TesseraDAO
Why it happened
Attack class: Access controlOne admin key controlled mint, roles and withdrawals, so reassigning roles let the attacker print TSR and cash it out.
What would have stopped it
- Multisig and timelock on admin roles
- Revoking unused admin rights
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored TesseraDAO before this exploit.
About $2.5 million in stablecoins was taken from TesseraDAO on BNB Chain after an attacker gained control of the project's single admin account. They gave themselves the trading and withdrawal roles, minted 99 million TSR tokens, swapped them for stablecoins from the protocol and withdrew them. The TSR price fell about 99% and the proceeds were bridged to Ethereum and mixed through Tornado Cash. The team has not published an explanation or compensation plan.
The attacker used an admin account to reassign roles in the protocol contract, then minted 99 million TSR of the TSR token, swapped it in this trade and moved the proceeds to the attacker wallet.
Attack flow
All 4 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Role takeover: TesseraDAO protocol contract (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker wallet (attacker), about $2.49M reached this step. Step 3, Mixer: Tornado Cash (exit).
Step 1: Role takeover
- SourceTesseraDAO protocol contractroles reassigned to the attacker99M TSR minted0x6f2b45b9...4904cb
Step 2: Drain
- AttackerAttacker walletswapped TSR for BSC-USDabout $2.49M received0x2201037a...6f2dd8
Step 3: Mixer
- ExitTornado Cashabout 1,285 ETH depositedafter bridging to Ethereum
Why each step worked
- Single admin key with every power0x61a23e0eba09096ffeb954aa8a93c3079e87cf17
- No multisig, timelock or revoked rightsmissing controladmin rights never removed
- No mint cap or outflow limitmissing controlentire pool drained in two withdrawals
- Alert came about 19 hours latermissing controlno on-chain monitoring of role changes
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
Per Rekt's analysis, a single admin key held total control over TesseraDAO: it could mint TSR, assign roles, transfer ownership, trade and withdraw, with no multisig, timelock or second approval, and the admin rights were never revoked. QuillAudits said the attacker obtained the key and then used the protocol's own functions. Rekt does not establish whether the key was stolen or handed over. With that one key the attacker did not need any code flaw: it reassigned the roles to its own wallet, minted 99 million TSR, swapped it for stablecoins held by the protocol and withdrew them. The audit the project cited was never completed, per Rekt, and the team has not published a post-mortem.
Prevention analysis
Requiring several signers and a delay on ownership and role changes would have given holders time to react.
Dropping the mint and role powers once launched, as the project's own materials claimed, would have removed the path.
A cap on new supply and on stablecoin withdrawals would have limited the drain to a fraction of the pool.
Similar incidents
Privileged actions were reachable by an account that should not have held them.
A single privileged signer was compromised, and the protocol trusted it without a second check.
Remediation
Timeline
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