Nesa
Why it happened
Attack class: Logic errorA vesting-account delegation underflowed an EVM balance in the shared Cosmos EVM module, per Cosmos Labs.
What would have stopped it
- Bound every balance deduction
- Cap bridge withdrawals by size and window
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored Nesa before this exploit.
On August 24 an attacker used a flaw in the shared Cosmos EVM module that Nesa runs to inflate its balance on Nesa Chain about 200-fold, then bridged 257.7 million NES, about 26 percent of supply, to Ethereum. The $50 million figure is the market value of those tokens at pre-crash prices of about $0.20 per NES, per Bubblemaps and Rekt; it is not what the attacker kept. NES fell to about a cent as it was sold, and Bubblemaps estimates the attacker's profit at only about $60,000 after paying about $250,000 for the NES it started with. Nesa halted its chain, patched it and migrated NES to new contracts; it has not published a post-mortem.
The attacker, funded through Monero per Bubblemaps, held the bridged NES at this Ethereum wallet, which received 257,703,733 NES in one bridge withdrawal. Sales ran from a separate wallet.
Attack flow
All 5 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Attacker deposit on Nesa Chain (attacker). Step 2, Inflation and bridge: Hyperlane withdrawal to Ethereum (hub), about $50M reached this step. Step 3, Sale: DEX sales from a separate wallet (exit), about $237K reached this step.
Step 1: Root control
- AttackerAttacker deposit on Nesa Chain1,114,564.66 NES~ $250K
Step 2: Inflation and bridge
- HubHyperlane withdrawal to Ethereum257,703,733 NES~ $50M at pre-crash prices0x9AE755D2...2AB0d2
Step 3: Sale
- ExitDEX sales from a separate walletabout 185.7M NES for about 95.97 ETHprice fell to a fraction of a cent0xB92dF70F...2Ff83A
Why each step worked
- Balance views out of stepvesting delegation underflowed the EVM balance (Cosmos Labs mechanism)
- No post-mortem from Nesamissing controlexact Nesa transaction not published
- No bridge withdrawal capmissing controlabout 25.8 percent of supply in one transfer
- Thin liquiditymissing controlslippage erased almost all of the headline value
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
Nesa runs the shared Cosmos EVM module, which keeps balances in two places that must agree: the EVM and the Cosmos bank module. Cosmos Labs' disclosure describes how they could disagree. A vesting account could delegate its locked tokens through the staking precompile even though they were not spendable, which underflowed and wrapped its EVM-visible balance to an enormous number; sending that number to a rich account then overflowed the victim's balance to zero and handed the attacker the victim's tokens, with no change in supply. Nesa confirmed exploitation of a Cosmos EVM vulnerability on its chain but has not published a post-mortem, so applying the exact mechanism to Nesa is supported by Cosmos Labs' description and the matching technique on TAC and KiiChain rather than by a Nesa transaction. The flaw is in shared upstream code. Cosmos Labs rated it critical and said it affected Cosmos EVM below version 0.6.2 or 0.7.2. Nesa said on September 5 that its chain was patched with upstream support.
Prevention analysis
A deduction that cannot fall below zero would have stopped the wrapped balance that the rest of the attack depends on.
A quarter of the token supply crossed the bridge in one transfer. A per-window cap would have limited how much could leave before a halt.
Nesa's public endpoints returned errors for days and its explorer showed no data weeks later, so users could not check what was lost. A timely post-mortem, with the affected accounts, lets holders and exchanges act.
The patched Cosmos EVM releases were published about five days before the attack on Nesa. Applying them at once would have closed the path.
Similar incidents
TAC's staking pool was emptied on August 22 through the same shared Cosmos EVM balance-accounting flaw, a drain of real tokens with no change in total supply.
KiiChain lost about 148 million KII the same evening through the same chain of Cosmos EVM defects, repeated against 18 accounts.
A different bug in the same weak spot: vesting-account logic reachable from the EVM side of a Cosmos-based chain let an attacker move tokens out of accounts it did not control.
Remediation
Timeline
Get your protocol scored across 12 dimensions, or request ongoing coverage.