Radix
Why it happened
Attack class: Access controlA direct-access vault reference let transactions withdraw from vaults they did not own.
What would have stopped it
- Authorisation check on every vault access path
- Regression tests for engine refactors
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored Radix before this exploit.
On August 31, 2026, an attacker used a flaw in the Radix Engine's vault authorisation to withdraw about $1.25 million of Hyperlane-bridged assets from vaults they did not own. They bridged the assets to Ethereum, BNB Chain and Solana and sold them for ETH. Validators halted the network to stop further withdrawals and the Foundation said no keys or Hyperlane components were compromised. The Foundation's report, dated September 17, says a fix was written and a coordinated restart was in progress.
Over 26 transactions between 16:02 and 16:57 UTC on August 31, the attacker passed internal vault addresses as direct-access references into custom code, then withdrew from those vaults with ordinary calls. The engine did not check ownership, per the Radix Foundation's report. The withdrawn assets, which were Hyperlane-bridged tokens and a little XRD for fees, were sent out through Hyperlane routes to other chains.
Attack flow
All 4 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Radix Engine vault access (source). Step 2, Drain: 26 exploit transactions (hub), about $1.25M reached this step. Step 3, Bridge out: Ethereum, BNB Chain and Solana (exit).
Step 1: Root control
- SourceRadix Engine vault accessdirect-access vault referencesallowed ordinary withdrawals
Step 2: Drain
- Hub26 exploit transactionsHyperlane-bridged ETH, WBTC, USDT, USDC, BNB, SOL~ $1.25M
Step 3: Bridge out
- ExitEthereum, BNB Chain and Solanaassets bridged out and sold for ETHper the Foundation
Why each step worked
- Authorisation flawintroduced in a June 2023 code tidy-up
- Missed in reviewmissing controlinternal review and a 2024 audit did not catch it
- No ownership check on vaultsvaults owned by others could be drained
- Bridge routes stayed open for about an hourmissing controlshut down after the withdrawals were noticed
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
A flaw in the Radix Engine's vault authorisation let a transaction pass an internal vault address as a direct-access reference and then call ordinary withdrawal methods on it, which should have been blocked. The engine did not check that the caller owned or was authorised to use the vault. The Foundation's incident report says the flaw was introduced in June 2023 during a code tidy-up and was not caught by internal review or by a 2024 audit. It says Hyperlane, validator keys and private keys were not compromised and no admin or recall badge was used. The Foundation's belief that the attacker used AI-assisted code analysis is an assessment and not confirmed.
Prevention analysis
Rejecting ordinary method calls through direct-access references is the fix the Foundation shipped, and would have blocked the withdrawals.
Tests that assert vault access rules after refactors would have caught the 2023 change that opened the flaw.
Per-period caps on bridge-outs would have limited how much of each wrapped asset could leave before routes were shut.
Similar incidents
Vault funds could be moved because a caller was not properly checked.
A chain-level flaw let an attacker create or move bridged assets, which were then taken out through bridge routes.
Remediation
Timeline
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