LABUBU/OLPC PancakeSwap V2 pool
Why it happened
Attack class: RugpullThe owner set an absurd burn multiplier and then renounced.
What would have stopped it
- Check owner-set parameters before trusting a renounced token.
- Avoid pools paired with tokens that can burn or tax the pair's balance.
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored LABUBU/OLPC PancakeSwap V2 pool before this exploit.
About $1.1 million in USDT was pulled out of a PancakeSwap pool pairing the OLPC and LABUBU tokens on BNB Chain on June 20. The cause was a trap set inside the OLPC token by its own owner, who in May switched on a setting that let a tiny trade burn almost all of the pool's OLPC and then gave up control so it could never be undone. When the trap was sprung, LABUBU liquidity in the pool and the LABUBU/WBNB pool was drained, while PancakeSwap's own contracts and other pools were not affected. The money was moved to Ethereum within minutes and 633.4 ETH was sent into Tornado Cash.
The OLPC owner set the OLPC token burn multiplier to an absurd value and renounced; weeks later a fresh wallet used it to empty the OLPC/LABUBU pair in one transaction.
Attack flow
All 5 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: OLPC/LABUBU pair (source). Step 2, Swap: LABUBU/WBNB pool (swap), WBNB/USDT pool (swap), about $1.12M reached this step. Step 3, Mixer: Tornado Cash (exit).
Step 1: Root control
- SourceOLPC/LABUBU pair51.9M OLPC burned from the pair688,381 LABUBU taken0xedb7dcb4...c9f365
Step 2: Swap
- SwapLABUBU/WBNB pool564,128 LABUBU sold2,041 WBNB out0xdfacdc33...73c421
- SwapWBNB/USDT pool1,115,903.66 USDTsame transaction0x16b9a828...eb0dae
Step 3: Mixer
- ExitTornado Cash633.4 ETH inbridged via NEAR Intents and Aori0xd90e2f92...24f31b
Why each step worked
- Owner-set burn multiplier0x9fe0f22556caff3f0b1c258f37b5b19228034d6b
- Renounced to lock it inno owner left to undo the setting
- Pool trusts its cached reservesburns from the pair break its accounting
- No cap on owner parametersmissing controlany multiplier value was accepted
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
This was a trap built into the OLPC token by its owner, not a flaw an outsider stumbled on. OLPC's transfer logic burns OLPC from its trading pair whenever tokens leave the pair, multiplied by an owner-controlled setting. With the setting at 1 the token already behaved unusually; the owner then raised it to about 7.3 quintillion, which has no legitimate purpose and turned any tiny outflow from the pair into a burn of nearly all its OLPC. Three days later the owner renounced ownership, which made the token look safe while locking the trap in place for good. When it was triggered 46 days later, the burn knocked the pair's recorded reserves out of line with its real balance, a known weakness of constant-product pools paired with fee-on-transfer or burn-on-transfer tokens, and the LABUBU side could be bought out for almost nothing. PancakeSwap's contracts worked as designed and the platform says it was not at fault. SlowMist's founder questioned whether this was a theft at all given the parameter change, and analysts cited by NOMINIS call it a premeditated exit. BlackHart did not find a direct on-chain link between the owner wallet and the wallet that drained the pool, which was funded through a contract call six days before; the classification rests on the owner having set and locked the trap.
Prevention analysis
Renouncing ownership freezes settings, it does not make them safe. Reading the burn multiplier after renouncement would have shown an absurd value already locked in.
A token that can take tokens out of its own pair can break the pool's accounting at any time. Liquidity providers on the LABUBU side carried that risk without knowing it.
A hard upper bound on the multiplier, written into the contract, would have made the trap impossible to set.
Similar incidents
The token's own code, set up by its creators, was the trap: holders could buy but the value could only be pulled out by the insiders. Same class: hidden token behavior used for an exit.
A deflationary BSC token's transfer mechanics desynchronized a PancakeSwap pair's reserves from its real balance and the pool was drained. Same mechanism on the pool side.
PancakeSwap's V2 pair contracts were not at fault, but any pool paired with a token that can burn or tax the pair's balance inherits that token's risk.
Remediation
Timeline
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