TAC
Why it happened
Attack class: Logic errorA vesting account delegated locked tokens against a spendable balance of zero, the deduction wrapped around, and the staking pool's balance was overwritten.
What would have stopped it
- Keep both balance views in agreement
- Guard protocol-owned accounts on every write path
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored TAC before this exploit.
An attacker took 2,985,651,403 TAC, about 28.6 percent of TAC's supply and roughly $7.5 million by DeFiLlama's count, out of the pool that holds all tokens delegated to validators on August 22. TAC says it was a drain, not a mint, so total supply did not change, and no other TAC asset was touched. The cause is a flaw in the shared Cosmos EVM module that TAC runs, the same one used against MANTRA two days earlier, not TAC's own code. The attacker bridged the tokens to BNB Chain and sold about 1.2 billion for about $950,000 before TAC halted the chain; about 1.66 billion stolen TAC was still unsold, and TAC plans to restore the staking pool and cover the market shortfall from foundation reserves.
The attacker's contract, built on a prepared vesting account at exploit contract, emptied the staking pool in one transaction. The proceeds went to the attacker address, which bridged the TAC to BNB Chain in two transfers.
Attack flow
All 4 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Staking pool (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker contract and address (attacker), about $7.5M reached this step. Step 3, Bridge and sale: BNB Chain and TON sales (exit), Unsold or frozen TAC (exit), about $6.49M reached this step.
Step 1: Root control
- SourceStaking pool2,985,651,403.40 TAC~ $7.5M0x4feA7642...D39391
Step 2: Drain
- AttackerAttacker contract and addressone transaction at block 24,662,148gain equal to the pool's loss0xecb0Af97...c77c84
Step 3: Bridge and sale
- ExitBNB Chain and TON sales1.208 billion TAC sold for 950,293 USDT49.9 million TAC sold on TON
- ExitUnsold or frozen TACabout 1.66 billion TAC on BNB Chain65.1 million TAC frozen by the halt
Why each step worked
- Wrong balance deducteddelegating locked vesting tokens read the spendable balance, which was zero
- No lower bound on the deductionthe contract's EVM balance wrapped to an enormous number
- Protocol-account guard skipped EVM transfersthe pool balance could be overwritten at commit
- No supply-based alarmmissing controlsupply never changed, so nothing flagged the move
- No per-window bridge limitmissing controlnearly all of it left in under two minutes
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
TAC runs on the open-source Cosmos EVM module, which keeps two views of every balance: the EVM's own view and the Cosmos bank module's view. Per TAC's post-mortem and Cosmos Labs' disclosure, those views disagreed in three places. When a vesting account delegated tokens that were locked, the deduction was taken from the spendable balance, which was zero; nothing stopped that deduction from going below zero, so the contract's EVM balance wrapped around to an astronomically large number; and the protection meant to stop protocol-owned accounts from being overwritten did not cover direct transfers inside the EVM layer, so the staking pool's balance was overwritten when the transaction committed. The attacker's gain and the pool's loss cancelled out, which is why total supply never changed and no alarm tied to supply fired. No private key was stolen and no governance action was needed. The flaw sits in shared upstream code, not TAC-specific code: Cosmos Labs rated it critical and said it affected chains running Cosmos EVM below version 0.6.2 or 0.7.2, which were published on August 19, 2026 without a security advisory, about 20 hours before the first attack on MANTRA. It was exploited on six chains between August 20 and August 25. Cosmos Labs says its own earlier testing had judged the bug harmless on the chain configurations it tried.
Prevention analysis
If the amount deducted for a delegation had been checked against the right balance and could never drop below zero, the contract's balance could not have wrapped around and nothing else in the attack would have worked.
The staking pool's balance could be overwritten at commit because the guard did not cover direct EVM transfers. A guard on every path that writes balances would have kept the pool intact.
The fix was merged in May and released in August without an advisory. Chains that track upstream fixes closely, and upstream projects that flag them, shrink the window an attacker can use.
The attacker bridged almost the entire stolen amount in under two minutes. Per-window limits and a fast pause on every bridge, which TAC says it is adding, would have cut how much reached BNB Chain.
Similar incidents
KiiChain lost about 148 million KII the same evening through the same chain of Cosmos EVM defects, repeated against 18 accounts.
Nesa confirmed exploitation of a Cosmos EVM vulnerability on August 24, with the moved NES bridged to Ethereum. Same module, same class.
A different bug in the same weak spot: vesting-account logic reachable from the EVM side of a Cosmos-based chain let an attacker move tokens out of accounts it did not control.
Remediation
Timeline
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