Lazy Summer Protocol
Why it happened
Attack class: Composability exploitAn offboarding that was started but never finished.
What would have stopped it
- Finish offboarding: empty and remove a capped strategy promptly.
- Value vault-in-vault positions at live, realizable prices.
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored Lazy Summer Protocol before this exploit.
An attacker took about $6.04 million from two Lazy Summer Protocol USDC vaults on Ethereum by exploiting a strategy that had been half retired. A Silo position impaired by the Stream Finance collapse in November 2025 still counted toward the vaults' value, so the attacker, using flash loans and Silo shares bought cheaply months earlier, pushed the vaults' share price up and redeemed at the higher price for real USDC. The loss fell on other depositors in those two vaults, and all Lazy Summer vaults were paused across chains. Part of the proceeds was swapped to ether and sent through Tornado Cash, and compensation is still being decided by the DAO.
The attacker used an executor contract and overvalued Silo shares to lift the share price of the Lower Risk USDC vault and the Higher Risk USDC vault, redeeming for about $6.04 million in one transaction.
Attack flow
All 4 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Lower Risk USDC vault (source), Higher Risk USDC vault (source). Step 2, Inflate + redeem: Executor contract (hub), Attacker wallet (attacker), about $6.04M reached this step. Step 3, Mixer: Tornado Cash (exit), about $6M reached this step.
Step 1: Root control
- SourceLower Risk USDC vaultshare price counts the Silo positionabout $5.64M lost0x98C49e13...9EcF17
- SourceHigher Risk USDC vaultsecond vault in the same transactionabout $0.40M lost0xE9cDA459...70cB06
Step 2: Inflate + redeem
- HubExecutor contractMorpho flash loans, no feeshare price up about 9.5 percent0x0514F827...82FC61
- AttackerAttacker wallet6,016,755 DAIplus about $100K of vault shares0x7BF71616...B3BDCa
Step 3: Mixer
- ExitTornado Cashvia an intermediary walletfrom July 7
Why each step worked
- Impaired Silo position still counted in valuecapped in October 2025 but never removed
- Offboarding never finishedmissing controlno sweep, write-down or removal
- Morpho flash loansabout 65.4 million USDC and 1 million USDT for one transaction
- No limit on same-block share price jumpsmissing controlinflate and redeem in one transaction
- No response before cash-outmissing controlcaps zeroed 1.5 hours later, after the transaction had settled
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
The root cause was an offboarding that was started but never finished. Lazy Summer vaults spread deposits across strategy positions and price their shares from the total value of those positions. After the November 2025 Stream Finance collapse impaired the Silo Varlamore USDC Growth position, its deposit cap was set to zero in late October 2025, but it was never removed from the vault's active set, so it kept counting toward the vault's value at a figure well above what it could be sold for. That left a gap between what the vault said a share was worth and what backed it. The attacker bought the impaired Silo shares cheaply months in advance and, in one flash-loan-funded transaction, used them to lift the vault's reported value by about 9.5 percent and redeemed at the higher price, with the difference paid from other depositors' liquid USDC. No key was stolen and the contracts behaved as written; per Summer.fi's post-mortem and the Verichains and Rekt analyses, the failure was operational, compounded by valuing a vault-in-vault position from stored accounting rather than live, realizable value. A 2025 ChainSecurity review had noted that removing a strategy requires it to be fully empty, which made complete offboarding harder.
Prevention analysis
Setting the deposit cap to zero stopped new deposits but left the impaired position in the share price for eight months. Sweeping it, writing it down and removing it would have closed the gap the attacker used.
Marking the Silo position to what it could actually be sold for after the Stream Finance collapse would have removed the overvaluation, so adding more of it could not lift the vault's share price.
Counting only assets that entered through deposits, or capping how fast reported value can rise in one block, stops a same-transaction inflate-and-redeem.
Similar incidents
Vault share value was raised without real backing and redeemed for real USDC with flash loan help. Same class: share price decoupled from realizable assets.
An attacker inflated the price per share of a vault token used inside another protocol, then borrowed against the inflated value. Same composability pattern: one vault trusting another vault's reported value.
Remediation
Timeline
Get your protocol scored across 12 dimensions, or request ongoing coverage.