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Maya Protocol (MAYAChain)

August 18, 2026·MAYAChain·Logic Error
$1.7M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Logic error

A batch of messages faked a missing payout, the theft routine paid an uncapped subsidy into a thin pool, and a failed funding transfer was never rolled back.

What would have stopped it

  • Make pool credits and their funding transfers atomic
  • Cap compensation subsidies against pool depth and Reserve balance

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Maya Protocol (MAYAChain) before this exploit.

An attacker drained about $1.7 million from Maya Protocol, the THORChain-style cross-chain exchange on MAYAChain, by chaining several accounting bugs that made the network credit a nearly empty ARB.LINK pool with about 49.45 million CACAO that never arrived. They bought almost the whole pool for 100 CACAO, withdrew about 48.87 million real CACAO from the shared liquidity and sold it for 20.83 BTC plus a little ETH and LINK, which crashed CACAO by nearly 89% and cut pool value by about $11 million. Every liquidity provider in Maya's pools absorbed the loss; no keys or vaults were compromised. The BTC sat untouched until early November, when it was moved to a fresh Bitcoin address.

MAYAChain vault keyssafe(no key compromise)
THORChain and other networkssafe
Maya liquidity providersdrained(about $1.7 million taken, about $11 million pool value lost)
CACAO holdersdrained(price fell about 89% during the drain)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker's MAYAChain address sent a 23-message transaction that tricked MAYAChain into crediting the ARB.LINK pool with CACAO it never received, then bought and withdrew the pool and swapped the CACAO for 20.83 BTC sent to a Bitcoin address, later moved to a fresh address.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Phantom credit: ARB.LINK pool (source). Step 2, Pool drain: Attacker MAYAChain address (attacker), about $1.7M reached this step. Step 3, Bitcoin exit: Attacker Bitcoin address (attacker), Consolidation address (exit), about $1.34M reached this step.

  1. Step 1: Phantom credit

    • Source
      ARB.LINK pool
      +49.45M CACAO on the books
      Reserve held only about 168K
  2. Step 2: Pool drain

    • Attacker
      Attacker MAYAChain address
      100 CACAO buys 99.93% of the pool
      48.87M CACAO withdrawn
      maya1dl3yr...mwsv8x
  3. Step 3: Bitcoin exit

Why each step worked

    • Shared transaction ID overwrote outbound trackingmaya1dl3yrfpedyr5jfr0r86s2apjltnjqgszmwsv8x
    • Uncapped theft-slash subsidyno limit against pool depth or Reserve balance
    • No rollback when the Reserve transfer failedmissing controlpool credit kept after the funding error
    • Withdrawals trusted the pool's book balancepaid from shared Asgard liquidity
    • No circuit breaker on a CACAO price collapsemissing controlswaps kept clearing as CACAO fell 89%
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
At 17:00 UTC the attacker sent one MAYAChain transaction with 23 messages that all shared one transaction ID: 20 small trade-account withdrawals of ETH and two of LINK to Arbitrum, followed by a 1-unit CACAO donation to the ARB.LINK pool. The final donation overwrote the outbound tracking for the LINK withdrawals.
2.
When the legitimate LINK withdrawals were paid out on Arbitrum, MAYAChain could no longer match them to a request, treated them as an unauthorized vault outflow and started its theft-slashing routine. That routine credited the thin ARB.LINK pool with about 49.45 million CACAO in compensation before trying to move the CACAO from the Reserve, which held only about 168,000.
3.
The Reserve transfer failed, but the pool's inflated CACAO balance was not rolled back. The pool now showed about 49.45 million CACAO on its books that had never arrived.
4.
At 17:03 UTC the attacker added 100 CACAO to the nearly empty ARB.LINK pool, which gave it about 99.93% of the pool, and in the same transaction withdrew 99%. About 48.87 million CACAO came out of the shared Asgard liquidity.
5.
From 17:06 UTC the attacker sold the CACAO in 4 million CACAO swaps for real BTC in Maya's other pools, crashing CACAO from about $0.115 to $0.013. Twelve Bitcoin outputs totalling 20.83 BTC reached one address at 17:32 UTC, plus about 6 ETH and 100 LINK on Arbitrum.
6.
The BTC sat untouched until 5 November, when all 20.83 BTC was consolidated into a fresh address, where it remains.

Root cause

No key or contract was compromised. The attacker chained several edge cases in MAYAChain's own node software, per the team's preliminary analysis, SlowMist and the published reconstructions. First, several messages in one transaction could share a single ID, and the last one overwrote the record MAYAChain uses to match outbound payments, so genuine payouts looked missing. Second, the theft-detection path that then fired paid a compensation subsidy into the affected pool with no cap against the pool's size. Third, that credit was written to the pool before the Reserve transfer meant to fund it; when the transfer failed for lack of funds, the error was logged and the pool write was kept. The result was a pool with about 49.45 million CACAO on its books and almost nothing real behind it. Pool math then treated the near-empty pool as fresh, so a 100 CACAO deposit bought almost all of it, and withdrawals paid out of the shared Asgard vault trusted the pool's book balance. The real CACAO taken came from every other liquidity provider.

Prevention analysis

Make pool credits and their funding transfers atomic

If the failed Reserve transfer had rolled back the pool credit, the ARB.LINK pool would never have shown CACAO that did not exist, and there would have been nothing to withdraw.

Cap compensation subsidies against pool depth and Reserve balance

A 49.45 million CACAO credit to a pool holding almost nothing, from a Reserve holding 168,000, should have been rejected outright. A cap would have limited the subsidy to a small fraction of that.

Enforce unique transaction IDs per outbound message

Rejecting batches whose messages overwrite each other's outbound records would have kept the genuine LINK payouts matched and the theft detector quiet.

Similar incidents

THORChain (2021)

MAYAChain is a fork of THORChain, which lost about $13 million in 2021 to attacks on how its nodes matched deposits, refunds and outbound payments. Same family: node accounting that can be steered into paying out value that was never deposited.

Nomic nBTC (2026)

A balance was credited without the matching funds ever moving, and the attacker swapped the phantom balance for real liquidity. Same family: one side of a two-sided balance change silently fails.

Remediation

1.Maya halted all trading on 18 August to contain outflows. Its founder said the team would fix the flaws before swaps resumed, offered the attacker a bug bounty for returning the funds, and planned to replace the roughly 20 BTC from Maya's own investments if they were not returned.
2.MAYAChain released node v1.133.0 on 29 September, which hardens outbound matching, enforces unique native transaction IDs, caps the theft-slash subsidy, stops add-liquidity to a zero-unit pool being swallowed, and runs a one-time CACAO recovery migration that rebalanced pool CACAO and retired the ARB.LINK pool.done
3.The 20.83 BTC was consolidated into a fresh Bitcoin address on 5 November and has not been returned.
4.Other THORChain-derived networks should check that every pool credit tied to a later transfer is reverted when that transfer fails, and that compensation paths are capped.

Timeline

2026-08-18Attacker sends the 23-message transaction that overwrites outbound tracking for the LINK withdrawals.
2026-08-18Attacker adds 100 CACAO to the inflated ARB.LINK pool and withdraws 99%, taking about 48.87 million CACAO.
2026-08-18First 4 million CACAO swap to BTC. CACAO falls from about $0.115 to $0.013 within minutes.
2026-08-1820.83 BTC lands in the attacker's Bitcoin address in twelve outputs.
2026-08-18Maya founder confirms the exploit; the network halts all trading.
2026-09-29MAYAChain tags node v1.133.0 with the fixes and a CACAO recovery migration.
2026-11-05Attacker moves all 20.83 BTC to a fresh address.
Maya Protocol team (Aaluxx Myth). PeckShield (BTC trace). SlowMist. Defimon and SigIntZero (independent reconstructions)
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