Nomic nBTC
Why it happened
Attack class: Logic errorNomic committed IBC transfers its escrow never paid for, so Osmosis minted nBTC against nothing.
What would have stopped it
- Check escrow against minted supply on every transfer
- Rate-limit inflows of small bridged assets in absolute terms
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored Nomic nBTC before this exploit.
An attacker used a flaw in Nomic's IBC transfer accounting to mint 40.65 nBTC on Osmosis with no Bitcoin behind it, then swapped about 18 BTC worth of it out of Osmosis's Alloyed BTC pool. In total 39.84 counterfeit nBTC, about $3.15 million at September prices and 36% of Alloyed BTC's backing, ended up in the pool, and it went unnoticed for 74 days. Osmosis froze the attacker's remaining 22.65 allBTC with an emergency upgrade, seized it through governance and covered the rest from its community pool, so Alloyed BTC holders were made whole; Nomic's Bitcoin reserve was not touched. The extracted share was bridged to Ethereum and mixed through Tornado Cash.
A single Nomic transaction sent 25 transfers from Nomic's Osmosis channel escrow that the escrow never paid for, minting 40.65 nBTC to the attacker's Osmosis address, which swapped part of it out of the Alloyed BTC pool and bridged the proceeds to an Ethereum wallet that fed Tornado Cash.
Attack flow
All 6 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Unbacked mint: Nomic channel escrow (source). Step 2, Extraction: Attacker Osmosis address (attacker), Alloyed BTC pool (hub), about $3.15M reached this step. Step 3, Mixer: Attacker Ethereum wallet (attacker), Tornado Cash (exit), about $1.36M reached this step.
Step 1: Unbacked mint
- SourceNomic channel escrow25 x 1.626 BTC in one tx40.65 nBTC, no Bitcoin behind itnomic1kq2r...5ak9g7
Step 2: Extraction
- AttackerAttacker Osmosis addressabout 18 BTC swapped out22.65 allBTC heldosmo1wq76r...vtzltn
- HubAlloyed BTC pool39.84 counterfeit nBTC inside36% of backingosmo1z6r6q...fu25e3
Step 3: Mixer
- AttackerAttacker Ethereum wallet671.75 ETH invia Axelar and Noble0x8f36fd9f...89d2b5
- ExitTornado Cash671.1 ETH33 deposits
Why each step worked
- Escrow not debited on outbound transferNomic transfer accounting flaw
- No absolute inflow cap on nBTCmissing controlsupply jumped 24 times in one block
- 74 days without a reserve checkmissing controlnBTC cap raised while the gap was unknown
- Emergency freeze of the remainderosmo1wq76r2mhqsa9yaygghuwyq4wy6dcsgf8vtzltn
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
MsgTransferRoot cause
Sending a token over IBC is only safe if the sending chain locks exactly as much in escrow as the receiving chain mints. Nomic's own IBC transfer handling broke that rule: per the Osmosis forensic report, a transfer path that did not properly check who was sending, combined with a balance update that could net to zero, let an outbound transfer be committed while Nomic's escrow balance stayed the same. The same backing could therefore be reused, and 25 transfers in one transaction minted 40.65 nBTC on Osmosis against nothing. IBC itself and Osmosis worked as designed: each packet carried a valid proof of what Nomic's state committed, and Osmosis, like every IBC receiver, trusts the sending chain's accounting. Nomic's Bitcoin reserve was not touched and reconciles exactly; the counterfeit existed only on Nomic's ledger. No rate limit existed on nBTC inflows because supply had sat at 1 to 2 BTC for years, so the whole mint landed at once, and it stayed hidden for 74 days.
Prevention analysis
An invariant that escrow must rise by exactly the amount sent would have rejected the first transfer that left the escrow unchanged, and none of the 25 packets would have been committed.
A cap of a few BTC per period on nBTC entering Osmosis would have stopped a 40 BTC mint landing in one block, a 24 times jump in supply.
Nomic held 0.746 BTC against more than 40 nBTC on Osmosis for 74 days. A periodic proof-of-reserve check would have exposed the gap before Alloyed BTC raised its nBTC cap.
Similar incidents
IBC tokens with nothing behind them were minted and then redeemed against real collateral elsewhere. Same lesson: an IBC asset is only as sound as the accounting of the chain that issues it.
A cross-chain credit was applied without a matching debit on the source side, inflating supply. Same family: one side of a two-sided balance change silently goes missing.
Remediation
Timeline
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