Humanity Protocol
An attacker took control of the multisig that governs Humanity Protocol's H token on BNB Chain, rewrote the token's code, and minted 100 million new H for themselves, worth around 13 million dollars at the pre-attack price. Three of the project's operational signing keys had been compromised, which let the attacker seize the token's upgrade controls and mint without any limit. The same key access was used to drain roughly 10 million dollars of existing H from more than a hundred wallets, for a combined impact near 23 million dollars. The token contract was not broken by a coding bug. The keys that governed it were taken, and the minted and stolen H was then dispersed across wallets, swapped, and bridged out.
Humanity Protocol is not one of the protocols we publish a live safety score for, so we had no prior reading on it. The weakness here is the kind our model weighs heavily wherever it applies: full upgrade authority over a live token concentrated in a multisig, with no contract-level cap on minting once that authority is held. A token is only as safe as the keys that can rewrite it, and here the operational signing keys were taken and used to swap in attacker code.
Humanity's H token on BNB Chain is an upgradeable proxy whose upgrade authority sat with a three of six Gnosis Safe. Three of those signing keys were compromised and used to sign a single Safe transaction that handed ownership of the token's proxy admin to an attacker wallet (takeover tx). Seconds later the attacker deployed a malicious implementation and pointed the token at it, replacing the legitimate code (upgrade tx). The attacker then minted 100 million H to themselves (mint tx). The wallet was funded ahead of time from an upstream account that itself traced back to an exchange.
Safe. The H token contract logic was not broken by a coding bug. The keys that governed it were taken and used to swap in attacker code.
Three of six operational signer keys were compromised. With them the attacker signed a Safe transaction that took ownership of the token proxy admin, deployed a malicious implementation and swapped it in, then called mint for 100 million H. No contract was broken.
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
The root cause is a compromise of the operational signing keys that controlled the H token's upgrade authority, not a flaw in the token or in the Gnosis Safe. Forensics on the takeover transaction confirm this precisely. The Safe's singleton, owner set, threshold, and guard were all unchanged before and after the takeover, ruling out the proxy-singleton swap, owner injection, module, and guard attack classes. The takeover ran as an ordinary Safe execTransaction with a plain call, not a delegatecall, carrying three live owner signatures. Recovering those three signatures against the computed Safe transaction hash yields three confirmed owners, exactly the three that signed every prior legitimate transaction. Comparison with the Safe transaction service shows the malicious transaction had no proposer and all three confirmations collapsed to the execution block time, which is the fingerprint of a transaction assembled and signed offline with keys already in hand and submitted directly, rather than proposed through the interface and confirmed by deceived signers. The conclusion is direct theft of the three active operational keys. With those keys the attacker held the multisig that owned the token proxy, swapped the token code for a malicious version, and minted without limit. A token contract with no upgrade timelock and no contract-level mint cap leaves nothing between a compromised admin and unlimited inflation.
Prevention analysis
Similar incidents
A compromised deployer key was used to mint unlimited aBNBc tokens. Same shape: stolen admin authority over a token used to inflate supply without limit.
A Gnosis Safe multisig was used to move funds after its signers were induced to authorize a malicious transaction. Same class: the multisig worked as designed while the signing layer was the point of failure.
A compromised key upgraded the token contract and minted new supply. Same shape: proxy upgrade authority turned into an unlimited mint.