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KiiChain

August 22, 2026·KiiChain·Logic Error
$9.7M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Logic error

A contract at a precomputed vesting-account address delegated more than its spendable balance, the balance underflowed, and a second flaw let it overwrite victim balances.

What would have stopped it

  • Bound every balance deduction
  • Restrict creation of vesting accounts

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored KiiChain before this exploit.

An attacker took about 148.3 million KII from 18 accounts on KiiChain on the evening of August 22, a value DeFiLlama puts at about $9.7 million. The cause is a set of balance-accounting flaws in the shared Cosmos EVM module that KiiChain runs, not KiiChain's own code, and the same technique hit MANTRA and TAC the same week. About 67.6 million KII went to BNB Chain over a bridge, where 64.6 million KII sold for about $1.6 million, and KiiChain halted its chain. Cosmos Labs says about 80.7 million KII is still on the halted chain and recoverable once the network is restored.

Total KII supplysafe(unchanged, balances were reassigned)
18 accounts on KiiChaindrained(about 148.3 million KII, about $9.7 million per DeFiLlama)
KII left on the halted chaindrained(about 80.7 million KII, recoverable per Cosmos Labs)
KiiChain networkdrained(halted at block 9,355,723)
Exploit anatomy

Per Cosmos Labs, the first logged exploit transaction on KiiChain was this transaction, at block 9,355,102. The sequence ran 18 times, and the attacker moved part of the proceeds to BNB Chain by bridge and swapped it for stablecoins.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: 18 KiiChain accounts (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker contracts (attacker), about $9.7M reached this step. Step 3, Bridge and sale: BNB Chain sales and exchange (exit), KII left on the halted chain (exit), about $5.28M reached this step.

  1. Step 1: Root control

    • Source
      18 KiiChain accounts
      148,326,583.15 KII
      ~ $9.7M
  2. Step 2: Drain

    • Attacker
      Attacker contracts
      18 repeats of one sequence
      no supply change
  3. Step 3: Bridge and sale

    • Exit
      BNB Chain sales and exchange
      64.6 million KII for 1.6M USDT
      3 million KII to an exchange
    • Exit
      KII left on the halted chain
      about 80.7 million KII
      recoverable on restoration

Why each step worked

    • Unbounded balance deductiondelegating locked vesting tokens wrapped the EVM balance
    • Missing overflow guard on EVM transfersthe wrapped balance could overwrite a victim's balance
    • No halt on abnormal debitsmissing controlthe sequence repeated before the chain stopped
    • No bridge outflow limitmissing control67.6 million KII left over the bridge
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
On the evening of August 22, the attacker deployed a contract at an address worked out in advance and turned that address into a vesting account first, per KiiChain and the Cosmos Labs post-mortem.
2.
The contract delegated one unit more KII than its spendable balance through the staking precompile. Per DeFiLlama's summary of KiiChain's account, that caused an underflow in the balance write-back, and a missing overflow guard in the EVM value-transfer path let real KII be redirected from victim accounts to the attacker.
3.
The sequence was repeated 18 times, taking about 148.3 million KII in total (148,326,583.15 per KiiChain), with no increase in total supply.
4.
The attacker moved 67,597,997.87 KII to BNB Chain over the Hyperlane bridge, swapped 64.6 million KII for 1,607,323.41 USDT on PancakeSwap and sent 3 million KII to an exchange deposit address. KiiChain halted at block 9,355,723 at 22:50 UTC; about 80.7 million KII stayed on the halted chain.

Root cause

KiiChain runs the shared Cosmos EVM module, which tracks balances twice: once inside the EVM and once in the Cosmos bank module. Per Cosmos Labs and KiiChain, the two views were not kept consistent when a vesting account delegated locked tokens through the staking precompile. The deduction was not bounded, so the EVM balance of the attacker's contract wrapped around to an enormous number, and a second weakness in the EVM transfer path let that number be used to overwrite a rich account's balance so that the attacker kept the victim's tokens and the victim was left with zero. Because the gain and the loss cancel, total supply never changed. The attacker needed no key, only a contract deployed at a precomputed address that had first been made a vesting account. The flaw is in shared upstream code, not code KiiChain wrote. Cosmos Labs rated it critical and said it affected Cosmos EVM below version 0.6.2 or 0.7.2. KiiChain says it blocked creation of vesting accounts as a temporary measure and disputed whether all the upstream defects had been fixed in published releases, so chain operators should apply the patches Cosmos Labs published and follow its current guidance.

Prevention analysis

Bound every balance deduction

A deduction that cannot fall below zero would have stopped the first step, and the wrapped balance would never have existed.

Restrict creation of vesting accounts

Vesting accounts are a niche feature. Limiting who can create them, which KiiChain did after the attack as a temporary measure, removes the set-up the attacker needed.

Halt on abnormal balance movement

Eighteen repeats and a bridge transfer ran before the halt. A monitor that stops the chain on large debits from dormant accounts would have cut the loss early.

Act on upstream fixes as soon as they ship

The fix was published about 50 hours before the attack on KiiChain. Chains that apply security releases immediately, and upstream teams that mark them as security releases, close the window.

Similar incidents

TAC (2026)

TAC's staking pool was emptied on August 22 through the same shared Cosmos EVM balance-accounting flaw, a drain of real tokens with no change in total supply.

Nesa (2026)

Nesa confirmed exploitation of a Cosmos EVM vulnerability on August 24, with the moved NES bridged to Ethereum. Same module, same class.

BounceBit Chain (2026)

A different bug in the same weak spot: vesting-account logic reachable from the EVM side of a Cosmos-based chain let an attacker move tokens out of accounts it did not control.

Remediation

1.KiiChain halted its chain at block 9,355,723 and blocked vesting account creation as a temporary measure.
2.Cosmos Labs estimates about 54 percent of the KII taken, roughly 80.7 million, remains on the halted chain and is recoverable once the network is restored; the rest left through the bridge and exchanges.
3.Any chain running Cosmos EVM should apply the patched releases published by Cosmos Labs and follow its current guidance, and should restrict who can create vesting accounts until it has.

Timeline

2026-08-19Cosmos EVM 0.6.2 and 0.7.2 are published with the underflow fix.
2026-08-22KiiChain's exploitation begins in the window of about 21:00 to 22:50 UTC; the exact first-transaction time is not published.
2026-08-22KiiChain halts at block 9,355,723.
2026-08-22Cosmos Labs urges all Cosmos EVM chains to halt immediately.
2026-08-28Cosmos Labs publishes its post-mortem naming KiiChain.
KiiChain team (detection, halt and incident account). Cosmos Labs (disclosure and fund-flow reconstruction)
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