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Liquid Network

September 6, 2026·Liquid Network·Bridge Exploit
$320.0M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Logic error

Liquid nodes cached proof checks with a cache key that could be matched by crafted bytes, so an invalid proof was accepted and unbacked coins were later redeemed for real bitcoin.

What would have stopped it

  • Peg-out size and velocity limits
  • Reserve-versus-supply monitoring that pauses automatically

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Liquid Network before this exploit.

Someone exploited a flaw in Elements, the software behind the Liquid sidechain, to create about 4,000 L-BTC that had no bitcoin behind it. They sent it to SideSwap's peg-out service, which converted it to real bitcoin, and the Liquid Federation released about 3,996 BTC, roughly $320 million at the time. The actors posted that they were white hats, and about 3,400 BTC was returned the next day, leaving about 600 BTC outstanding per Blockstream's last report. Blockstream says no keys were compromised and other Liquid assets were not inflated, though the network was paused while it recovered.

Federation and SideSwap keyssafe(not compromised, per Blockstream)
Other Liquid-issued assets such as USDtsafe(not inflated, but unavailable while the network was paused)
Liquid bitcoin reservesdrained(about 3,996 BTC released, about $320 million)
Peg-out servicepartially affected(disabled during the staged recovery)
Exploit anatomy

On Liquid, the attacker submitted a transaction that Elements nodes accepted as valid, creating about 4,000 unbacked L-BTC. The attacker then used SideSwap's peg-out service, and the Federation released about 3,996 BTC on Bitcoin. Later, about 3,400 BTC was returned to the Federation peg wallet.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Unbacked mint: Liquid sidechain (source). Step 2, Peg-out: SideSwap peg-out service (hub), about $320M reached this step. Step 3, Reserve drain: Actor wallet (exit).

  1. Step 1: Unbacked mint

    • Source
      Liquid sidechain
      about 4,000 L-BTC created
      no bitcoin behind it
  2. Step 2: Peg-out

    • Hub
      SideSwap peg-out service
      received about 4,000 L-BTC
      burned it and requested BTC
  3. Step 3: Reserve drain

    • Exit
      Actor wallet
      about 3,996 BTC received
      about 3,400 BTC returned

Why each step worked

    • Range proof cache accepted forged matchcache key built from fields joined without length markers
    • Earlier cache bug fixed but not yet visiblepublic fix revealed the code of the second flaw on September 1
    • Online peg-out signing keymissing controlpayouts forwarded automatically
    • No peg-out size or velocity limitmissing controlone request drained most reserves
    • No supply-versus-reserve alarmmissing controlhalt came hours after the peg-out
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
Per Blockstream's incident report, a flaw in how Elements nodes cached range proof checks let the attacker create about 4,000 L-BTC on the Liquid sidechain with no bitcoin behind it. The exploit was confirmed in Liquid block 4,050,336.
2.
The attacker first tested a small peg-out, then deposited the roughly 4,000 unbacked L-BTC with SideSwap's peg-out service, where it looked the same as properly backed L-BTC.
3.
SideSwap processed a valid-looking peg-out and burned the L-BTC, and the Liquid Federation released about 3,996 BTC from its Bitcoin reserve to SideSwap, which forwarded it onward.
4.
Blockstream halted the Liquid bridge nodes after the network stalled. The actor posted an on-chain message claiming to be white hats, and about 3,400 BTC was later returned to the Federation peg wallet.

Root cause

Liquid's nodes cache the result of range proof verification so they do not repeat expensive checks. Per Blockstream's incident report, an earlier version of the cache key left out parts of the data a proof is tied to, and the fix for that issue joined fields together without length markers. That let the attacker build a proof and script whose bytes lined up with a previously cached valid entry, so the node returned 'valid' without actually verifying it. The result was L-BTC that nodes accepted as real but that had no bitcoin reserve behind it. The peg-out then worked as designed: SideSwap's peg-out service burned what looked like normal L-BTC and the Federation released real bitcoin. Blockstream states that no Federation or SideSwap key was compromised. It also says SideSwap's peg-out authorization setup kept its signing key online, paid out automatically and applied no size or velocity limit, which meant a single large peg-out passed through unchecked.

Prevention analysis

Peg-out size and velocity limits

A cap on how much bitcoin one peg-out request could release would have turned a reserve-draining event into a small one.

Reserve-versus-supply monitoring that pauses automatically

An automatic halt when L-BTC supply exceeded reserves would have stopped the peg-out within minutes, not hours.

Offline peg-out signing with human review

Keeping the peg-out authorization key offline, as the Federation charter requires, would have forced a review before a record-size release.

Similar incidents

Nomic nBTC (2026)

A voucher on a bitcoin-backed chain was created without matching reserves, and the bridge honored it for real bitcoin.

Aztec Connect (2026)

Forged proofs were accepted as valid by on-chain verification, releasing funds that had no real backing.

Remediation

1.Blockstream deployed an emergency patch to bridge nodes on September 7 and released Elements 23.3.4 with a hardened fix, then restarted block production on a corrected chain with replacement block 4,050,336 on September 9.done
2.Peg-outs remained disabled during the staged recovery, and the remaining shortfall of about 600 BTC was still being pursued per Blockstream's last update.
3.Other chains built on Elements or similar caching of proof verification should review how cache keys are built and upgrade to the patched release.
4.Operators of peg-out services should keep signing keys offline and apply size and velocity limits.

Timeline

2026-09-06Exploit transaction confirmed in Liquid block 4,050,336, creating about 4,000 unbacked L-BTC.
2026-09-06Federation releases about 3,996 BTC on Bitcoin in the peg-out.
2026-09-06Blockstream coordinates a halt of the Liquid bridge nodes.
2026-09-06The actor posts an on-chain message saying they are white hats.
2026-09-06Liquid publicly discloses the incident.
2026-09-07Emergency interim patch deployed to bridge nodes.
2026-09-07About 3,400 BTC returned to the Federation peg wallet.
2026-09-09Block production resumes on a corrected chain.
Blockstream and the Liquid Federation (incident report). stutxo, who reported the earlier cache bug. Bitcoin Red Team. Alpen Labs (review of the patched release). Halborn and Chainalysis (public analysis)
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