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Harmony

August 11, 2026·Harmony·Signature Replay
$3.2M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Signature replay / forgery

Already-used cross-shard receipts were replayed because the record that marks them spent was keyed on unsigned fields.

What would have stopped it

  • Key replay protection only on authenticated data
  • Supply invariant checks and mint alerts at the node level

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Harmony before this exploit.

An attacker exploited a flaw in how the Harmony blockchain moves ONE between its shards, replaying already-used cross-shard receipts to credit themselves with about 3 trillion ONE that had no source. They pushed billions of the forged ONE to exchanges within hours, crashing ONE's price by roughly 40%, and SlowMist estimates about $3.2 million was cashed out before exchanges froze the four exploiter wallets. Harmony patched the flaw the same morning and rolled the chain back to just before the attack, which erased the forged supply but also discarded every later transaction. The loss falls on exchanges and buyers who took forged ONE before the freezes; Harmony has since proposed retiring its mainnet and moving ONE to Ethereum.

ONE balances before 23:25 UTC on 11 Augustsafe(restored by the rollback)
Harmony bridgesafe(paused as a precaution, no bridge loss reported)
Transactions after the rollback pointdrained(141,628 Shard 0 blocks discarded)
Exchanges and buyers of forged ONEdrained(about $3.2 million cashed out, per SlowMist)
Exploit anatomy

Replayed cross-shard receipts credited forged ONE to wallets including exploiter wallet 1 and exploiter wallet 2, which moved 2.8 billion ONE to a relay wallet and then to a dispersal wallet feeding exchange deposits, before a rollback erased the forged supply.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Forged mint: Replayed cross-shard receipts (source), Exploiter wallet 2 (attacker). Step 2, Dispersal: Relay wallet (hub), about $3.2M reached this step. Step 3, Cash out: Exchange deposit wallets (exit).

  1. Step 1: Forged mint

    • Source
      Replayed cross-shard receipts
      about 3.01T ONE in six credits
      empty, zero-gas blocks
    • Attacker
      Exploiter wallet 2
      3B ONE at 01:01 UTC
      first wave
      0xed2fc1bf...bb08eb
  2. Step 2: Dispersal

  3. Step 3: Cash out

    • Exit
      Exchange deposit wallets
      forged ONE sold before freezes
      ~ $3.2M per SlowMist

Why each step worked

    • Spent-receipt record keyed on unsigned fieldsolder receipts not bound to the signed header
    • Weak quorum check for older committeesuse by the attacker not confirmed
    • No supply alarm on the nodemissing controltrillions of ONE minted before anyone halted
    • Rollback cannot reverse off-chain saleschain reset to 23:25:37 UTC on 11 August
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
From 23:25 UTC on 11 August the attacker began crediting itself with native ONE on Harmony's Shard 0 by replaying cross-shard receipts that had already been used, in blocks with no ordinary transactions. Harmony later counted six forged cross-shard credits into four wallets, about 3.01 trillion ONE in all.
2.
The first wave credited 1 billion ONE to one wallet at 00:02 UTC and 3 billion ONE to another at 01:01 UTC on 12 August.
3.
At 01:02 UTC the second wallet sent 2.8 billion ONE onward, and three minutes later almost all of it moved again toward exchange deposit wallets. ONE's price began falling on OKX from about 01:00 UTC.
4.
One forged-mint wallet then attempted 534 transfers of 5 billion ONE each in 106 seconds; 477 succeeded, moving 2.385 trillion ONE across exchanges, DEX pools, bridges and hundreds of wallets. Harmony traced 10,288 transfers into 409 wallets.
5.
Exchanges blocked the four exploiter wallets at Harmony's request, Harmony shipped a patch at 06:30 UTC and paused its bridge, and Shard 0 halted at 12:32 UTC. Forged ONE sold before the freezes, about $3.2 million per SlowMist's estimate, could not be reversed.
6.
Validators rolled both affected shards back to their state at 23:25:37 UTC on 11 August, erasing the forged supply along with 141,628 Shard 0 blocks of later activity.

Root cause

Harmony moves native ONE between its shards with cross-shard receipts: a credit on the destination shard is allowed once, against a receipt proven from the source shard. Per Harmony's incident report, the record that marks a receipt as already used was keyed, for older receipts, on identifying fields that were not tied to the signed block header. Changing those fields made a spent receipt look new, so the destination shard credited ONE again with no matching debit on the source shard, and the forged credits appeared in otherwise empty blocks. Harmony also found a second weakness in how quorum was checked for older committees, and has not said whether the attacker needed it. Both were fixed in release v2026.1.1. The flaw sat in the chain's own consensus code, not in a smart contract or in the Horizon bridge, which Harmony paused only as a precaution. On-chain, the rollback removed the forged supply; the real loss is the forged ONE that was sold to exchanges and other buyers before the freezes.

Prevention analysis

Key replay protection only on authenticated data

Deriving the spent-receipt record from the signed header for every receipt, old or new, would have made each receipt usable once. This is the fix Harmony shipped.

Supply invariant checks and mint alerts at the node level

Native supply jumped by billions, then trillions, of ONE in empty blocks. An automatic halt on an impossible supply change would have stopped the mint before the first wave reached exchanges.

Retire legacy verification paths at a fork

The weak check survived for receipts from before a recent hard fork. Rejecting old-format receipts outright would have closed the path the attacker used.

Similar incidents

BNB Chain Token Hub (2022)

A cross-chain proof was accepted for a transfer that never happened, minting about 2 million BNB. Same class: the chain's own cross-chain verification credited value it should have rejected.

Nomic nBTC (2026)

A cross-chain credit was made without the matching debit on the sending side. Same family: one side of a two-sided balance change silently goes missing.

Remediation

1.Harmony released v2026.1.1 on 12 August at 06:30 UTC, fixing receipt replay and the quorum check, then v2026.1.2 and v2026.1.3 with further cross-shard, consensus and staking hardening.done
2.Harmony asked exchanges to freeze funds tracing to four exploiter wallets, paused bridge.harmony.one, halted Shard 0, and rolled Shards 0 and 1 back to 23:25:37 UTC on 11 August, discarding all later transactions.
3.In September Harmony proposed retiring its Layer 1 mainnet and reissuing ONE as an ERC-20 token on Ethereum, with $1.372 million set aside for compensation over four quarters.
4.Sharded and cross-chain systems should bind every replay-protection key to signed data and alert on any native supply change that ordinary transactions cannot explain.

Timeline

2026-08-11First forged cross-shard credit lands on Shard 0 at block 92,730,036.
2026-08-121 billion ONE credited to the first exploiter wallet.
2026-08-123 billion ONE credited to a second wallet; 2.8 billion is moved on a minute later.
2026-08-12Independent analyst Juiceberg posts the first public alert of a 4 billion ONE mint.
2026-08-12Harmony confirms the incident and starts working with exchanges to freeze funds.
2026-08-12Harmony publishes the four exploiter wallets for exchanges to block.
2026-08-12Emergency release v2026.1.1 fixes the receipt replay; bridge.harmony.one is paused at 06:39 UTC.
2026-08-12CertiK Alert reports more than 3 trillion ONE created across six abnormal blocks.
2026-08-12Shard 0 halts at block 92,753,555 to prepare a rollback.
2026-08-17Harmony publishes the rollback plan to block 92,730,034 on Shard 0 and 94,978,278 on Shard 1.
Juiceberg (first public alert). Harmony team (incident reports, patch, rollback). CertiK Alert. SlowMist (cash-out estimate). Verichains (analysis). ZachXBT
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