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Taiko Bridge

June 21, 2026·Ethereum·Key Compromise
$1.7M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Access control

A leaked enclave signing key and a registration check that allowed insecure enclaves let rogue provers finalize a fake Taiko state on Ethereum, which the bridge honored.

What would have stopped it

  • Keep signing keys out of source control and scan repositories for secrets.
  • Reject debug-mode enclaves at registration.

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Taiko Bridge before this exploit.

An attacker took about $1.75 million from Taiko's bridge on Ethereum by getting rogue provers accepted and using them to finalize a fake version of the Taiko chain. That let them withdraw USDC, USDT, crvUSD, ETH, TAIKO and other tokens that had never been sent across. The root problem was a signing key left in a public code repository plus a registration check that did not reject insecure enclaves; withdrawal limits kept more than $11 million in the bridge untouched. Taiko paused the bridge, refilled it 1:1 and made every user whole before reopening on July 2. The attacker sent about 810 ETH through Tornado Cash, while 1.99 million TAIKO was frozen at MEXC.

Bridge userssafe(made whole by the Taiko Foundation)
Funds under withdrawal limitssafe(more than $11 million never moved)
Taiko proving math and bridge contractssafe(no contract bug exploited)
ERC20 Vault and ETH Bridge reservesdrained(about $1.75 million withdrawn)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker's main wallet used a helper contract to register rogue provers in one transaction, finalized fake checkpoints, and then withdrew tokens from the ERC20 Vault and ETH from the Bridge into a second wallet before mixing the ETH through Tornado Cash.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Rogue provers: Main attacker wallet (attacker). Step 2, Drain: ERC20 Vault (source), Bridge (bridge), about $1.24M reached this step. Step 3, Launder: Consolidation wallet (hub), Tornado Cash and MEXC (exit), about $1.4M reached this step.

  1. Step 1: Rogue provers

    • Attacker
      Main attacker wallet
      registers two rogue provers
      posts fake checkpoints
      0x7506DeA0...e1B76a
  2. Step 2: Drain

  3. Step 3: Launder

    • Hub
      Consolidation wallet
      ETH withdrawals plus swap proceeds
      feeds the main wallet
      0xA9803508...38a846
    • Exit
      Tornado Cash and MEXC
      about 810 ETH mixed
      1.99M TAIKO frozen at MEXC

Why each step worked

    • Enclave signing key in a public repositorylet outsiders sign provers the contracts trusted
    • Registration accepted insecure enclavesdebug mode was never rejected
    • Trusted hardware alone could finalize statezero-knowledge proofs were optional
    • Some tokens had no withdrawal limitmissing controllower-value tokens drained in full
    • Pause took hours to executemissing controlfirst council proposals reverted; pause landed at 05:40 UTC
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
The attacker registered two rogue prover instances with Taiko's Ethereum contracts. This was possible because an enclave signing key had been published in a public code repository and the registration check did not reject enclaves running in an insecure mode. The same transaction posted the first fraudulent proof.
2.
Over the next seven hours the rogue provers finalized about 30 fake checkpoints of the Taiko chain on Ethereum. Each fake checkpoint let the attacker claim withdrawals that never happened on Taiko. In total 39 forged withdrawal messages were submitted to the bridge.
3.
At 22:07 UTC the attacker cashed out eight token claims from the ERC20 Vault, starting with 649,761 USDC, then crvUSD, USDT, CRV, WETH, WBTC and smaller tokens, and later 1.99 million TAIKO and another 26,000 USDC.
4.
About 278 ETH flowed out of the Bridge to a second attacker wallet across roughly 25 withdrawals until 02:10 UTC. The bridge's daily ETH limit throttled this part of the drain, and an 18 ETH claim was picked up by an MEV bot, which later returned 17 ETH to Taiko.
5.
Taiko's Security Council paused the Bridge and ERC20 Vault at 05:40 UTC on June 22. The attacker swapped the stablecoins for ETH, sent the TAIKO to an MEXC deposit address where it was frozen, and moved about 810 ETH through Tornado Cash between June 23 and July 28.

Root cause

This was an operational key exposure combined with a gap in how Taiko admitted provers, not a break in the bridge contracts or in the proving math, per Taiko Labs' post-mortem. Taiko's Ethereum contracts accepted proofs from approved SGX prover enclaves and identified trusted enclaves by the key that signed their software. That signing key had been committed to Taiko's public prover repository, and the registration check did not reject enclaves running in a debug mode that offers no confidentiality. Together these let an outsider register provers the contracts treated as Taiko's own. Taiko also allowed two SGX proofs to finalize a block, with zero-knowledge proofs optional, and it kept a permissionless proving fallback for liveness, so rogue provers were enough to finalize a fake version of the Taiko chain on Ethereum. The bridge then honored withdrawals backed by that fake state. Per-asset withdrawal limits capped the damage: about $1.75 million left, while more than $11 million in the Bridge and Vault never moved. Taiko has since rejected debug-mode enclaves at registration and, through its Unzen upgrade, made a zero-knowledge proof mandatory on every block.

Prevention analysis

Keep signing keys out of source control and scan repositories for secrets.

The attack began with a signing key sitting in a public repository. Secret scanning on commits, and holding release signing keys in hardware, would have left the attacker with nothing to sign rogue provers with.

Reject debug-mode enclaves at registration.

Even with the key exposed, checking the enclave's production flag would have blocked the rogue provers. Taiko deployed this fix on June 29.

Require at least one independent proof type on every block.

With zero-knowledge proofs optional, a single trusted-hardware path could finalize state alone. Making a zero-knowledge proof mandatory, as Taiko's Unzen upgrade now does, removes that single point of failure.

Keep per-asset withdrawal limits on every bridged token.

Limits are why only about $1.75 million of more than $13 million left. Tokens without a limit were drained in full, so covering every asset would have shrunk the loss further.

Similar incidents

Wormhole (2022)

The bridge accepted an attestation it should have rejected and released funds on Ethereum-side state that never existed. Same class: a bridge that trusts a verifier step which an outsider managed to satisfy.

Alephium token bridge (2026)

Forged guardian attestations were accepted by the bridge and released about $815,000. Same family: forged proof of a cross-chain event that never happened.

Payy Network (2026)

A rollup bridge paid out against a proof that should have failed. Same lesson: a rollup bridge is only as strong as the weakest path that can finalize state on Ethereum.

Remediation

1.Taiko's Security Council paused the Bridge and ERC20 Vault on June 22 and disabled permissionless proving, proposing and forced inclusion.
2.Taiko deployed the debug-enclave fix, invalidated the fraudulent checkpoints and restored the chain to its pre-attack state on June 29, after an OpenZeppelin incident review.done
3.The Taiko Foundation and Taiko Labs recollateralized the bridge 1:1 on June 30, made every affected user whole, and released the bridge on July 2 under conservative limits.done
4.Taiko's Unzen upgrade makes a zero-knowledge proof mandatory on every block and runs two independent zkVMs, so trusted hardware alone can no longer finalize state.
5.Other rollups that accept trusted-hardware proofs should check enclave mode at registration, keep signing keys out of repositories, and avoid any path where one proof type can finalize state alone.

Timeline

2026-06-21Last legitimate proof is posted on Ethereum.
2026-06-21Attack begins: two rogue prover instances are registered and the first fraudulent proof is posted.
2026-06-21Funds start leaving the ERC20 Vault, beginning with 649,761 USDC.
2026-06-21Taiko confirms an exploit and notifies its Security Council.
2026-06-22Taiko posts a security notice warning users not to rely on bridges.
2026-06-22Last fraudulent proof is posted.
2026-06-22Security Council proposal pauses the Bridge and ERC20 Vault.
2026-06-23Attacker begins sending ETH into Tornado Cash.
2026-06-29Fix deployed: debug enclaves rejected, fraudulent checkpoints invalidated, chain restored.
2026-07-02Bridge released after 1:1 recollateralization; users made whole.
Taiko Labs (post-mortem). Blockaid (real-time detection). BlockSec Phalcon (root cause). OpenZeppelin (incident response review)
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