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Nostra Money Market

September 17, 2026·Starknet·Oracle Manipulation
$3.5M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Oracle manipulation

A thin NSTR pool was moved by a small buy, and a two-source price made it look worth about 8,300 times more.

What would have stopped it

  • Do not list tokens with very low market capitalisation as collateral
  • Require at least three independent sources and reject outliers

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Nostra Money Market before this exploit.

On September 17, 2026 an attacker borrowed about $3.5 million of ETH, STRK, stablecoins and WBTC from Nostra's money market on Starknet after pushing the price of the illiquid NSTR token far above its market value. They created a thin NSTR pool, moved its price with a small buy, and the bad quote reached Nostra through Pragma's price feed alongside only one other source. Nostra paused the market, and about $1.9 million had already been bridged to Ethereum within hours. Nostra said the final loss and any recovery were not yet known.

Nostra contracts and codesafe(no flash loan or reentrancy bug involved)
Other Pragma feedssafe(six feeds were flagged as high risk after review)
Nostra money market lendersdrained(about $3.5 million borrowed out)
Nostra TVLdrained(fell from about $4.15 million to about $743,000 in two days)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker's pool trading account created a thin NSTR/SolvBTC pool in one transaction and moved its price. The manipulated quote entered Pragma's feed in this oracle update. The borrowing account then borrowed assets from Nostra, starting with the ETH borrow, and sent proceeds through one transit account and another to an Ethereum wallet.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: NSTR price feed (source). Step 2, Drain: Borrowing account (hub), about $3.5M reached this step. Step 3, Exit: Ethereum wallet (exit), about $1.9M reached this step.

  1. Step 1: Root control

    • Source
      NSTR price feed
      two sources: $0.006 and $99
      midpoint $49.5 used
  2. Step 2: Drain

  3. Step 3: Exit

Why each step worked

    • Thin pool moved by a small buyNSTR market cap under $600,000
    • No three-source minimummissing controlper Pragma
    • Illiquid token accepted as collateralprice about 8,300x too high
    • No per-asset borrow capmissing controlone account took the whole amount
    • Funds moved within hoursmissing controlbefore the market was paused
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
The attacker created an NSTR/SolvBTC pool seeded with about 1.5 SolvBTC placed away from the market price. That thin pool appears to have steered GeckoTerminal's pool selection toward it as a price reference for NSTR, per GoPlus as relayed by Rekt.
2.
A small buy in the pool moved its NSTR quote from a fraction of a cent to just over $99.
3.
Pragma's NSTR response then had only two contributing inputs: an AVNU-derived price near $0.006 and the manipulated GeckoTerminal quote near $99. Their midpoint, about $49.5, reached Nostra as the NSTR collateral price. Pragma says it found no decimals or median-calculation error and that the manipulated input reflected an on-chain pool price.
4.
Against NSTR collateral valued at that price, one account borrowed about $3.56 million across ETH, STRK, USDC.e, USDT, WBTC and DAI in seven transactions, including about 939 ETH.
5.
The attacker sold the borrowed assets in about 80 swaps, moved funds through two Starknet transit accounts and NEAR Intents, and consolidated on Ethereum. Nostra paused the money market on September 17.

Root cause

Nostra accepted NSTR, a token with a market capitalisation under $600,000, as collateral and priced it from a feed that a small trade could move. Per Pragma's statement as reported by Rekt, NSTR was already classed as a high-risk feed because of limited liquidity and few pricing sources, and Pragma had raised this with Nostra earlier. The response that reached Nostra had only two contributing sources, and one of them was a quote from a thin on-chain pool that the attacker had created and moved. Averaging two inputs, one sound and one manipulated, gave a price about 8,300 times too high by an independent estimate. Pragma says an enforced three-source minimum would have rejected the response, and that the bad input reflected a real on-chain pool price rather than a decimals or median-calculation bug. No flash loan or reentrancy was involved. The design failure was listing an illiquid token as collateral with a price that needed no more than two cheap-to-move inputs.

Prevention analysis

Do not list tokens with very low market capitalisation as collateral

NSTR's whole market was under $600,000, so any collateral factor above zero let a small trade create millions of borrowing power.

Require at least three independent sources and reject outliers

Pragma says an enforced three-source minimum would have rejected the manipulated response, and an outlier filter would have dropped the $99 quote against a $0.006 one.

Cap borrowing against any single collateral token

A per-asset debt cap sized to the token's liquidity would have bounded the loss even if the price were wrong.

Similar incidents

Bonzo Lend (2026)

A bad price for a small token reached the lending market's price feed and was accepted as collateral value.

Moonwell (2026)

An illiquid collateral token's price was pushed up and borrowed against.

Mango Markets (2022)

A low-liquidity asset's price was inflated and used as collateral to drain the pool.

Remediation

1.Nostra paused lending, borrowing, withdrawals and liquidations on the money market and promised a detailed post-mortem, which was pending when we reviewed coverage.pending
2.Pragma reviewed its mainnet feeds on September 18 and rated six of 22 as critical risk, including NSTR, per press reports.
3.Lending markets that read Pragma or similar aggregators should set a minimum source count, reject outliers, and avoid listing illiquid tokens as collateral.

Timeline

2026-09-17The same day, one account borrows about $3.5 million on Nostra, and Nostra discloses it and pauses the money market. Exact times were not published.
2026-09-17AVNU-derived NSTR price near $0.006 is recorded in the Pragma feed.
2026-09-17GeckoTerminal-derived NSTR price near $99 is recorded, about ten minutes later.
2026-09-18Pragma rates six of 22 mainnet feeds critical risk, including NSTR.
Nostra (disclosure). Pragma (statement). PeckShield, CertiK, BlockSec, GoPlus and AMLBot (analysis and tracing). Sprunky (price decoding)
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