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Nomic nBTC

June 25, 2026·Nomic·Logic Error
$3.1M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Logic error

Nomic committed IBC transfers its escrow never paid for, so Osmosis minted nBTC against nothing.

What would have stopped it

  • Check escrow against minted supply on every transfer
  • Rate-limit inflows of small bridged assets in absolute terms

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Nomic nBTC before this exploit.

An attacker used a flaw in Nomic's IBC transfer accounting to mint 40.65 nBTC on Osmosis with no Bitcoin behind it, then swapped about 18 BTC worth of it out of Osmosis's Alloyed BTC pool. In total 39.84 counterfeit nBTC, about $3.15 million at September prices and 36% of Alloyed BTC's backing, ended up in the pool, and it went unnoticed for 74 days. Osmosis froze the attacker's remaining 22.65 allBTC with an emergency upgrade, seized it through governance and covered the rest from its community pool, so Alloyed BTC holders were made whole; Nomic's Bitcoin reserve was not touched. The extracted share was bridged to Ethereum and mixed through Tornado Cash.

Nomic Bitcoin reservesafe(reconciles exactly, no BTC taken)
Osmosis and IBCsafe(worked as designed)
Alloyed BTC holderssafe(made whole by seizure and community pool)
Osmosis community pooldrained(covered a 17.19 BTC gap, about $1.36 million)
nBTC held outside Alloyed BTCpartially affected(about 0.8 BTC, Nomic halted)
Exploit anatomy

A single Nomic transaction sent 25 transfers from Nomic's Osmosis channel escrow that the escrow never paid for, minting 40.65 nBTC to the attacker's Osmosis address, which swapped part of it out of the Alloyed BTC pool and bridged the proceeds to an Ethereum wallet that fed Tornado Cash.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Unbacked mint: Nomic channel escrow (source). Step 2, Extraction: Attacker Osmosis address (attacker), Alloyed BTC pool (hub), about $3.15M reached this step. Step 3, Mixer: Attacker Ethereum wallet (attacker), Tornado Cash (exit), about $1.36M reached this step.

  1. Step 1: Unbacked mint

    • Source
      Nomic channel escrow
      25 x 1.626 BTC in one tx
      40.65 nBTC, no Bitcoin behind it
      nomic1kq2r...5ak9g7
  2. Step 2: Extraction

  3. Step 3: Mixer

    • Attacker
      Attacker Ethereum wallet
      671.75 ETH in
      via Axelar and Noble
      0x8f36fd9f...89d2b5
    • Exit
      Tornado Cash
      671.1 ETH
      33 deposits

Why each step worked

    • Escrow not debited on outbound transferNomic transfer accounting flaw
    • No absolute inflow cap on nBTCmissing controlsupply jumped 24 times in one block
    • 74 days without a reserve checkmissing controlnBTC cap raised while the gap was unknown
    • Emergency freeze of the remainderosmo1wq76r2mhqsa9yaygghuwyq4wy6dcsgf8vtzltn
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
On 23 June the attacker's new Osmosis address bought a small amount of nBTC and sent 0.06 BTC of it back to Nomic, a dry run of the route.
2.
At 21:50 UTC on 25 June one Nomic transaction carried 25 identical IBC transfers of 1.626 BTC each out of Nomic's escrow for the Osmosis channel. Nomic recorded the transfers as sent while its escrow balance never went down, so Osmosis received 25 valid packets and minted 40.65 nBTC with no Bitcoin behind it.
MsgTransfer
3.
Nine minutes later the attacker began putting the counterfeit nBTC into the Alloyed BTC pool on Osmosis and taking out real BTC-backed liquidity. About 18 BTC was extracted within 22 minutes and bridged to Ethereum through Axelar and Noble.
4.
The proceeds converged on one Ethereum wallet, which received 671.75 ETH and sent 671.1 ETH into Tornado Cash in 33 deposits on 25 and 28 June.
5.
On 17 July the attacker converted its remaining 22.65 nBTC into allBTC and left it on Osmosis. In all, 39.84 nBTC ended up inside Alloyed BTC, about 36% of its backing, and the mint went unnoticed until Nomic's chain halted on 7 September.
6.
Osmosis validators ran emergency release v31.1.0 on 7 and 8 September to freeze the attacker's 22.65 allBTC. Governance proposal 1044 then approved seizing it and spending community pool BTC on the remaining 17.19 BTC gap, and the v32 upgrade moved the frozen allBTC to the Liquidity subDAO.

Root cause

Sending a token over IBC is only safe if the sending chain locks exactly as much in escrow as the receiving chain mints. Nomic's own IBC transfer handling broke that rule: per the Osmosis forensic report, a transfer path that did not properly check who was sending, combined with a balance update that could net to zero, let an outbound transfer be committed while Nomic's escrow balance stayed the same. The same backing could therefore be reused, and 25 transfers in one transaction minted 40.65 nBTC on Osmosis against nothing. IBC itself and Osmosis worked as designed: each packet carried a valid proof of what Nomic's state committed, and Osmosis, like every IBC receiver, trusts the sending chain's accounting. Nomic's Bitcoin reserve was not touched and reconciles exactly; the counterfeit existed only on Nomic's ledger. No rate limit existed on nBTC inflows because supply had sat at 1 to 2 BTC for years, so the whole mint landed at once, and it stayed hidden for 74 days.

Prevention analysis

Check escrow against minted supply on every transfer

An invariant that escrow must rise by exactly the amount sent would have rejected the first transfer that left the escrow unchanged, and none of the 25 packets would have been committed.

Rate-limit inflows of small bridged assets in absolute terms

A cap of a few BTC per period on nBTC entering Osmosis would have stopped a 40 BTC mint landing in one block, a 24 times jump in supply.

Routinely reconcile bridged supply against the real reserve

Nomic held 0.746 BTC against more than 40 nBTC on Osmosis for 74 days. A periodic proof-of-reserve check would have exposed the gap before Alloyed BTC raised its nBTC cap.

Similar incidents

Secret Network Axelar bridge (2026)

IBC tokens with nothing behind them were minted and then redeemed against real collateral elsewhere. Same lesson: an IBC asset is only as sound as the accounting of the chain that issues it.

Harmony (2026)

A cross-chain credit was applied without a matching debit on the source side, inflating supply. Same family: one side of a two-sided balance change silently goes missing.

Remediation

1.Osmosis froze Nomic and Alloyed BTC inflows and outflows, set IBC rate limits on Nomic to zero, and validators ran emergency release v31.1.0 to freeze the attacker's 22.65 allBTC.
2.Osmosis proposal 1044 (passed 20 September) seized the frozen 22.65 allBTC and spent community pool BTC on the remaining 17.19 BTC, so Alloyed BTC holders were made whole. The v32 upgrade executed the transfer to the Liquidity subDAO.
3.Nomic's chain has been halted since 7 September. About 0.8 nBTC held outside Alloyed BTC remains Nomic's liability against a 0.746 BTC reserve.
4.Other chains built on the same IBC framework as Nomic should update to a release that enforces escrow invariants, and IBC receivers should cap inflows of thinly held bridged assets.

Timeline

2026-06-23Dry run: the attacker buys nBTC and sends 0.06 BTC back to Nomic over the same route.
2026-06-2525 identical IBC packets from one Nomic transaction mint 40.65 nBTC on Osmosis with no Bitcoin behind them.
2026-06-25Extraction begins through Alloyed BTC. About 18 BTC is taken out within 22 minutes.
2026-06-28Last of 671.1 ETH is deposited into Tornado Cash.
2026-07-17Attacker converts the remaining 22.65 nBTC into allBTC and leaves it in place.
2026-09-07Nomic's chain halts. A backing check by Osmosis team members then exposes the counterfeit nBTC.
2026-09-07Emergency release v31.1.0 reaches one third of Osmosis voting power, freezing the attacker's 22.65 allBTC.
2026-09-09Osmosis discloses the exploit.
2026-09-20Osmosis proposal 1044 passes, approving the seizure and the community pool cover.
2026-10-27Osmosis v32 upgrade proposal passes; the upgrade moves the frozen allBTC to the Liquidity subDAO.
Osmosis team and moderation subDAOs (detection, freeze, forensic report). Osmosis validators. Nomic validator who reported the halt. SlowMist
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