Raydium
Why it happened
Attack class: Logic errorThe legacy program did not validate the LP mint, so a fake LP token bypassed the proportion checks.
What would have stopped it
- Validate the LP mint against the pool's own record
- Retire legacy pools by migrating funds out
What the score saw
Our assessment of Raydium looked at its current programs and its history, and did not cover the retired program that was drained. It flagged a long upgrade history but not that old pools still held funds.
Score dimensions
- Maturitymissed
On June 10, 2026, an attacker drained about $1.34 million from five deprecated pools of Raydium's retired legacy AMM program, using a fake LP token the old program failed to validate. Raydium said current users and its current mainnet programs were not affected, and that its treasury will cover the full loss for liquidity providers in the five pools. Per PeckShield, the funds were bridged to Ethereum and most went to Tornado Cash.
The attacker used a fake LP token mint against Raydium's retired legacy AMM V3 program, which did not validate the mint, to claim the balances of five inactive pools. The loss was about 150,000 RAY, 5,600 SOL and 893,700 USDC, per The Block and Coinpaprika.
Attack flow
All 4 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Retired AMM V3 program (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker wallet (attacker), about $1.34M reached this step. Step 3, Laundering: Tornado Cash (exit).
Step 1: Root control
- SourceRetired AMM V3 programfive inactive legacy poolsphased out in 2021
Step 2: Drain
- AttackerAttacker walletabout 150,000 RAY, 5,600 SOL, 893,700 USDC~ $1.34M
Step 3: Laundering
- ExitTornado Cashbridged to Ethereum for about 810 ETHmost sent to the mixer, per PeckShield
Why each step worked
- LP mint not validateda fake LP token passed the proportion checks
- Old program left livemissing controlfunds remained in deprecated pools
- Claim on the whole pool balanceprogram treated the fake LP as a real provider
- No monitoring of legacy poolsmissing controldrain ran across five pools
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
The legacy AMM V3 program did not validate the LP token mint it was handed. Raydium's statement attributes the exploit to insufficient validation of LP mints, which let an attacker bypass the program's proportion checks. With a fake mint of tiny supply, the program treated the attacker as a legitimate liquidity provider owed the pool balance. Raydium described it as a self-contained logic error in the legacy program, not a key compromise, and said current programs carry no propagation risk. The program had been retired in 2021, but five pools still held funds, so an old and unmonitored contract was left holding user value.
Prevention analysis
Checking that the LP mint matches the one the pool created would have rejected the fake token.
Closing or migrating pools when a program is phased out would have left nothing in the old contract to drain.
Alerts on any activity in retired programs would have flagged the first drain and shortened the response time.
Similar incidents
A Solana AMM released real vault tokens after trusting an account the caller supplied.
Another vault holding funds trusted an input it should have validated.
Remediation
Timeline
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