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NEAR Intents

October 1, 2026·BNB Chain·Logic Error
$3.8M
total loss
Statusrecovered

Why it happened

Attack class: Logic error

A failed deposit notification left the credit in place after the refund, so unbacked balances were withdrawn as real USDT.

What would have stopped it

  • Solvency check on total user balances
  • Automatic pause on a failed invariant

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored NEAR Intents before this exploit.

NEAR Intents lost about $3.8 million in USDT on BNB Chain after an attacker created balances inside the Intents contract that had no tokens behind them and withdrew them through the Omni bridge. The team first called it an Omni bug, and its later post-mortem placed the flaw in the Intents contract's deposit notification step. NEAR paused services, patched the contract and compensated affected users. Per NEAR, the full amount was returned by October 2 after tracing and negotiation.

Omni bridge coresafe(per NEAR's post-mortem the flaw was in the Intents contract)
Other tokens and networkssafe(early statements put the impact on USDT on BNB Chain)
BNB Chain USDT in the bridge vaultdrained(about $3.8 million withdrawn)
Userspartially affected(compensated in full per NEAR)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker made deposit notifications fail in the NEAR Intents contract, then withdrew the unbacked balances through the Omni bridge from the bridge vault on BNB Chain, starting with this withdrawal and ending with this one. The attacker wallet later contacted the recovery team.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Ghost balance: NEAR Intents contract (source). Step 2, Withdrawal: Omni bridge vault on BNB Chain (bridge), about $3.8M reached this step. Step 3, Recovery: Bitcoin and exchange deposits (exit).

  1. Step 1: Ghost balance

    • Source
      NEAR Intents contract
      deposit credit kept after refund
      balances with no tokens behind them
  2. Step 2: Withdrawal

    • Bridge
      Omni bridge vault on BNB Chain
      USDT paid out to the attacker
      about $3.8M in five withdrawals
      0x233c5370...4Cb4Cd
  3. Step 3: Recovery

    • Exit
      Bitcoin and exchange deposits
      proceeds traced to Bitcoin and KuCoin
      returned per NEAR on October 2

Why each step worked

    • Failed deposit callback kept the creditthird-party notification call in the custody contract
    • Monitoring compared bridge vaults onlymissing controltotal user balances were never checked against holdings
    • No solvency invariantmissing controlwithdrawals continued for about 40 hours
    • Rapid tracing by exchanges and analystsalerts and an identification post led to the return
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
Per NEAR's post-mortem, the attacker deployed a contract on NEAR that made the deposit notification call from the Intents contract fail.
2.
When the notification failed, the token contract refunded the deposit but the Intents contract kept the credit, so the attacker held internal balances that nothing backed.
3.
The attacker withdrew those balances as real USDT on BNB Chain through the Omni bridge, in a series of withdrawals from the bridge's BSC vault.
4.
NEAR paused the contract, patched it and worked with outside researchers. The funds were traced to Bitcoin and exchange deposits, and NEAR says the full amount was returned by October 2.

Root cause

Per NEAR's post-mortem, the flaw was in the NEAR Intents smart contract, not in the Omni bridge as first reported. When a deposit arrived, the contract credited the user and then called a third-party contract to notify it. An attacker made that notification fail in a way that caused the deposit to be refunded while the credit inside Intents stayed in place. This produced balances that were not backed by tokens, which the attacker then withdrew as real assets through the Omni bridge. Monitoring only compared the bridge's vaults to token supply on NEAR, which still matched, and nobody checked whether the sum of user balances inside Intents matched what the contract actually held. NEAR also reports the same callback feature had a bug-bounty report earlier in the year and a further report after the incident, and removed the feature.

Prevention analysis

Solvency check on total user balances

An invariant that total user balances equal the contract's holdings, which NEAR added after the incident, would have flagged unbacked credits at the first withdrawal.

Automatic pause on a failed invariant

A contract that pauses itself when balances diverge would have stopped the withdrawals within minutes, not about 40 hours.

Keeping deposit notification calls outside the contract that holds funds

Removing third-party callbacks from the custody contract, as NEAR later did, removes the path that created the ghost balance.

Similar incidents

Secret Network Axelar bridge (2026)

A forged deposit was credited on one side and withdrawn as real value on another.

Nomic nBTC (2026)

Balances with no reserve behind them were honored at the bridge exit.

Remediation

1.NEAR paused the Intents contract, deployed a fix and re-enabled deposits on October 2, per its post-mortem.done
2.NEAR added an invariant check that pauses the contract automatically if user balances diverge from its holdings.
3.NEAR removed the deposit notification feature on October 7 after a further bug-bounty report and is prioritizing formal verification.
4.Protocols that call external contracts from custody contracts should check total solvency, not only bridge-side balances.

Timeline

2026-09-30First large USDT withdrawal from the bridge vault on BNB Chain, per Rekt.
2026-10-01Last withdrawal in the series.
2026-10-01NEAR Intents publishes its first statement and pauses services.
2026-10-02NEAR's contributor announces the funds were returned in full.
2026-10-16NEAR publishes its post-mortem (date approximate).
NEAR Intents team and SHIELD monitoring. Alex Shevchenko (post-mortem and recovery). ZachXBT, AMLBot and Unchained (public alerts). CertiK and Rekt News (analysis)
Continuous adversarial monitoring

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