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Radix

August 31, 2026·Radix·Access Control
$1.3M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Access control

A direct-access vault reference let transactions withdraw from vaults they did not own.

What would have stopped it

  • Authorisation check on every vault access path
  • Regression tests for engine refactors

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Radix before this exploit.

On August 31, 2026, an attacker used a flaw in the Radix Engine's vault authorisation to withdraw about $1.25 million of Hyperlane-bridged assets from vaults they did not own. They bridged the assets to Ethereum, BNB Chain and Solana and sold them for ETH. Validators halted the network to stop further withdrawals and the Foundation said no keys or Hyperlane components were compromised. The Foundation's report, dated September 17, says a fix was written and a coordinated restart was in progress.

Private keys and validator keyssafe(per the Foundation)
Hyperlane bridge componentssafe(worked as designed)
Bridged assets in Radix vaultsdrained(about $1.25 million plus a small amount of XRD for fees)
Network operationdrained(liveness was deliberately broken to stop the attack)
Exploit anatomy

Over 26 transactions between 16:02 and 16:57 UTC on August 31, the attacker passed internal vault addresses as direct-access references into custom code, then withdrew from those vaults with ordinary calls. The engine did not check ownership, per the Radix Foundation's report. The withdrawn assets, which were Hyperlane-bridged tokens and a little XRD for fees, were sent out through Hyperlane routes to other chains.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Radix Engine vault access (source). Step 2, Drain: 26 exploit transactions (hub), about $1.25M reached this step. Step 3, Bridge out: Ethereum, BNB Chain and Solana (exit).

  1. Step 1: Root control

    • Source
      Radix Engine vault access
      direct-access vault references
      allowed ordinary withdrawals
  2. Step 2: Drain

    • Hub
      26 exploit transactions
      Hyperlane-bridged ETH, WBTC, USDT, USDC, BNB, SOL
      ~ $1.25M
  3. Step 3: Bridge out

    • Exit
      Ethereum, BNB Chain and Solana
      assets bridged out and sold for ETH
      per the Foundation

Why each step worked

    • Authorisation flawintroduced in a June 2023 code tidy-up
    • Missed in reviewmissing controlinternal review and a 2024 audit did not catch it
    • No ownership check on vaultsvaults owned by others could be drained
    • Bridge routes stayed open for about an hourmissing controlshut down after the withdrawals were noticed
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
Between 16:02 and 16:57 UTC on August 31, the attacker ran 26 transactions that passed internal vault addresses as direct-access references into package code, per the Radix Foundation's incident report.
2.
The engine let ordinary withdrawal calls run on those vaults without checking ownership or authorisation, so the attacker withdrew bridged assets held by other accounts and components.
3.
The attacker bridged the assets to Ethereum, BNB Chain and Solana through the normal Hyperlane routes, and they were sold for ETH.
4.
Validators and the Foundation shut down bridge routes and then halted consensus to stop further withdrawals.

Root cause

A flaw in the Radix Engine's vault authorisation let a transaction pass an internal vault address as a direct-access reference and then call ordinary withdrawal methods on it, which should have been blocked. The engine did not check that the caller owned or was authorised to use the vault. The Foundation's incident report says the flaw was introduced in June 2023 during a code tidy-up and was not caught by internal review or by a 2024 audit. It says Hyperlane, validator keys and private keys were not compromised and no admin or recall badge was used. The Foundation's belief that the attacker used AI-assisted code analysis is an assessment and not confirmed.

Prevention analysis

Authorisation check on every vault access path

Rejecting ordinary method calls through direct-access references is the fix the Foundation shipped, and would have blocked the withdrawals.

Regression tests for engine refactors

Tests that assert vault access rules after refactors would have caught the 2023 change that opened the flaw.

Bridge rate limits per asset

Per-period caps on bridge-outs would have limited how much of each wrapped asset could leave before routes were shut.

Similar incidents

Crypto DAO Pro (2026)

Vault funds could be moved because a caller was not properly checked.

Nomic nBTC (2026)

A chain-level flaw let an attacker create or move bridged assets, which were then taken out through bridge routes.

Remediation

1.Hyperlane removed Radix from its operations and the Foundation paused the Ethereum route; the Foundation reported the engine fix written within 48 hours and independently reviewed.
2.Validators broke network liveness to stop further transactions, and a coordinated upgrade and restart was in progress as of the September 17 report.
3.Other chains with similar engine-level access rules should review every path that hands out references to internal storage.

Timeline

2026-08-31First of 26 exploit transactions.
2026-08-31Last exploit transaction.
2026-08-31Community validators and the Radix team identify the withdrawals and start incident response.
2026-08-31Emergency call decides to break network liveness, carried out by 23:30 UTC.
2026-09-17Radix Foundation publishes its public incident report.
Radix Foundation. RDX Works. Hyperlane. Zellic. Hacken
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