Initia
Why it happened
Attack class: Logic errorA flaw in MoveVM script caching let attacker code skip security checks and mint unbacked bridged assets, which bridges paid out in real assets.
What would have stopped it
- Verify scripts independently of the cache
- Check bridge redemptions against real backing
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored Initia before this exploit.
On October 23 an attacker minted unbacked bridged and wrapped assets on Initia's layer 1, about $2.6 million by the first researcher's count and about $2.7 million by Initia's, and cashed them out to Ethereum. Initia says the cause was a previously unknown flaw in how its MoveVM caches scripts, and that native INIT was not minted. About 1.4 million AUSD, 105 ETH and 1.08 million USDC left through bridges before Initia halted the layer 1 and all rollups. The network restarted on November 2 with an audited patch and without a rollback, and the Initia Foundation approved 1:1 funding to restore backing.
Using a flaw in how Initia's MoveVM cached scripts, the attacker created unbacked bridged assets on the L1 and redeemed them through bridges for real assets, until Initia halted the L1 and its rollups at 15:41:30 UTC. Attacker addresses and transaction hashes have not been published.
Attack flow
All 4 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Unbacked balances on the L1 (source). Step 2, Bridge: LayerZero, Noble and CCTP (bridge), about $2.6M reached this step. Step 3, Recipient: Ethereum wallet (exit), about $2.73M reached this step.
Step 1: Root control
- SourceUnbacked balances on the L1AUSD, ETH and USDC claims~ $2.6M
Step 2: Bridge
- BridgeLayerZero, Noble and CCTP1.4M AUSD, 105 ETH, 1.08M USDCmoved to Ethereum
Step 3: Recipient
- ExitEthereum walletabout 1,135.5 ETHconsolidated
Why each step worked
- Script cache accepted unverified codeper Initia, malicious code bypassed MoveVM checks
- Bridges paid out against minted balancesreal assets released against unbacked claims
- No backing check on redemptionmissing controlnothing compared the balance to real collateral
- No automatic haltmissing controlthe chain stopped only after the assets had left
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
Initia runs a Move virtual machine on the Cosmos SDK, and its layer 1 holds the wrapped and bridged assets that rollups and exchanges rely on. Per Initia's statement, a flaw in how MoveVM caches scripts let attacker code get past the VM's security checks and alter the state the VM saw. That let the attacker mint balances of bridged and wrapped assets that had no real backing, which were then redeemed through real bridges. Initia's co-founder called it a previously unknown Day 0 bug. The attacker needed no key and no governance power, and the flaw did not touch native INIT. As of the sources reviewed Initia had not published a final post-mortem, so the exact cache defect is described only as the team has put it. The bridges worked as designed: they released real assets against balances the chain recorded as valid.
Prevention analysis
If the VM re-checked every script's security properties on load instead of trusting a cached result, the manipulated state would not have been accepted.
The bridges released real assets against minted balances. A backing check on the source side, or a daily limit, would have capped what could leave.
The halt came at 15:41 UTC after the minting; a monitor comparing wrapped balances to held collateral could have stopped it sooner.
The flaw sat in the shared virtual machine. Reviews focused on application contracts would not reach it, so the VM layer deserves its own audit.
Similar incidents
Another 2026 chain where unbacked tokens were created on the chain itself and redeemed for real assets over a bridge.
Unbacked tokens minted through a flaw on the chain side of a bridge, then redeemed for real assets elsewhere.
Remediation
Timeline
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