Payy Network
Why it happened
Attack class: Signature replay / forgeryPayy's verifier, on an outdated proving library, accepted a forged burn proof, and the bridge paid out the fake withdrawal with no second check.
What would have stopped it
- Track security advisories for the proving library and upgrade promptly.
- Reject impossible values in the rollup contract itself.
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored Payy Network before this exploit.
An attacker took about $1.92 million in USDC from Payy, a privacy payments network with its own rollup bridge on Ethereum. Payy's proof verifier accepted a fake withdrawal backed by no real balance, so the bridge paid out 1.83 million USDC in one batch and another 90,202 USDC hours later. The cause was a known bug in the third-party proving library Payy uses, fixed upstream months earlier, which Payy had not updated. Payy paused the whole network, freezing user balances and cards until a fix ships. The attacker sold most of the USDC for about 683 ETH and sent it through Tornado Cash.
Payy's verifier accepted a fake burn, and the Payy rollup bridge paid 1.83 million USDC to the attacker wallet in one settlement. The USDC went to a second wallet, was sold for about 683 ETH, and was mixed through Tornado Cash.
Attack flow
All 5 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Forged burn: Payy rollup bridge (bridge). Step 2, Settle: Attacker wallet (attacker), about $1.92M reached this step. Step 3, Mixer: Second wallet to Tornado Cash (exit), about $1.83M reached this step.
Step 1: Forged burn
- BridgePayy rollup bridgeUSDC held for Payy userspays out every verified withdrawal0x367c1eaf...d85270
Step 2: Settle
- AttackerAttacker wallet1,828,589 USDC at 04:21 UTC90,202 USDC at 09:30 UTC0xAa4985dB...B57E70
Step 3: Mixer
- ExitSecond wallet to Tornado Cashsold for about 683 ETH682.3 ETH mixed on September 260xb483b174...3f3d38
Why each step worked
- Verifier accepted an invalid burn proofknown proving-library bug, fixed upstream in May 2026
- Outdated pinned dependencyPayy ran an October 2025 build
- No on-chain rule against a zero burn hashmissing controla value normal users cannot produce
- No independent balance checkmissing controlaggregation reused the same verifier
- Pause came ten hours after the first payoutmissing controlsecond settlement went through first
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
verifyRollup(uint256,bytes32,bytes,bytes32[],bytes32,(bytes32,bytes32,uint256)[])tx:0xf43abdac...1e1814Root cause
Payy's rollup bridge on Ethereum pays out whatever withdrawals a verified batch contains, so its safety rests entirely on the zero-knowledge verifier rejecting invalid proofs. Per Payy's September 29 post-mortem, the deployed verifier, built on Aztec's Noir and Barretenberg proving library, accepted an invalid burn proof. Certora's analysis traces this to a soundness bug in Barretenberg that Aztec fixed in May 2026 and shipped in its v5.0.0 release on July 13; Payy had pinned its services to an October 2025 build and never picked up the fix. Once the forged burn passed verification, Payy's own prover and validator processed it like any other withdrawal, which is why early reports, including ExVul's, pointed at Payy's infrastructure. Payy later ruled out a compromised key, social engineering or an attack on its off-chain systems. Two further gaps made it worse: the forged burn carried an all-zero burn hash that ordinary users cannot produce, yet the rollup contract had no rule rejecting it, and no later aggregation step re-checked note balances. Payy paused the network the same day.
Prevention analysis
The bug was fixed upstream four months before the attack and in a stable release more than two months before. Upgrading the pinned verifier build would have closed the hole.
The forged withdrawal carried an all-zero burn hash that normal users cannot create. A simple on-chain check for that value would have blocked both payouts even with the verifier fooled.
Payy's aggregation re-verified each proof with the same verifier, so nothing confirmed that burned notes existed. A second check against note balances, or a different proof system, would have caught the fake burn.
One withdrawal of 1.83 million USDC sat in a batch of small user withdrawals. A per-withdrawal cap or delay on unusually large exits would have limited the loss.
Similar incidents
A retired Aztec rollup lost about $2.18 million to forged proofs its genuine verifier accepted. Same class: a proving-system soundness failure turned straight into a withdrawal.
A flaw in a Groth16 verifier let an attacker forge proofs and drain about $2.26 million. Same root: the contract trusted a verifier that could be satisfied without a valid statement.
Rogue provers finalized fake state and the bridge paid out about $1.75 million. Same lesson: a rollup bridge is only as strong as the weakest check that can finalize state on Ethereum.
Remediation
Timeline
Get your protocol scored across 12 dimensions, or request ongoing coverage.