Kava Lend
Why it happened
Attack class: Precision loss / roundingThe BUSD market's interest index divides by net supply and skips the division only at exactly zero, so a tiny supply inflated deposits about 243,000-fold.
What would have stopped it
- Guard the division when supply is tiny, not only when it is zero
- Cap how fast an index or collateral value can change
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored Kava Lend before this exploit.
On the night of November 13 to 14, an attacker drained about 55.2 million KAVA, about $3.7 million at pre-attack prices, from Kava Lend, the lending protocol on the Kava chain. A rounding and division flaw in the interest index of the nearly idle BUSD market let a tiny effective supply inflate deposits about 243,000-fold, and the attacker borrowed KAVA against them across 127 loans. About 49.2 million KAVA was bridged to BNB Chain and mostly sold for about $2.09 million, and KAVA fell by almost half. Kava says the event was isolated to Kava Lend and was not an infinite mint, and has promised an incident report.
On-chain data read by The Block shows the attack on Kava Lend's BUSD market played out over about three minutes, followed by a bridge transfer of the borrowed KAVA to BNB Chain. Neither Kava nor the press has published attacker addresses or transaction hashes.
Attack flow
All 4 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Kava Lend module (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker and second account (attacker), about $3.7M reached this step. Step 3, Bridge and sale: BNB Chain sales (exit), about $2.09M reached this step.
Step 1: Root control
- SourceKava Lend moduleabout 55.2M KAVA~ $3.7M
Step 2: Drain
- AttackerAttacker and second account127 loans against inflated collateraleach cleared by a liquidation
Step 3: Bridge and sale
- ExitBNB Chain salesabout 49.2M KAVA bridgedabout $2.09M realised
Why each step worked
- Division guarded only at exactly zeroa tiny supply multiplied the interest index about 243,000 times
- Dormant BUSD market left livean unwatched market with almost no real supply
- No limit on how fast collateral value movesmissing controldeposit value rose 243,000-fold in about three minutes
- No pause on the bridge the funds usedmissing controlKava paused Axelar; the KAVA left through LayerZero
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
Kava Lend credits depositors with a share of borrowers' interest by dividing that interest by the market's net supply, which feeds an index that grows over time. The code avoids that division only when the supply is exactly zero, not when it is a tiny positive amount. DeFiLlama's summary of the incident, and The Block's reading of Kava's public source code, say the attacker used a small loan in the nearly idle BUSD market to push the effective supply down to a sliver, so the index multiplied about 243,000 times in minutes. Deposits made in advance were then counted as hugely more collateral than they were worth, and the attacker borrowed KAVA against them 127 times, using a second account to liquidate each loan in a way that erased the debt without recovering enough collateral. No key was stolen and Kava says the event was not an infinite mint. Kava has not yet published an incident report, so this account rests on the team's short statements, on-chain readings by The Block and DeFiLlama's description. Other lending markets that divide by a small or near-empty supply should guard that case.
Prevention analysis
A minimum-supply check on the interest index would have stopped the 243,000-fold jump even in a nearly empty market.
A limit on how far a deposit's value can move in a few minutes would have flagged the jump before any loan could be taken.
The BUSD market was nearly idle, since Paxos stopped minting BUSD in 2023. Retiring or capping dormant markets removes an unwatched attack surface.
The attacker probed the market from November 8. Monitoring for repeated odd deposit and borrow cycles in a quiet market could have given days of warning.
Similar incidents
Another 2026 chain-level accounting flaw where an arithmetic edge case made a balance far larger than the real tokens behind it, though in a different module.
Remediation
Timeline
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