BlackHart
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TAC

August 22, 2026·TAC·Logic Error
$7.5M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Logic error

A vesting account delegated locked tokens against a spendable balance of zero, the deduction wrapped around, and the staking pool's balance was overwritten.

What would have stopped it

  • Keep both balance views in agreement
  • Guard protocol-owned accounts on every write path

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored TAC before this exploit.

An attacker took 2,985,651,403 TAC, about 28.6 percent of TAC's supply and roughly $7.5 million by DeFiLlama's count, out of the pool that holds all tokens delegated to validators on August 22. TAC says it was a drain, not a mint, so total supply did not change, and no other TAC asset was touched. The cause is a flaw in the shared Cosmos EVM module that TAC runs, the same one used against MANTRA two days earlier, not TAC's own code. The attacker bridged the tokens to BNB Chain and sold about 1.2 billion for about $950,000 before TAC halted the chain; about 1.66 billion stolen TAC was still unsold, and TAC plans to restore the staking pool and cover the market shortfall from foundation reserves.

Other TAC assets and bridgessafe(TAC says only the TAC token was affected)
Total TAC supplysafe(unchanged, a drain not a mint)
Staking pooldrained(2,985,651,403 TAC, about $7.5 million per DeFiLlama)
Delegator positionsdrained(unbacked until the planned state edit)
Stolen TAC still on BNB Chainunknown(about 1.66 billion TAC unsold when TAC published)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker's contract, built on a prepared vesting account at exploit contract, emptied the staking pool in one transaction. The proceeds went to the attacker address, which bridged the TAC to BNB Chain in two transfers.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Staking pool (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker contract and address (attacker), about $7.5M reached this step. Step 3, Bridge and sale: BNB Chain and TON sales (exit), Unsold or frozen TAC (exit), about $6.49M reached this step.

  1. Step 1: Root control

  2. Step 2: Drain

    • Attacker
      Attacker contract and address
      one transaction at block 24,662,148
      gain equal to the pool's loss
      0xecb0Af97...c77c84
  3. Step 3: Bridge and sale

    • Exit
      BNB Chain and TON sales
      1.208 billion TAC sold for 950,293 USDT
      49.9 million TAC sold on TON
    • Exit
      Unsold or frozen TAC
      about 1.66 billion TAC on BNB Chain
      65.1 million TAC frozen by the halt

Why each step worked

    • Wrong balance deducteddelegating locked vesting tokens read the spendable balance, which was zero
    • No lower bound on the deductionthe contract's EVM balance wrapped to an enormous number
    • Protocol-account guard skipped EVM transfersthe pool balance could be overwritten at commit
    • No supply-based alarmmissing controlsupply never changed, so nothing flagged the move
    • No per-window bridge limitmissing controlnearly all of it left in under two minutes
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
At 19:46 UTC on August 22 the attacker deployed a factory and an exploit contract on TAC, at an address prepared in advance on top of a vesting account. Per TAC's post-mortem, this set-up is what the flaw in the shared Cosmos EVM module needed.
2.
At 19:46:37 UTC the contract moved 2,985,651,403.40 TAC, about 28.6 percent of supply, out of the staking pool that holds all delegated TAC. TAC says this was a drain, not a mint: no new TAC was created and total supply did not change.
3.
Within about two minutes the attacker bridged the TAC to BNB Chain through the LayerZero token adapter in two transfers, then began selling. Per TAC, 1,208,329,197 TAC was sold on BNB Chain for 950,293 USDT, and a smaller amount was sent to TON and sold there.
4.
TAC's sequencer was stopped at 20:56 UTC and block production halted at block 24,671,475 at 23:58 UTC. By then about 1.66 billion stolen TAC was still unsold on BNB Chain and 65.1 million had been bridged back and frozen by the halt.

Root cause

TAC runs on the open-source Cosmos EVM module, which keeps two views of every balance: the EVM's own view and the Cosmos bank module's view. Per TAC's post-mortem and Cosmos Labs' disclosure, those views disagreed in three places. When a vesting account delegated tokens that were locked, the deduction was taken from the spendable balance, which was zero; nothing stopped that deduction from going below zero, so the contract's EVM balance wrapped around to an astronomically large number; and the protection meant to stop protocol-owned accounts from being overwritten did not cover direct transfers inside the EVM layer, so the staking pool's balance was overwritten when the transaction committed. The attacker's gain and the pool's loss cancelled out, which is why total supply never changed and no alarm tied to supply fired. No private key was stolen and no governance action was needed. The flaw sits in shared upstream code, not TAC-specific code: Cosmos Labs rated it critical and said it affected chains running Cosmos EVM below version 0.6.2 or 0.7.2, which were published on August 19, 2026 without a security advisory, about 20 hours before the first attack on MANTRA. It was exploited on six chains between August 20 and August 25. Cosmos Labs says its own earlier testing had judged the bug harmless on the chain configurations it tried.

Prevention analysis

Keep both balance views in agreement

If the amount deducted for a delegation had been checked against the right balance and could never drop below zero, the contract's balance could not have wrapped around and nothing else in the attack would have worked.

Guard protocol-owned accounts on every write path

The staking pool's balance could be overwritten at commit because the guard did not cover direct EVM transfers. A guard on every path that writes balances would have kept the pool intact.

Treat every upstream security fix as urgent

The fix was merged in May and released in August without an advisory. Chains that track upstream fixes closely, and upstream projects that flag them, shrink the window an attacker can use.

Cap and pause bridge outflows

The attacker bridged almost the entire stolen amount in under two minutes. Per-window limits and a fast pause on every bridge, which TAC says it is adding, would have cut how much reached BNB Chain.

Similar incidents

KiiChain (2026)

KiiChain lost about 148 million KII the same evening through the same chain of Cosmos EVM defects, repeated against 18 accounts.

Nesa (2026)

Nesa confirmed exploitation of a Cosmos EVM vulnerability on August 24, with the moved NES bridged to Ethereum. Same module, same class.

BounceBit Chain (2026)

A different bug in the same weak spot: vesting-account logic reachable from the EVM side of a Cosmos-based chain let an attacker move tokens out of accounts it did not control.

Remediation

1.TAC halted the network at block 24,671,475 and plans a targeted state edit at that block, not a rollback, so the 7,772 legitimate transactions from the last four hours are kept; the staking pool is to be restored to 2,985,651,403.40 TAC and delegators returned to their prior balances, with no action needed from them.
2.TAC says the 1,258,228,061.40 TAC sold on the market will be covered from TAC Foundation reserves, and the 65.1 million TAC frozen on the chain will be removed. The treatment of the 1.66 billion TAC still on BNB Chain was not decided when the post-mortem was published, and holders are told not to trade it.
3.TAC prepared a three-part patch (copy only spendable tokens, reject deductions below zero, block overwrites of protocol-account balances) and plans per-window bridge limits and a fast-pause path on every bridge; bridging is disabled in both directions meanwhile.
4.Any other chain running Cosmos EVM should confirm it has applied the patched releases Cosmos Labs published and follow its current guidance.

Timeline

2026-08-19Cosmos Labs publishes Cosmos EVM 0.6.2 and 0.7.2 with the underflow fix, described only as security fixes.
2026-08-20First attack in the series, on MANTRA.
2026-08-22The attacker's TAC account is funded with 274.78 TAC bridged from BNB Chain for gas.
2026-08-22Exploit executes at block 24,662,148 and the staking pool is drained.
2026-08-22First of two LayerZero bridge transfers of the stolen TAC to BNB Chain.
2026-08-22TAC stops its sequencer.
2026-08-22Block production halts at block 24,671,475.
2026-08-28Cosmos Labs publishes its post-mortem; TAC publishes its own account with a recovery plan in early September.
TAC team and validators (detection and halt). Cosmos Labs (disclosure and reconstruction). SEAL 911, Elliptic, Chainalysis, AML Bot, Scorechain and Crystal Intelligence (tracing, per TAC)
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