BlackHart
Go live
Hacks feed/LABUBU/OLPC PancakeSwap V2 pool

LABUBU/OLPC PancakeSwap V2 pool

June 20, 2026·BNB Chain·Rugpull
$1.1M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Rugpull

The owner set an absurd burn multiplier and then renounced.

What would have stopped it

  • Check owner-set parameters before trusting a renounced token.
  • Avoid pools paired with tokens that can burn or tax the pair's balance.

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored LABUBU/OLPC PancakeSwap V2 pool before this exploit.

About $1.1 million in USDT was pulled out of a PancakeSwap pool pairing the OLPC and LABUBU tokens on BNB Chain on June 20. The cause was a trap set inside the OLPC token by its own owner, who in May switched on a setting that let a tiny trade burn almost all of the pool's OLPC and then gave up control so it could never be undone. When the trap was sprung, LABUBU liquidity in the pool and the LABUBU/WBNB pool was drained, while PancakeSwap's own contracts and other pools were not affected. The money was moved to Ethereum within minutes and 633.4 ETH was sent into Tornado Cash.

PancakeSwap contractssafe
Other PancakeSwap poolssafe
OLPC/LABUBU pooldrained(688,381 LABUBU taken)
LABUBU/WBNB pooldrained(about 2,041 WBNB sold out of it)
Exploit anatomy

The OLPC owner set the OLPC token burn multiplier to an absurd value and renounced; weeks later a fresh wallet used it to empty the OLPC/LABUBU pair in one transaction.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: OLPC/LABUBU pair (source). Step 2, Swap: LABUBU/WBNB pool (swap), WBNB/USDT pool (swap), about $1.12M reached this step. Step 3, Mixer: Tornado Cash (exit).

  1. Step 1: Root control

  2. Step 2: Swap

  3. Step 3: Mixer

Why each step worked

    • Owner-set burn multiplier0x9fe0f22556caff3f0b1c258f37b5b19228034d6b
    • Renounced to lock it inno owner left to undo the setting
    • Pool trusts its cached reservesburns from the pair break its accounting
    • No cap on owner parametersmissing controlany multiplier value was accepted
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
The OLPC token, deployed on April 30, 2026, burns tokens out of its PancakeSwap pair whenever OLPC leaves the pair, by the amount moved times an owner-set multiplier that started at 1. On May 5 the owner wallet raised that multiplier to 7,326,680,472,586,200,649, a value with no ordinary use that let a tiny transfer out of the pair burn almost all of its OLPC.
2.
Three days later, on May 8, the same owner wallet renounced ownership. The token now looked owner-free and safe, but the extreme multiplier was locked in and nobody could undo it.
3.
On June 20 at 11:31:03 UTC, a wallet first funded six days earlier triggered the trap in one transaction. A tiny OLPC movement out of the OLPC/LABUBU pair burned about 51.9 million OLPC from it, leaving the pair's recorded reserves far out of line with its real balance. The wallet then took 688,381 LABUBU out of the pair for almost nothing.
4.
In the same transaction the LABUBU was sold through the LABUBU/WBNB pool for 2,041 WBNB and then through the WBNB/USDT pool, ending as 1,115,903.66 USDT in the wallet.
5.
Within about 25 minutes the proceeds were bridged to the same address on Ethereum through NEAR Intents and the Aori bridge, and 633.4 ETH was deposited into Tornado Cash between 11:55 and 12:01 UTC.

Root cause

This was a trap built into the OLPC token by its owner, not a flaw an outsider stumbled on. OLPC's transfer logic burns OLPC from its trading pair whenever tokens leave the pair, multiplied by an owner-controlled setting. With the setting at 1 the token already behaved unusually; the owner then raised it to about 7.3 quintillion, which has no legitimate purpose and turned any tiny outflow from the pair into a burn of nearly all its OLPC. Three days later the owner renounced ownership, which made the token look safe while locking the trap in place for good. When it was triggered 46 days later, the burn knocked the pair's recorded reserves out of line with its real balance, a known weakness of constant-product pools paired with fee-on-transfer or burn-on-transfer tokens, and the LABUBU side could be bought out for almost nothing. PancakeSwap's contracts worked as designed and the platform says it was not at fault. SlowMist's founder questioned whether this was a theft at all given the parameter change, and analysts cited by NOMINIS call it a premeditated exit. BlackHart did not find a direct on-chain link between the owner wallet and the wallet that drained the pool, which was funded through a contract call six days before; the classification rests on the owner having set and locked the trap.

Prevention analysis

Check owner-set parameters before trusting a renounced token.

Renouncing ownership freezes settings, it does not make them safe. Reading the burn multiplier after renouncement would have shown an absurd value already locked in.

Avoid pools paired with tokens that can burn or tax the pair's balance.

A token that can take tokens out of its own pair can break the pool's accounting at any time. Liquidity providers on the LABUBU side carried that risk without knowing it.

Cap owner-settable parameters in the token code.

A hard upper bound on the multiplier, written into the contract, would have made the trap impossible to set.

Similar incidents

SQUID token (2021)

The token's own code, set up by its creators, was the trap: holders could buy but the value could only be pulled out by the insiders. Same class: hidden token behavior used for an exit.

BEVO token (2023)

A deflationary BSC token's transfer mechanics desynchronized a PancakeSwap pair's reserves from its real balance and the pool was drained. Same mechanism on the pool side.

PancakeSwap

PancakeSwap's V2 pair contracts were not at fault, but any pool paired with a token that can burn or tax the pair's balance inherits that token's risk.

Remediation

1.PancakeSwap said its core contracts were not responsible and that the loss was isolated to this pool.
2.Pending: neither the OLPC nor the LABUBU team has published a post-mortem, and the funds went into Tornado Cash.pending
3.Traders and liquidity providers should check a token's owner-set parameters and transfer logic before buying or pairing with it, even after ownership is renounced.
4.Token launch platforms and scanners should flag transfer functions that can burn from the trading pair.

Timeline

2026-04-30OLPC token is deployed with the burn multiplier set to 1.
2026-05-05OLPC owner raises the burn multiplier to about 7.3 quintillion.
2026-05-08OLPC owner renounces ownership, locking the setting in place.
2026-06-14The wallet that later drains the pool receives its first funds.
2026-06-20One transaction burns the pair's OLPC, takes the LABUBU side and exits with 1,115,903.66 USDT.
2026-06-20After bridging to Ethereum, the wallet begins depositing 633.4 ETH into Tornado Cash.
2026-06-20ExVul publishes a security alert with the addresses and attack transaction.
2026-06-20SlowMist founder Cos flags the owner's parameter change and questions the theft framing.
ExVul. PeckShield. SlowMist (Cos). NOMINIS. BlackHart on-chain reconstruction
Continuous adversarial monitoring

Get your protocol scored across 12 dimensions, or request ongoing coverage.