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Nesa

August 24, 2026·Nesa·Logic Error
$50.0M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Logic error

A vesting-account delegation underflowed an EVM balance in the shared Cosmos EVM module, per Cosmos Labs.

What would have stopped it

  • Bound every balance deduction
  • Cap bridge withdrawals by size and window

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Nesa before this exploit.

On August 24 an attacker used a flaw in the shared Cosmos EVM module that Nesa runs to inflate its balance on Nesa Chain about 200-fold, then bridged 257.7 million NES, about 26 percent of supply, to Ethereum. The $50 million figure is the market value of those tokens at pre-crash prices of about $0.20 per NES, per Bubblemaps and Rekt; it is not what the attacker kept. NES fell to about a cent as it was sold, and Bubblemaps estimates the attacker's profit at only about $60,000 after paying about $250,000 for the NES it started with. Nesa halted its chain, patched it and migrated NES to new contracts; it has not published a post-mortem.

Other chainssafe(Nesa has not reported other assets lost)
Native Nesa token supply on Ethereumdrained(257.7 million NES, about 25.8 percent, appeared on Ethereum without backing, per Rekt)
NES holders at the saledrained(price fell from about $0.20 to about a cent)
Nesa Chaindrained(halted; endpoints down for days)
About 47 million NESunknown(destination not accounted for by the sales or the burn, per Rekt)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker, funded through Monero per Bubblemaps, held the bridged NES at this Ethereum wallet, which received 257,703,733 NES in one bridge withdrawal. Sales ran from a separate wallet.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Attacker deposit on Nesa Chain (attacker). Step 2, Inflation and bridge: Hyperlane withdrawal to Ethereum (hub), about $50M reached this step. Step 3, Sale: DEX sales from a separate wallet (exit), about $237K reached this step.

  1. Step 1: Root control

    • Attacker
      Attacker deposit on Nesa Chain
      1,114,564.66 NES
      ~ $250K
  2. Step 2: Inflation and bridge

    • Hub
      Hyperlane withdrawal to Ethereum
      257,703,733 NES
      ~ $50M at pre-crash prices
      0x9AE755D2...2AB0d2
  3. Step 3: Sale

    • Exit
      DEX sales from a separate wallet
      about 185.7M NES for about 95.97 ETH
      price fell to a fraction of a cent
      0xB92dF70F...2Ff83A

Why each step worked

    • Balance views out of stepvesting delegation underflowed the EVM balance (Cosmos Labs mechanism)
    • No post-mortem from Nesamissing controlexact Nesa transaction not published
    • No bridge withdrawal capmissing controlabout 25.8 percent of supply in one transfer
    • Thin liquiditymissing controlslippage erased almost all of the headline value
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
On August 24, per Rekt's reconstruction, the attacker deposited 1,114,564.66 NES into Nesa between 03:13 and 04:12 UTC, about $250,000 by Bubblemaps' count.
2.
Nesa says it identified malicious behavior exploiting a Cosmos EVM vulnerability on its layer 1. Rekt and Bubblemaps describe the attacker's balance on Nesa being inflated about 200-fold; Nesa has not published the exploit transaction or the affected accounts.
3.
The attacker withdrew 257,703,733 NES, about 25.8 percent of supply, to Ethereum over the Hyperlane bridge at 10:51 UTC.
4.
Between about 15:11 and 16:09 UTC roughly 185.7 million NES was sold on Ethereum exchanges from a separate wallet. Prices collapsed from about $0.20 the day before to a fraction of a cent, so Bubblemaps estimates the attacker cleared only about $60,000 in profit.
5.
A 25 million NES burn sent from the Ethereum side as a bridge attempt at 13:40 UTC was not delivered before Nesa halted its chain.

Root cause

Nesa runs the shared Cosmos EVM module, which keeps balances in two places that must agree: the EVM and the Cosmos bank module. Cosmos Labs' disclosure describes how they could disagree. A vesting account could delegate its locked tokens through the staking precompile even though they were not spendable, which underflowed and wrapped its EVM-visible balance to an enormous number; sending that number to a rich account then overflowed the victim's balance to zero and handed the attacker the victim's tokens, with no change in supply. Nesa confirmed exploitation of a Cosmos EVM vulnerability on its chain but has not published a post-mortem, so applying the exact mechanism to Nesa is supported by Cosmos Labs' description and the matching technique on TAC and KiiChain rather than by a Nesa transaction. The flaw is in shared upstream code. Cosmos Labs rated it critical and said it affected Cosmos EVM below version 0.6.2 or 0.7.2. Nesa said on September 5 that its chain was patched with upstream support.

Prevention analysis

Bound every balance deduction

A deduction that cannot fall below zero would have stopped the wrapped balance that the rest of the attack depends on.

Cap bridge withdrawals by size and window

A quarter of the token supply crossed the bridge in one transfer. A per-window cap would have limited how much could leave before a halt.

Publish a clear incident account early

Nesa's public endpoints returned errors for days and its explorer showed no data weeks later, so users could not check what was lost. A timely post-mortem, with the affected accounts, lets holders and exchanges act.

Apply upstream security releases the day they ship

The patched Cosmos EVM releases were published about five days before the attack on Nesa. Applying them at once would have closed the path.

Similar incidents

TAC (2026)

TAC's staking pool was emptied on August 22 through the same shared Cosmos EVM balance-accounting flaw, a drain of real tokens with no change in total supply.

KiiChain (2026)

KiiChain lost about 148 million KII the same evening through the same chain of Cosmos EVM defects, repeated against 18 accounts.

BounceBit Chain (2026)

A different bug in the same weak spot: vesting-account logic reachable from the EVM side of a Cosmos-based chain let an attacker move tokens out of accounts it did not control.

Remediation

1.Nesa halted its chain on August 24 and said it would restore services after a software fix and further safeguards. On September 5 it said the chain was fully patched with upstream support.
2.Nesa announced new canonical NES contracts on Ethereum and BNB Chain, and Binance Alpha set a 1:1 swap, refunds for certain net buyers during the halt and resumption of trading on September 10, per Rekt.
3.Any chain running Cosmos EVM should apply the patched releases published by Cosmos Labs and follow its current guidance.

Timeline

2026-08-19Cosmos EVM 0.6.2 and 0.7.2 are published with the underflow fix.
2026-08-24The attacker begins depositing NES into Nesa; the deposits run until about 04:12 UTC.
2026-08-24257,703,733 NES is withdrawn to Ethereum over the Hyperlane bridge.
2026-08-24A 25 million NES burn is sent as a bridge attempt; it is not delivered before the halt.
2026-08-24Sales of about 185.7 million NES begin from a separate wallet and run until about 16:09 UTC.
2026-08-24Nesa says it identified malicious behavior tied to a Cosmos EVM vulnerability; Cosmos Labs tells chains on older versions to halt and upgrade.
2026-09-05Nesa says its chain is patched and trading will reopen that week.
Bubblemaps (tracing and valuation). Rekt (reconstruction). Nesa team (detection and halt). Cosmos Labs (shared vulnerability disclosure)
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