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Hacks feed/Notional V1

Notional V1

September 3, 2026·Ethereum·Integer Overflow
$1.7M
total loss
StatusConfirmed
View the Notional V1 score →

Why it happened

Attack class: Integer Overflow/Underflow

An unchecked conversion to a smaller integer made a large debt read as zero in the collateral check of the V1 Escrow.

What would have stopped it

  • Checked integer conversions
  • Retire or drain old deployments

What the score saw

771Damascus, scored May 15, 2026

Our pre-hack assessment of Notional treated the first version as retired history and did not check that its Escrow still held funds. It did flag thin development and monitoring activity, which fits an old contract that nobody was watching closely.

Score dimensions

  • Maturitymissed
  • Operational securitypartly flagged

An attacker took about $1.7 million from the old V1 Escrow of Notional on Ethereum, made up of 69,257.37 DAI and 1,658,524.86 USDC. A number conversion in the collateral check cut a large debt down to zero, so the contract released funds without counting the debt. The Notional multisig paused and upgraded the contract about four hours later. No funds have been recovered, and current Notional versions were not the target.

Current Notional versionssafe(not the drained contract)
Notional V1 Escrowdrained(1,658,524.86 USDC drained)
Notional V1 Escrow DAIdrained(69,257.37 DAI drained)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker prepared the position in tx and drained the V1 Escrow in tx. The multisig paused and upgraded it in tx.

The attack in 2 steps. Step 1, Root control: Notional V1 Escrow (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker (exit), about $1.73M reached this step.

  1. Step 1: Root control

  2. Step 2: Drain

    • Exit
      Attacker
      withdraws against uncounted debt
      ~ $1.73M

Why each step worked

    • Unchecked conversion to a smaller integerlarge debt cut down to zero in the collateral check
    • Dormant contract still fundedold version held user balances
    • No monitoring on the legacy contractmissing controlpause and upgrade came about four hours later
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
The attacker made a first transaction against the legacy V1 Escrow, which still held user funds.
2.
The attacker's position carried a debt large enough to overflow a smaller integer type, and an unchecked conversion made the large debt read as zero in the collateral check.
3.
With the debt counted as zero, the Escrow let the attacker withdraw 69,257.37 DAI and 1,658,524.86 USDC.
4.
The Notional multisig paused and upgraded the Escrow about four hours later.

Root cause

Per Notional's post-mortem, the drained contract was the V1 Escrow, an old contract that still held funds. Its collateral check converted a debt amount to a smaller integer type without checking that the value fit. A large enough debt was cut down and read as zero, so the position looked fully collateralised and the Escrow released funds against debt that was never counted. The code was audited and had been dormant, but dormant did not mean empty, and no new review or monitoring covered it. DeFiLlama labels the incident V2, but the post-mortem identifies the V1 Escrow.

Prevention analysis

Checked integer conversions

A conversion that reverts when the value does not fit would have rejected the oversized debt instead of reading it as zero.

Retire or drain old deployments

Migrating remaining balances out of V1 and closing the Escrow would have left nothing to take.

Monitoring on legacy contracts

Alerts on unusual positions or withdrawals from old contracts would have shortened the response from hours.

Similar incidents

Balancer V1 (2026)

Another legacy, audited deployment from an earlier product generation that still held user funds and was drained in 2026 by a numeric edge case in old code.

Remediation

1.The Notional multisig paused and upgraded the Escrow, per its post-mortem.
2.Teams with legacy deployments should confirm what they still hold, use checked conversions, and close or migrate old contracts.
3.Users should withdraw from any old protocol version they no longer need.

Timeline

2026-09-03First attack transaction.
2026-09-04Drain transaction on the V1 Escrow.
2026-09-04Multisig pauses and upgrades the Escrow.
Notional team. The Breach Ledger
Continuous adversarial monitoring

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