Nostra Money Market
Why it happened
Attack class: Oracle manipulationA thin NSTR pool was moved by a small buy, and a two-source price made it look worth about 8,300 times more.
What would have stopped it
- Do not list tokens with very low market capitalisation as collateral
- Require at least three independent sources and reject outliers
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored Nostra Money Market before this exploit.
On September 17, 2026 an attacker borrowed about $3.5 million of ETH, STRK, stablecoins and WBTC from Nostra's money market on Starknet after pushing the price of the illiquid NSTR token far above its market value. They created a thin NSTR pool, moved its price with a small buy, and the bad quote reached Nostra through Pragma's price feed alongside only one other source. Nostra paused the market, and about $1.9 million had already been bridged to Ethereum within hours. Nostra said the final loss and any recovery were not yet known.
The attacker's pool trading account created a thin NSTR/SolvBTC pool in one transaction and moved its price. The manipulated quote entered Pragma's feed in this oracle update. The borrowing account then borrowed assets from Nostra, starting with the ETH borrow, and sent proceeds through one transit account and another to an Ethereum wallet.
Attack flow
All 5 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: NSTR price feed (source). Step 2, Drain: Borrowing account (hub), about $3.5M reached this step. Step 3, Exit: Ethereum wallet (exit), about $1.9M reached this step.
Step 1: Root control
- SourceNSTR price feedtwo sources: $0.006 and $99midpoint $49.5 used
Step 2: Drain
- HubBorrowing account939 ETH, 28M STRK, stablecoins, WBTC~ $3.56M0x06d48ef7...344bc3
Step 3: Exit
- ExitEthereum walletvia NEAR Intentsabout $1.9M seen on Ethereum0xa059aaab...7f3c37
Why each step worked
- Thin pool moved by a small buyNSTR market cap under $600,000
- No three-source minimummissing controlper Pragma
- Illiquid token accepted as collateralprice about 8,300x too high
- No per-asset borrow capmissing controlone account took the whole amount
- Funds moved within hoursmissing controlbefore the market was paused
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
Nostra accepted NSTR, a token with a market capitalisation under $600,000, as collateral and priced it from a feed that a small trade could move. Per Pragma's statement as reported by Rekt, NSTR was already classed as a high-risk feed because of limited liquidity and few pricing sources, and Pragma had raised this with Nostra earlier. The response that reached Nostra had only two contributing sources, and one of them was a quote from a thin on-chain pool that the attacker had created and moved. Averaging two inputs, one sound and one manipulated, gave a price about 8,300 times too high by an independent estimate. Pragma says an enforced three-source minimum would have rejected the response, and that the bad input reflected a real on-chain pool price rather than a decimals or median-calculation bug. No flash loan or reentrancy was involved. The design failure was listing an illiquid token as collateral with a price that needed no more than two cheap-to-move inputs.
Prevention analysis
NSTR's whole market was under $600,000, so any collateral factor above zero let a small trade create millions of borrowing power.
Pragma says an enforced three-source minimum would have rejected the manipulated response, and an outlier filter would have dropped the $99 quote against a $0.006 one.
A per-asset debt cap sized to the token's liquidity would have bounded the loss even if the price were wrong.
Similar incidents
A bad price for a small token reached the lending market's price feed and was accepted as collateral value.
An illiquid collateral token's price was pushed up and borrowed against.
A low-liquidity asset's price was inflated and used as collateral to drain the pool.
Remediation
Timeline
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