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Kava Lend

November 14, 2026·Kava·Logic Error
$3.7M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Precision loss / rounding

The BUSD market's interest index divides by net supply and skips the division only at exactly zero, so a tiny supply inflated deposits about 243,000-fold.

What would have stopped it

  • Guard the division when supply is tiny, not only when it is zero
  • Cap how fast an index or collateral value can change

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Kava Lend before this exploit.

On the night of November 13 to 14, an attacker drained about 55.2 million KAVA, about $3.7 million at pre-attack prices, from Kava Lend, the lending protocol on the Kava chain. A rounding and division flaw in the interest index of the nearly idle BUSD market let a tiny effective supply inflate deposits about 243,000-fold, and the attacker borrowed KAVA against them across 127 loans. About 49.2 million KAVA was bridged to BNB Chain and mostly sold for about $2.09 million, and KAVA fell by almost half. Kava says the event was isolated to Kava Lend and was not an infinite mint, and has promised an incident report.

Rest of the Kava chainsafe(Kava says the incident was contained to Kava Lend, not an infinite mint)
Kava Lend KAVA liquiditydrained(about 55.2 million KAVA, about $3.7 million)
KAVA holdersdrained(price fell almost half in 24 hours)
Later BUSD depositsunknown(the inflated claim was reported still outstanding)
Exploit anatomy

On-chain data read by The Block shows the attack on Kava Lend's BUSD market played out over about three minutes, followed by a bridge transfer of the borrowed KAVA to BNB Chain. Neither Kava nor the press has published attacker addresses or transaction hashes.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Kava Lend module (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker and second account (attacker), about $3.7M reached this step. Step 3, Bridge and sale: BNB Chain sales (exit), about $2.09M reached this step.

  1. Step 1: Root control

    • Source
      Kava Lend module
      about 55.2M KAVA
      ~ $3.7M
  2. Step 2: Drain

    • Attacker
      Attacker and second account
      127 loans against inflated collateral
      each cleared by a liquidation
  3. Step 3: Bridge and sale

    • Exit
      BNB Chain sales
      about 49.2M KAVA bridged
      about $2.09M realised

Why each step worked

    • Division guarded only at exactly zeroa tiny supply multiplied the interest index about 243,000 times
    • Dormant BUSD market left livean unwatched market with almost no real supply
    • No limit on how fast collateral value movesmissing controldeposit value rose 243,000-fold in about three minutes
    • No pause on the bridge the funds usedmissing controlKava paused Axelar; the KAVA left through LayerZero
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
Per The Block's reading of on-chain data, the attacker had been depositing and borrowing in Kava Lend's nearly idle BUSD market since November 8, apparently preparing.
2.
At about 11 p.m. US Eastern on November 13 (04:00 UTC on November 14), a small BUSD loan cut that market's net supply to a tiny fraction of a dollar. Within about three minutes the value credited to its depositors rose roughly 243,000-fold.
3.
The attacker borrowed KAVA against the inflated deposit across 127 loans, using a second account to liquidate each loan so that the borrowing limit did not stop the next one. About 55.2 million KAVA, worth about $3.76 million before the attack, left the lending module.
4.
About 49.2 million KAVA was bridged to BNB Chain through LayerZero and mostly sold for about $2.09 million, and about 4.58 million KAVA went to five addresses on Kava. Kava paused the Axelar bridge and partner exchanges suspended KAVA deposits and withdrawals.

Root cause

Kava Lend credits depositors with a share of borrowers' interest by dividing that interest by the market's net supply, which feeds an index that grows over time. The code avoids that division only when the supply is exactly zero, not when it is a tiny positive amount. DeFiLlama's summary of the incident, and The Block's reading of Kava's public source code, say the attacker used a small loan in the nearly idle BUSD market to push the effective supply down to a sliver, so the index multiplied about 243,000 times in minutes. Deposits made in advance were then counted as hugely more collateral than they were worth, and the attacker borrowed KAVA against them 127 times, using a second account to liquidate each loan in a way that erased the debt without recovering enough collateral. No key was stolen and Kava says the event was not an infinite mint. Kava has not yet published an incident report, so this account rests on the team's short statements, on-chain readings by The Block and DeFiLlama's description. Other lending markets that divide by a small or near-empty supply should guard that case.

Prevention analysis

Guard the division when supply is tiny, not only when it is zero

A minimum-supply check on the interest index would have stopped the 243,000-fold jump even in a nearly empty market.

Cap how fast an index or collateral value can change

A limit on how far a deposit's value can move in a few minutes would have flagged the jump before any loan could be taken.

Disable or cap dormant markets

The BUSD market was nearly idle, since Paxos stopped minting BUSD in 2023. Retiring or capping dormant markets removes an unwatched attack surface.

Alert on repeated test borrowing

The attacker probed the market from November 8. Monitoring for repeated odd deposit and borrow cycles in a quiet market could have given days of warning.

Similar incidents

KiiChain (2026)

Another 2026 chain-level accounting flaw where an arithmetic edge case made a balance far larger than the real tokens behind it, though in a different module.

Remediation

1.Kava said the incident was isolated to Kava Lend and was not an infinite mint, paused the Axelar cross-chain bridge as a precaution and said it would publish a complete incident report when ready.
2.Partner exchanges paused KAVA deposits and withdrawals as a precaution.
3.Per Bitquery as reported by Cryptonews, the attacker's inflated BUSD claim stayed outstanding at the time, so later BUSD deposits into that market could be at risk; users should withdraw funds from affected Kava Lend markets until the team confirms a fix.
4.Other lending protocols should check how their interest index behaves when a market's supply is near zero.

Timeline

2026-11-08Attacker begins repeated deposit and borrow cycles in the BUSD market, per The Block.
2026-11-14A small BUSD loan cuts the market's net supply to a sliver; the deposit value rises about 243,000-fold within three minutes.
2026-11-14Bridging of about 49.2 million KAVA to BNB Chain through LayerZero begins.
2026-11-14Kava first acknowledges unexpected behavior in a dApp on its chain and says it is not an infinite mint.
2026-11-14Kava pauses the Axelar bridge as a precaution.
Kava team (statements and bridge pause). The Block (on-chain reading)
Continuous adversarial monitoring

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