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Initia

October 23, 2026·Initia·Logic Error
$2.6M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Logic error

A flaw in MoveVM script caching let attacker code skip security checks and mint unbacked bridged assets, which bridges paid out in real assets.

What would have stopped it

  • Verify scripts independently of the cache
  • Check bridge redemptions against real backing

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Initia before this exploit.

On October 23 an attacker minted unbacked bridged and wrapped assets on Initia's layer 1, about $2.6 million by the first researcher's count and about $2.7 million by Initia's, and cashed them out to Ethereum. Initia says the cause was a previously unknown flaw in how its MoveVM caches scripts, and that native INIT was not minted. About 1.4 million AUSD, 105 ETH and 1.08 million USDC left through bridges before Initia halted the layer 1 and all rollups. The network restarted on November 2 with an audited patch and without a rollback, and the Initia Foundation approved 1:1 funding to restore backing.

Native INIT supplysafe(Initia says no native INIT was minted)
Bridged and wrapped assets on the layer 1drained(unbacked AUSD, ETH and USDC balances created)
Assets paid out over bridgesdrained(about $2.6M to $2.7M)
Layer 1 and rollupsdrained(halted for about nine days)
Withdrawals after the restartunknown(temporary processing windows and limits on some assets)
Exploit anatomy

Using a flaw in how Initia's MoveVM cached scripts, the attacker created unbacked bridged assets on the L1 and redeemed them through bridges for real assets, until Initia halted the L1 and its rollups at 15:41:30 UTC. Attacker addresses and transaction hashes have not been published.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Unbacked balances on the L1 (source). Step 2, Bridge: LayerZero, Noble and CCTP (bridge), about $2.6M reached this step. Step 3, Recipient: Ethereum wallet (exit), about $2.73M reached this step.

  1. Step 1: Root control

    • Source
      Unbacked balances on the L1
      AUSD, ETH and USDC claims
      ~ $2.6M
  2. Step 2: Bridge

    • Bridge
      LayerZero, Noble and CCTP
      1.4M AUSD, 105 ETH, 1.08M USDC
      moved to Ethereum
  3. Step 3: Recipient

    • Exit
      Ethereum wallet
      about 1,135.5 ETH
      consolidated

Why each step worked

    • Script cache accepted unverified codeper Initia, malicious code bypassed MoveVM checks
    • Bridges paid out against minted balancesreal assets released against unbacked claims
    • No backing check on redemptionmissing controlnothing compared the balance to real collateral
    • No automatic haltmissing controlthe chain stopped only after the assets had left
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
On October 23 the attacker used a flaw in the script-caching mechanism of Initia's MoveVM, which Initia says let malicious code bypass security checks and manipulate the state the virtual machine saw.
2.
Using that manipulated state, the attacker credited itself with unbacked bridged and wrapped assets on the layer 1, about 2 million unbacked AUSD per reports. Initia says no native INIT was minted and INIT supply did not change.
3.
The attacker moved assets out over LayerZero, Noble and Circle's cross-chain transfer protocol: per Initia, about 1.4 million AUSD, 105 ETH and 1.08 million USDC went to Ethereum, where they were consolidated into about 1,135.5 ETH.
4.
Initia halted its layer 1 and all rollups at 15:41:30 UTC and paused INIT deposits and withdrawals on exchanges, including Upbit, at 15:57 UTC.

Root cause

Initia runs a Move virtual machine on the Cosmos SDK, and its layer 1 holds the wrapped and bridged assets that rollups and exchanges rely on. Per Initia's statement, a flaw in how MoveVM caches scripts let attacker code get past the VM's security checks and alter the state the VM saw. That let the attacker mint balances of bridged and wrapped assets that had no real backing, which were then redeemed through real bridges. Initia's co-founder called it a previously unknown Day 0 bug. The attacker needed no key and no governance power, and the flaw did not touch native INIT. As of the sources reviewed Initia had not published a final post-mortem, so the exact cache defect is described only as the team has put it. The bridges worked as designed: they released real assets against balances the chain recorded as valid.

Prevention analysis

Verify scripts independently of the cache

If the VM re-checked every script's security properties on load instead of trusting a cached result, the manipulated state would not have been accepted.

Check bridge redemptions against real backing

The bridges released real assets against minted balances. A backing check on the source side, or a daily limit, would have capped what could leave.

Halt automatically on supply or backing mismatch

The halt came at 15:41 UTC after the minting; a monitor comparing wrapped balances to held collateral could have stopped it sooner.

Audit the VM layer, not just contracts

The flaw sat in the shared virtual machine. Reviews focused on application contracts would not reach it, so the VM layer deserves its own audit.

Similar incidents

Nomic (2026)

Another 2026 chain where unbacked tokens were created on the chain itself and redeemed for real assets over a bridge.

Secret Network (2026)

Unbacked tokens minted through a flaw on the chain side of a bridge, then redeemed for real assets elsewhere.

Remediation

1.Initia halted its layer 1 and rollups at 15:41:30 UTC on October 23 and paused INIT exchange deposits and withdrawals.
2.Per Cryptopolitan's report of Initia's announcement, the network restarted on November 2 on an upgrade that applied an independently audited MoveVM patch and removed the forged balances still tied to the attacker, without rolling back the chain.
3.Initia says it restored full backing for AUSD0, USDC.n and WETH, and the Initia Foundation approved 1:1 funding to cover the drained amounts; some withdrawals have a 24-hour processing window or hourly limits.
4.Other chains running a Move or other virtual machine with script caching should check that cached scripts are always re-verified, and should apply the published patch.

Timeline

2026-10-23The attack takes place, per Initia's October 24 update as reported by Altcoin Buzz.
2026-10-23Initia halts its layer 1 and all rollups.
2026-10-23INIT deposits and withdrawals are paused at exchanges, including Upbit.
2026-10-28Initia says a patch is drafted and with security partners for review.
2026-11-02Initia restarts the layer 1 and rollups on an upgrade with an audited MoveVM patch.
Spreek (first public report). Finance platform analysts cited by Cointelegraph (analysis). Initia team (halt, patch and restart)
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