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Lazy Summer Protocol

July 6, 2026·Ethereum·Logic Error
$6.0M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Composability exploit

An offboarding that was started but never finished.

What would have stopped it

  • Finish offboarding: empty and remove a capped strategy promptly.
  • Value vault-in-vault positions at live, realizable prices.

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Lazy Summer Protocol before this exploit.

An attacker took about $6.04 million from two Lazy Summer Protocol USDC vaults on Ethereum by exploiting a strategy that had been half retired. A Silo position impaired by the Stream Finance collapse in November 2025 still counted toward the vaults' value, so the attacker, using flash loans and Silo shares bought cheaply months earlier, pushed the vaults' share price up and redeemed at the higher price for real USDC. The loss fell on other depositors in those two vaults, and all Lazy Summer vaults were paused across chains. Part of the proceeds was swapped to ether and sent through Tornado Cash, and compensation is still being decided by the DAO.

Other Lazy Summer vaultssafe(paused as a precaution)
Morpho flash loan liquiditysafe(repaid in the same transaction)
Lower Risk USDC vaultdrained(about $5.64 million)
Higher Risk USDC vaultdrained(about $0.40 million)
Depositor compensationunknown(still being decided by the DAO)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker used an executor contract and overvalued Silo shares to lift the share price of the Lower Risk USDC vault and the Higher Risk USDC vault, redeeming for about $6.04 million in one transaction.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Lower Risk USDC vault (source), Higher Risk USDC vault (source). Step 2, Inflate + redeem: Executor contract (hub), Attacker wallet (attacker), about $6.04M reached this step. Step 3, Mixer: Tornado Cash (exit), about $6M reached this step.

  1. Step 1: Root control

    • Source
      Lower Risk USDC vault
      share price counts the Silo position
      about $5.64M lost
      0x98C49e13...9EcF17
    • Source
      Higher Risk USDC vault
      second vault in the same transaction
      about $0.40M lost
      0xE9cDA459...70cB06
  2. Step 2: Inflate + redeem

  3. Step 3: Mixer

    • Exit
      Tornado Cash
      via an intermediary wallet
      from July 7

Why each step worked

    • Impaired Silo position still counted in valuecapped in October 2025 but never removed
    • Offboarding never finishedmissing controlno sweep, write-down or removal
    • Morpho flash loansabout 65.4 million USDC and 1 million USDT for one transaction
    • No limit on same-block share price jumpsmissing controlinflate and redeem in one transaction
    • No response before cash-outmissing controlcaps zeroed 1.5 hours later, after the transaction had settled
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
Months before the attack, wallets funded through Base acquired Silo Varlamore USDC Growth vault shares, a position impaired by the November 2025 Stream Finance collapse that Lazy Summer still counted at a higher value.
2.
On July 6, 2026 at 05:17:59 UTC, one transaction funded by Morpho flash loans used those overvalued shares to raise the reported value of two Lazy Summer USDC vaults, then redeemed vault shares at the higher price for real USDC.
3.
The flash loans were repaid in the same transaction and about 6,016,755 DAI plus leftover vault shares went to the attacker wallet; about $5.64 million came from the Lower Risk vault and $0.40 million from the Higher Risk vault.
4.
Over the following days part of the proceeds was swapped to ether and sent through an intermediary wallet into Tornado Cash in batches.

Root cause

The root cause was an offboarding that was started but never finished. Lazy Summer vaults spread deposits across strategy positions and price their shares from the total value of those positions. After the November 2025 Stream Finance collapse impaired the Silo Varlamore USDC Growth position, its deposit cap was set to zero in late October 2025, but it was never removed from the vault's active set, so it kept counting toward the vault's value at a figure well above what it could be sold for. That left a gap between what the vault said a share was worth and what backed it. The attacker bought the impaired Silo shares cheaply months in advance and, in one flash-loan-funded transaction, used them to lift the vault's reported value by about 9.5 percent and redeemed at the higher price, with the difference paid from other depositors' liquid USDC. No key was stolen and the contracts behaved as written; per Summer.fi's post-mortem and the Verichains and Rekt analyses, the failure was operational, compounded by valuing a vault-in-vault position from stored accounting rather than live, realizable value. A 2025 ChainSecurity review had noted that removing a strategy requires it to be fully empty, which made complete offboarding harder.

Prevention analysis

Finish offboarding: empty and remove a capped strategy promptly.

Setting the deposit cap to zero stopped new deposits but left the impaired position in the share price for eight months. Sweeping it, writing it down and removing it would have closed the gap the attacker used.

Value vault-in-vault positions at live, realizable prices.

Marking the Silo position to what it could actually be sold for after the Stream Finance collapse would have removed the overvaluation, so adding more of it could not lift the vault's share price.

Ignore direct transfers when computing share price.

Counting only assets that entered through deposits, or capping how fast reported value can rise in one block, stops a same-transaction inflate-and-redeem.

Similar incidents

Thetanuts Finance (2026)

Vault share value was raised without real backing and redeemed for real USDC with flash loan help. Same class: share price decoupled from realizable assets.

Cream Finance (2021)

An attacker inflated the price per share of a vault token used inside another protocol, then borrowed against the inflated value. Same composability pattern: one vault trusting another vault's reported value.

Remediation

1.Block Analitica set deposit caps on the two affected vaults to zero about 1.5 hours after the attack, and the guardian multisig paused Lazy Summer vaults on Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum and Sonic; on HyperEVM the pause failed for a missing role but caps were already zero.
2.The Lazy Summer Foundation moved the donated Silo shares out of the Lower Risk vault, and governance began sweeping and removing the affected strategies.
3.Summer.fi, the company, announced it was winding down in July 2026; the DAO is working on restoring withdrawals and deciding on compensation, which is pending.pending
4.Vault curators should fully remove impaired strategies rather than only capping them, and value nested vault positions at live, realizable prices.

Timeline

2025-10-30Deposit cap on the Silo Varlamore position set to zero, but the position stays in the vault's active set.
2026-07-06Attacker consolidates the pre-acquired Silo shares into its executor contract.
2026-07-06Single attack transaction drains about $6.04 million from the two USDC vaults; Blockaid alerts while it is happening.
2026-07-06Deposit caps on the affected vaults set to zero, about 1.5 hours after the attack.
2026-07-06About three hours after the attack, Summer.fi says it is investigating and guardians pause Lazy Summer vaults across chains.
2026-07-07Proceeds begin moving into Tornado Cash.
Blockaid (first alert). CertiK and PeckShield (alerts). Verichains (analysis). SEAL 911 and Block Analitica (response)
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