BlackHart
Go live
Hacks feed/Limit Break Payment Processor

Limit Break Payment Processor

September 24, 2026·Ethereum·Access Control
$1.8M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Access control

A flaw in the shared contract let a trade be treated as accepted by the owner, so old approvals could be spent at a zero price.

What would have stopped it

  • Authenticate the real owner on every transfer
  • Ship an emergency pause on every version

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Limit Break Payment Processor before this exploit.

Starting September 24, 2026, an attacker used a flaw in Limit Break's Payment Processor to move NFTs and tokens out of wallets that had approved it, without any real sale. DeFiLlama puts the loss at about $1.8 million across Ethereum, ApeChain, Polygon and Base, and other trackers cite higher figures, up to $2.8 million. About 660 WETH could not be secured, while whitehats moved more than 23,155 NFTs worth over $5.7 million to safety. The newer V3 version was paused, but V2 cannot be paused or fixed, so users should revoke their approvals.

Wallets that revoked their approvalssafe
Live Magic Eden listingssafe(Magic Eden says none were affected)
NFTs moved by whitehatssafe(over 23,155, claimable after revoking)
Wallets with old approvals that were draineddrained(about $1.8 million per DeFiLlama, up to $2.8 million per other trackers)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker abused standing approvals that wallets had granted to Payment Processor V2. One WETH drain transaction on September 25 took about 281.66 WETH from 25 wallets, and the NFT pulls before it used the same approvals at a zero price.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Wallets with old approvals (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker-controlled addresses (attacker), about $1.8M reached this step. Step 3, Rescue: Whitehat custody (exit).

  1. Step 1: Root control

    • Source
      Wallets with old approvals
      approved years earlier
      NFTs, WETH, other tokens
  2. Step 2: Drain

    • Attacker
      Attacker-controlled addresses
      NFTs at zero price
      about 281.66 WETH in one transaction
  3. Step 3: Rescue

    • Exit
      Whitehat custody
      over 23,155 NFTs
      worth over $5.7M

Why each step worked

    • Spoofable caller identitytrade treated as accepted by the owner
    • Standing approvals never expired2024 listings still exposed
    • V2 cannot be pausedmissing controlimmutable contract
    • About 660 WETH not secured in timemissing controlfungible tokens could not be moved first
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
On September 24 the attacker began using a flaw in Payment Processor V2 on Ethereum to pull NFTs out of wallets that had approved the contract years earlier, without any real marketplace purchase. The first batch, 305 NFTs from one wallet, moved at a zero price, per CryptoTicker's account of 0xQuit's analysis.
2.
Overnight the same approach moved thousands more NFTs from users who had listed on Magic Eden in 2024. Limit Break found that V3 carried the same flaw and paused it where it could, while V2, an immutable contract, could not be paused.
3.
On September 25 the approval flaw was used in reverse against token approvals. One transaction took about 281.66 WETH from 25 wallets, and the sweep continued across Ethereum and other chains, with USDC, WILD and WAPE also taken.
4.
A whitehat team led by 0xQuit moved more than 23,155 vulnerable NFTs, worth over $5.7 million, into safe custody for owners to reclaim after they revoke approvals. About 660 WETH could not be secured in time.

Root cause

The Payment Processor is a shared trading contract that users approve once so a marketplace can move their NFTs and tokens when a sale settles. The sources describe a flaw in how V2 decided who was acting: it accepted a caller identity that could be forged, so a trade could be treated as if the owner had agreed to it. With that, an attacker could spend an approval the owner granted long ago, at a zero price, with no signature from the owner and no key theft. The weakness did not sit in any one marketplace. It sat in the shared contract that holds every standing approval, so old listings from 2024 stayed exposed even after Magic Eden dropped V2 in October 2024 and closed its EVM marketplace in early 2026. V3 had the same flaw. V2 is immutable and cannot be paused or patched, which is why the response was rescue and revocation instead of a fix. Limit Break has not published a full post-mortem, so the detail above rests on the statements of Limit Break and 0xQuit as reported by press.

Prevention analysis

Authenticate the real owner on every transfer

A transfer that requires a check bound to the actual owner, rather than a relayed identity, would have stopped zero-price pulls against old approvals.

Ship an emergency pause on every version

V3 could be paused within hours. V2 could not, so it stayed usable and whitehats had to move assets by hand.

Expire or scope approvals by default

Approvals limited by time or amount would have left far less exposed from 2024 listings.

Similar incidents

Lumi Finance (2026)

A validation flaw let an attacker spend token allowances users had already granted, leaving standing approvals as the exposure.

BV-7X (2026)

Long-lived token approvals let an attacker move assets weeks after the approval was granted.

Remediation

1.Limit Break paused Payment Processor V3 where it could and stated that V2, an immutable contract, cannot be fixed.
2.Limit Break told users to revoke their Payment Processor approvals, for both tokens and NFTs, instead of waiting for a fix. Its investigation is pending.pending
3.Whitehats led by 0xQuit moved vulnerable NFTs to custody and opened a claim site where owners reclaim them after revoking.
4.Treat this as possibly still live: revoke token and NFT approvals to Payment Processor contracts on every chain you have used, using a tool such as Revoke.cash. Other shared trading contracts that hold standing approvals should confirm they can be paused.

Timeline

2026-09-24First attack pulls 305 NFTs from one wallet at zero price, per CryptoTicker.
2026-09-250xQuit finds the flaw and contacts Limit Break, which pauses V3. V2 cannot be paused.
2026-09-25Whitehat rescue of vulnerable NFTs begins.
2026-09-25WETH drain begins. The first transaction takes about 281.66 WETH from 25 wallets.
2026-09-26Limit Break tells users to revoke V2 and V3 approvals, saying V2 is immutable.
0xQuit (Yuga Labs), who analysed the flaw and led the NFT rescue. Revoke.cash, which tracked the exposure. DeFiLlama, for the loss figure
Continuous adversarial monitoring

Get your protocol scored across 12 dimensions, or request ongoing coverage.