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Papertrade

October 10, 2026·HyperEVM·Oracle Manipulation
$1.3M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Oracle manipulation

An instant order-book midpoint with no averaging settled leveraged profits, so moving the book moved the payout.

What would have stopped it

  • Price positions with a time-weighted average instead of the instantaneous midpoint
  • Add a deviation limit against an independent second price

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Papertrade before this exploit.

On October 10, 2026 an account took about $1.28 million net out of Papertrade's Martingaler liquidity pool on HyperEVM, shortly after the synthetic perpetuals exchange launched. Papertrade priced trades from the instantaneous midpoint of Hyperliquid's ETH order book with no averaging, so trading on Hyperliquid while holding huge leveraged positions on Papertrade moved the price used to settle profits. The team said overnight manipulation attempts hit its BTC and ETH markets, blamed loose launch limits, and said a winning user returned almost all profits, a claim CertiK did not verify. The team has said it is tightening open-interest limits.

Hyperliquid itselfsafe(only its public order-book prices were used)
Papertrade deposits outside the Martingaler poolsafe(not reported as affected)
Martingaler liquidity providersdrained(about $1.28 million net outflow)
Funds returneddrained(team says most profits were returned, unverified)
Exploit anatomy

The traced trading account opened a leveraged ETH position in one transaction and settled it in another. Positions were priced by the price oracle proxy and paid from the exchange proxy, which paid out five withdrawals, the largest in this transaction and this one.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Price oracle (source). Step 2, Drain: Trading account (hub), about $1.28M reached this step. Step 3, Outflow: Net outflow (exit).

  1. Step 1: Root control

  2. Step 2: Drain

  3. Step 3: Outflow

    • Exit
      Net outflow
      about 1.28M USDC
      team says most returned

Why each step worked

    • No time-weighted averagemissing controlone instantaneous quote
    • No independent price checkmissing controlno deviation limit
    • Loose launch open-interest capsmissing controlper the team
    • Fixed-size haircutdoes not scale with position
    • No per-account payout limitmissing controlshared pool exposed to one account
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
Papertrade's price oracle reads Hyperliquid's instantaneous best bid and best ask through a system precompile and uses the midpoint as the execution price, with no averaging and no independent deviation check, per CertiK's analysis.
2.
On October 10 an account opened and closed highly leveraged synthetic positions against Papertrade's liquidity pool. One position CertiK traced was an ETH long opened at 21:41 UTC with 20,000 USDC of margin at 500 times leverage, about $10 million of exposure, and settled six minutes later.
3.
DeFiLlama and the team describe the activity as moving Hyperliquid's ETH quote with trades on Hyperliquid itself while those positions were open, so the instantaneous midpoint used for entry, exit and profit settlement moved in the attacker's favour. CertiK notes that its single traced example does not by itself prove manipulation.
4.
The account made five withdrawals totalling about 2.48 million USDC against about 1.20 million USDC deposited, a net outflow of about 1.28 million USDC from the Martingaler liquidity pool, per CertiK.
5.
On October 11 Papertrade acknowledged overnight manipulation attempts on its BTC and ETH markets, attributed them to loose launch open-interest caps, and said it was tightening limits onchain and at its relayer. It also said a winning user returned almost all profits through new accounts, which CertiK did not verify.

Root cause

Papertrade priced positions off a number that a trader could move cheaply. Per CertiK's analysis and DeFiLlama's description, the protocol's price oracle took Hyperliquid's instantaneous best bid and best ask and returned their midpoint, rejecting only zero prices and crossed quotes. It had no time-weighted average, no limit on how far a price could deviate, and no second price source. A trader who could nudge the order book on Hyperliquid while holding a very large leveraged position on Papertrade could therefore be paid out at the moved price. CertiK also found that the haircut applied to asymmetric price impact used a fixed reference size of 100,000 USDC rather than the actual position size, so payouts grew with exposure while the haircut stayed at about 22 percent. Papertrade synthetic positions were paid from a shared liquidity pool, so a gain for one account was a loss for the pool's providers. The team says loose open-interest caps at launch made the attempts feasible. The deployed source was not verified, so CertiK's oracle analysis comes from decoded bytecode and historical traces.

Prevention analysis

Price positions with a time-weighted average instead of the instantaneous midpoint

Averaging over a window would have forced an attacker to hold the moved price for many blocks, which costs far more than a brief nudge.

Add a deviation limit against an independent second price

A check against another source such as Hyperliquid's own oracle price would have rejected a midpoint that had moved away from it.

Cap open interest and payouts per account and per pool at launch

The team attributes the incident to loose launch caps. Tighter caps would have bounded what any one account could take from the pool.

Scale the price-impact haircut to the actual position size

A haircut that grows with exposure would have reduced the payout on very large positions.

Similar incidents

Moonwell (2026)

A price that could be moved cheaply on a thin market was trusted by a lending market and borrowed against.

Nostra Money Market (2026)

A small trade moved a price input, and the protocol accepted it with no averaging or second source.

Mango Markets (2022)

A thin market price was moved and then used to extract value from a shared liquidity pool.

Remediation

1.Papertrade said on October 11 that it began tightening open-interest limits onchain and at the relayer. Whether the new limits are live and any change to the BBO-based pricing remain pending and are not confirmed by an independent source.pending
2.Papertrade said a winning user returned almost all of the profits through new accounts. This is the team's statement and CertiK did not verify it.
3.Other protocols that price off an order-book midpoint should use averaged prices, deviation limits and per-account exposure caps.

Timeline

2026-10-10First of five withdrawals by the traced account, 17,961 USDC.
2026-10-10Traced ETH long opened with 20,000 USDC margin at 500 times leverage.
2026-10-10The same position settles with a net gain of about 13,225 USDC.
2026-10-10The account executes 597 ETH fills on Hyperliquid between 22:01 and 22:03 UTC.
2026-10-10Largest withdrawal, about 1.54 million USDC.
2026-10-11Papertrade acknowledges BTC and ETH BBO manipulation attempts and says it is tightening limits. CertiK publishes its analysis of the incident.
2026-10-11Fifth and final withdrawal, about 50,000 USDC.
CertiK (analysis). Papertrade team (statement). DeFiLlama (classification)
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