Term Finance (Term Labs vaults)
Why it happened
Attack class: Governance attackControl of the vaults ran through a thin wrapped-share vote, and the vote could remove the Zodiac Delay cooldown that protected depositors.
What would have stopped it
- Governance cannot change its own delay
- Voting weight tied to real stake
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored Term Finance (Term Labs vaults) before this exploit.
An attacker took about $8.5 million from the Term Labs vaults on Ethereum, made up of 2,841.74 WETH and 1,679,639.29 USDC. Voting on the vaults required wrapped vault shares and almost none existed, so the attacker gained a majority vote cheaply, passed proposals that removed the waiting period on withdrawals, and moved the money out. Depositors in the ETH Meta Vault and five USDC vaults were affected. About 960 ETH had reached Tornado Cash by September 4 and no funds were returned.
The attacker gained a majority vote over the Term Labs vaults, passed proposals that removed the withdrawal delay, and drained the ETH vault in tx and the USDC vaults in tx.
Attack flow
All 5 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Term Labs vaults (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker (attacker), about $8.47M reached this step. Step 3, Mixer: Tornado Cash (exit), about $3M reached this step.
Step 1: Root control
- SourceTerm Labs vaultsETH Meta Vault plus five USDC vaults~ $8.5M total
Step 2: Drain
- AttackerAttacker2,841.74 WETH1,679,639.29 USDC
Step 3: Mixer
- ExitTornado Cashabout 960 ETH in by September 4no funds returned
Why each step worked
- Voting needed wrapped sharesalmost none were wrapped, so a majority was cheap
- Delay removable by the same voteZodiac Delay cooldown taken out by proposal
- No quorum floor or outflow capmissing controlone passed proposal opened all vaults
- No recoverymissing controlfunds were not returned
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
The Term Labs vaults let holders of wrapped vault shares vote on proposals that controlled the vaults themselves. Per the Defimon and Rekt write-ups, almost nobody had wrapped any shares, so the voting supply was tiny compared with the money the vaults held. That meant a majority vote could be gained cheaply, far below the value it controlled. The attacker used that majority to pass proposals that removed the Zodiac Delay cooldown, the control meant to give depositors time to exit or the team time to intervene, and then moved the funds in ordinary transactions. The design flaw was tying control of the whole vault to a thin, easily acquired voting base while the one delay that could have caught the attack was itself changeable by the same vote.
Prevention analysis
A cooldown that the same vote can remove gives no protection. Making the delay immutable, or requiring a separate longer process to change it, would have left depositors time to withdraw.
Counting all vault shares, wrapped or not, would have made a majority cost a large share of the vault rather than a trivial amount.
A minimum participation level and a cap on how much can leave per period would have limited the loss from a single passed proposal.
Similar incidents
Control of the treasury went to whoever held enough voting weight at the moment of the vote, with no delay between winning control and using it.
Remediation
Timeline
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