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Secret Network

June 10, 2026·Secret Network·Bridge Exploit
$4.7M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Bridge exploit

The Secret-side contract minted on any deposit naming a listed token, without checking which channel sent it.

What would have stopped it

  • Authorize every mint by the packet's source channel
  • Re-audit a fork when it changes the trust model

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Secret Network before this exploit.

An attacker drained about $4.67 million from the Axelar to Secret Network bridge by sending fake deposits from a chain they controlled to the Secret-side bridge contract, which minted seven kinds of Axelar-bridged tokens with nothing behind them. They then redeemed those tokens through the real bridge, and Axelar's escrow paid out its genuine USDT, USDC, ETH, WBTC, DAI, BNB and wstETH reserves within minutes. Only Axelar-bridged tokens on Secret lost their backing; SCRT, other Secret tokens, other IBC routes and Axelar itself were unaffected. The proceeds were swapped to ETH and cashed out mainly through ChangeNOW and KuCoin, and about $770,000 still sits in the attacker's Axelar wallet.

SCRT and non-Axelar Secret tokenssafe
Noble USDC route to Secretsafe(verified fully backed)
Axelar core protocol and other chainssafe
Axelar-bridged saTokens on Secretdrained(backing drained, about $4.67 million)
Exploit anatomy

From a counterfeit chain, the attacker's Secret account relayed fake deposits into the Secret bridge contract, which minted unbacked tokens; redeeming them sent Axelar's real reserves to the attacker's Axelar wallet, and from there through Osmosis to an Ethereum wallet that cashed out on exchanges.

The attack in 4 steps. Step 1, Fake deposits: Secret bridge contract (bridge). Step 2, Escrow drain: Attacker Axelar wallet (attacker), about $4.67M reached this step. Step 3, Swap: Attacker Ethereum wallet (attacker), about $3.9M reached this step. Step 4, Cash out: ChangeNOW (exit), KuCoin (exit), about $1.8M reached this step.

  1. Step 1: Fake deposits

  2. Step 2: Escrow drain

    • Attacker
      Attacker Axelar wallet
      USDT, USDC, WETH, WBTC, DAI, WBNB, wstETH
      ~ $4.67M released
      axelar1hzr...hl6ad8
  3. Step 3: Swap

    • Attacker
      Attacker Ethereum wallet
      via Osmosis and Axelar GMP
      ~ 2,349 ETH after swaps
      0x6c2eab82...123976
  4. Step 4: Cash out

Why each step worked

    • Source channel never checkedallow list keyed by token name only
    • Permissionless IBC channel openingcounterfeit chain connected on channel-227
    • Fork shipped without re-auditmissing controlescrow checks removed when the contract was rebuilt to mint
    • No outflow cap or anomaly pause on escrowmissing controlfull reserve paid to one wallet, unnoticed for 7 days
    • Packet forwarding through Osmosisosmo1hzra9z4zn8q0w8f3dj2wnw0xgetu8dfdm2l9s5
    • 30 fresh deposit wallets and spoof tokensused to clutter the trail
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
The attacker ran a private test chain and, between 19:01 and 19:05 UTC, opened its own IBC channel (channel-227) into the Secret-side bridge contract that issues Axelar-bridged tokens. Opening an IBC channel is permissionless across Cosmos.
2.
From 19:14 to 19:20 UTC the attacker relayed seven fake deposit messages over that channel, each naming a real Axelar asset. The contract checked only that the token was on its list, not which channel the deposit came from, and minted about 1.12 million saUSDT, 638,199 saUSDC, 893 saWETH, 16.5 saWBTC, 174,536 saDAI, 171 saWBNB and 17.7 saWstETH with nothing behind them.
3.
Between 19:33 and 19:36 UTC the attacker sent the fake tokens back to Axelar through the real bridge channel. Axelar treated them as ordinary withdrawals and released the genuine reserves held in its escrow, about $4.67 million, to one Axelar wallet.
4.
From that Axelar wallet the attacker made 18 IBC transfers through Osmosis, forwarding the assets on to Ethereum and BNB Chain. The Ethereum deliveries landed in the attacker's wallet between 19:39 and 19:58 UTC.
5.
The attacker swapped the tokens into about 2,349 ETH through CoW Protocol, then spread it across 30 deposit wallets into ChangeNOW (about 1,050 ETH), KuCoin (about 1,029 ETH) and HitBTC (about 100 ETH). The BNB leg went to ChangeNOW. About $770,000 was left on the Axelar wallet and is still there.

Root cause

The Secret-side contract for the Axelar connection (ics20-for-axelar, published by SCRT Labs and forked from its escrow-based snip20-ics20) minted Secret Axelar tokens whenever an IBC deposit named an allow-listed asset, without confirming the deposit arrived on the genuine Axelar channel. The upstream escrow contract checked a token's channel path and capped releases at what that channel had escrowed. When the fork was rebuilt to mint instead of escrow, those checks were removed and the new allow list was keyed by token name only, so the source was never authenticated. Because anyone can open an IBC channel to a contract, a counterfeit chain could deliver deposits the contract accepted as real. The gap dated to the repo's first commit in January 2023 and carried through a March 2026 migration, per Common Prefix and Secret's own report, and the fork was not re-audited. A second gap made the loss total: Axelar's escrow paid out the redemptions of the fake tokens, roughly 18 minutes after minting, with no anomaly alert or pause. Axelar's own code and IBC were not compromised.

Prevention analysis

Authorize every mint by the packet's source channel

Binding each allowed token to the one genuine Axelar channel would have rejected every deposit from the counterfeit chain, and nothing would have been minted.

Re-audit a fork when it changes the trust model

Turning an escrow contract into a minting contract removed the checks that implicitly authenticated the source. An audit of that change would very likely have caught the missing check.

Rate limits and anomaly pauses on bridge escrow

The escrow paid out its entire reserve to one wallet in minutes and nobody noticed for seven days. A per-channel outflow cap or alert would have stopped most of the drain.

Similar incidents

Nomic nBTC (2026)

IBC tokens with nothing behind them were minted on a counterparty chain and redeemed against real collateral. Same lesson: an IBC asset is only as sound as the accounting on the chain that issues it.

Wormhole (2022)

A bridge minted wrapped assets for a deposit message it had not properly verified, then the unbacked tokens were redeemed for real funds. Same class: mint without authenticating where the message came from.

Remediation

1.Secret disabled bridging on tunnel.scrt.network, and the Axelar Emergency Committee paused the Secret and Secret-SNIP connections on 17 June. Squid removed Secret from its frontend.
2.Secret and Axelar shared the full transaction trace with exchanges and law enforcement. Secret asked Axelar to freeze the roughly $770,000 left on the attacker's Axelar wallet; per Secret, Axelar declined, and the balance is still there.
3.Holders of Axelar-bridged saTokens on Secret should treat them as under-collateralized and follow Secret's guidance. SCRT, other Secret tokens and the Noble USDC route were not affected.
4.Any IBC contract that mints on receipt should authenticate the source channel for every packet and cap minting at what the counterparty has actually escrowed.

Timeline

2026-06-10Attacker creates the IBC client for its counterfeit chain on Secret, then opens connection-241 and channel-227.
2026-06-10First fake deposit mints 1.12 million saUSDT. Seven unbacked mints are complete by 19:20 UTC.
2026-06-10Redemptions through the real Axelar channel begin. Axelar's escrow releases the backing to the attacker's Axelar wallet by 19:36 UTC.
2026-06-10After swapping to about 2,349 ETH, the attacker starts dispersing it to exchanges, finishing at 09:19 UTC on 11 June.
2026-06-17A failed Axelar transfer reveals an empty escrow. The drain is traced and the Secret team is notified.
2026-06-17Axelar Emergency Committee pauses the Secret connections.
2026-06-19Secret publishes its incident report with the full transaction trace.
Axelar team (detection). Common Prefix (post-mortem). Secret Network team (incident report and fund trace). Squid
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