BlackHart
Go live
Hacks feed/Raydium

Raydium

June 10, 2026·Solana·Logic Error
$1.3M
total loss
StatusConfirmed
View the Raydium score →

Why it happened

Attack class: Logic error

The legacy program did not validate the LP mint, so a fake LP token bypassed the proportion checks.

What would have stopped it

  • Validate the LP mint against the pool's own record
  • Retire legacy pools by migrating funds out

What the score saw

787Damascus, scored May 19, 2026

Our assessment of Raydium looked at its current programs and its history, and did not cover the retired program that was drained. It flagged a long upgrade history but not that old pools still held funds.

Score dimensions

  • Maturitymissed

On June 10, 2026, an attacker drained about $1.34 million from five deprecated pools of Raydium's retired legacy AMM program, using a fake LP token the old program failed to validate. Raydium said current users and its current mainnet programs were not affected, and that its treasury will cover the full loss for liquidity providers in the five pools. Per PeckShield, the funds were bridged to Ethereum and most went to Tornado Cash.

Current Raydium userssafe(per Raydium)
Current mainnet programssafe(under a separate security review)
Five legacy AMM V3 poolsdrained(about $1.34 million, to be covered by the treasury)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker used a fake LP token mint against Raydium's retired legacy AMM V3 program, which did not validate the mint, to claim the balances of five inactive pools. The loss was about 150,000 RAY, 5,600 SOL and 893,700 USDC, per The Block and Coinpaprika.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Retired AMM V3 program (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker wallet (attacker), about $1.34M reached this step. Step 3, Laundering: Tornado Cash (exit).

  1. Step 1: Root control

    • Source
      Retired AMM V3 program
      five inactive legacy pools
      phased out in 2021
  2. Step 2: Drain

    • Attacker
      Attacker wallet
      about 150,000 RAY, 5,600 SOL, 893,700 USDC
      ~ $1.34M
  3. Step 3: Laundering

    • Exit
      Tornado Cash
      bridged to Ethereum for about 810 ETH
      most sent to the mixer, per PeckShield

Why each step worked

    • LP mint not validateda fake LP token passed the proportion checks
    • Old program left livemissing controlfunds remained in deprecated pools
    • Claim on the whole pool balanceprogram treated the fake LP as a real provider
    • No monitoring of legacy poolsmissing controldrain ran across five pools
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
The attacker targeted Raydium's legacy AMM V3 program, retired in 2021 and not reachable through Raydium's interface or SDK.
2.
The attacker submitted a fraudulent LP token mint that the program did not validate against real LP supply, bypassing its proportion checks.
3.
The program treated the attacker as a liquidity provider with a claim on the pool balance, and five inactive pools were drained of about 150,000 RAY, 5,600 SOL and 893,700 USDC.
4.
Per PeckShield, the proceeds were bridged to Ethereum and most were sent to Tornado Cash. Raydium said its treasury would cover the loss.

Root cause

The legacy AMM V3 program did not validate the LP token mint it was handed. Raydium's statement attributes the exploit to insufficient validation of LP mints, which let an attacker bypass the program's proportion checks. With a fake mint of tiny supply, the program treated the attacker as a legitimate liquidity provider owed the pool balance. Raydium described it as a self-contained logic error in the legacy program, not a key compromise, and said current programs carry no propagation risk. The program had been retired in 2021, but five pools still held funds, so an old and unmonitored contract was left holding user value.

Prevention analysis

Validate the LP mint against the pool's own record

Checking that the LP mint matches the one the pool created would have rejected the fake token.

Retire legacy pools by migrating funds out

Closing or migrating pools when a program is phased out would have left nothing in the old contract to drain.

Monitor deprecated programs

Alerts on any activity in retired programs would have flagged the first drain and shortened the response time.

Similar incidents

Aquifer (2026)

A Solana AMM released real vault tokens after trusting an account the caller supplied.

Crypto DAO Pro (2026)

Another vault holding funds trusted an input it should have validated.

Remediation

1.Raydium said its treasury will compensate liquidity providers who held positions in the five pools at the time of the exploit.
2.Raydium said it started a separate security review of its current mainnet programs.
3.Anyone still holding funds in retired programs of any protocol should withdraw them.

Timeline

2026-06-10Exploit of five legacy AMM V3 pools is reported.
2026-06-10Raydium discloses the exploit and says its treasury will cover the loss.
Raydium core contributors. Specter. PeckShield
Continuous adversarial monitoring

Get your protocol scored across 12 dimensions, or request ongoing coverage.