jaredfromsubway MEV bot
Why it happened
Attack class: Logic errorBait tokens collected approvals the bot never revoked, then one transaction used them to transferFrom the bot's WETH, USDC and USDT.
What would have stopped it
- Reset every token approval to zero at the end of each trade.
- Trade new tokens only through an allow-list or a wallet holding a small float.
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored jaredfromsubway MEV bot before this exploit.
An attacker baited jaredfromsubway, Ethereum's busiest sandwich-trading bot, with dozens of fake tokens and pools built to look like profitable trades. To trade them the bot gave the fake contracts permission to spend its funds, and the attacker made sure those permissions were never used up. On June 20 one transaction used the leftover permissions to pull about $7.48 million in WETH, USDC and USDT out of the bot. No ordinary users or public protocols were affected; the proceeds were turned into ether, with 3,000 ETH sent into Tornado Cash.
Bait contracts run by a coordinator collected standing approvals from the MEV bot, then used them in one sweep to move about $7.48 million to the attacker wallet.
Attack flow
All 5 on-chain stepsThe attack in 4 steps. Step 1, Root control: MEV bot contract (source). Step 2, Sweep: Bait coordinator (hub), about $7.48M reached this step. Step 3, Consolidate: Attacker main wallet (attacker). Step 4, Mixer: Tornado Cash (exit).
Step 1: Root control
- SourceMEV bot contract1,474.6 WETH, 2.87M USDC, 2.04M USDT~ $7.48M0x1f2f10d1...6df387
Step 2: Sweep
- HubBait coordinator66 bait contracts in one tx60 held bot approvals0xb84db016...a8df52
Step 3: Consolidate
- AttackerAttacker main walletstablecoins swapped to ETHsplit across five wallets0x3e37f4a1...ea65d0
Step 4: Mixer
- ExitTornado Cash3,000 ETH inabout $2.44M parked in DAI
Why each step worked
- Approvals to unknown contractsbot granted spend rights to fresh bait tokens
- No allowance resetmissing controlunused approvals were never revoked
- No cap on exposure to new tokensmissing controlmain treasury reachable from any route
- No post-trade allowance checkmissing controlunspent approvals went unnoticed
- Automated trading at machine speedno human review of new routes
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
The bot trusted contracts it had never seen before. jaredfromsubway's searcher automatically traded any route its models judged profitable, including routes through freshly deployed tokens and pools, and to do that it granted those unknown contracts permission to spend its WETH, USDC and USDT. It assumed a granted approval would be used up inside the same trade, never checked that it was, and never revoked what was left. The attacker built tokens that behaved honestly while the bot was learning the route, then flipped them into a mode where trades left the approvals untouched, so allowances quietly piled up over hundreds of the bot's own transactions. One coordinated transaction then used the standing approvals to pull about $7.48 million. No private key was stolen and no bug in a public protocol was used; Blockaid and CertiK both describe it as an attack on the bot's decision logic. The bot's speed and automation were the weakness: it gave spending rights to attacker code at machine speed with no allow-list, no per-trade allowance reset and no cap on its exposure to any single new token.
Prevention analysis
Approvals that never outlive a trade cannot accumulate. The final sweep would have found nothing to spend.
Routing unknown tokens through an isolated contract with a small balance would have capped the loss at that float instead of the bot's main treasury.
The trap relied on trades that left approvals unspent. A post-trade allowance check would have flagged the first such trade and stopped the bot.
Similar incidents
An attacker made an MEV bot act on attacker-supplied input, through an unprotected callback, and drained about 1,100 ETH. Same class: a searcher that executes or approves what outside contracts hand it.
Sandwich bots lost about $25 million when an attacker exploited their assumptions about how bundles would execute. Same theme: automated MEV strategies baited by an adversary who studied them.
Remediation
Timeline
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