuse by the attacker not confirmed
- No supply alarm on the nodemissing controltrillions of ONE minted before anyone halted
- Rollback cannot reverse off-chain saleschain reset to 23:25:37 UTC on 11 August
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
Harmony moves native ONE between its shards with cross-shard receipts: a credit on the destination shard is allowed once, against a receipt proven from the source shard. Per Harmony's incident report, the record that marks a receipt as already used was keyed, for older receipts, on identifying fields that were not tied to the signed block header. Changing those fields made a spent receipt look new, so the destination shard credited ONE again with no matching debit on the source shard, and the forged credits appeared in otherwise empty blocks. Harmony also found a second weakness in how quorum was checked for older committees, and has not said whether the attacker needed it. Both were fixed in release v2026.1.1. The flaw sat in the chain's own consensus code, not in a smart contract or in the Horizon bridge, which Harmony paused only as a precaution. On-chain, the rollback removed the forged supply; the real loss is the forged ONE that was sold to exchanges and other buyers before the freezes.
Prevention analysis
Deriving the spent-receipt record from the signed header for every receipt, old or new, would have made each receipt usable once. This is the fix Harmony shipped.
Native supply jumped by billions, then trillions, of ONE in empty blocks. An automatic halt on an impossible supply change would have stopped the mint before the first wave reached exchanges.
The weak check survived for receipts from before a recent hard fork. Rejecting old-format receipts outright would have closed the path the attacker used.
Similar incidents
A cross-chain proof was accepted for a transfer that never happened, minting about 2 million BNB. Same class: the chain's own cross-chain verification credited value it should have rejected.
A cross-chain credit was made without the matching debit on the sending side. Same family: one side of a two-sided balance change silently goes missing.
Remediation
Timeline
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