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TesseraDAO

June 1, 2026·BNB Chain·Access Control
$2.5M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Access control

One admin key controlled mint, roles and withdrawals, so reassigning roles let the attacker print TSR and cash it out.

What would have stopped it

  • Multisig and timelock on admin roles
  • Revoking unused admin rights

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored TesseraDAO before this exploit.

About $2.5 million in stablecoins was taken from TesseraDAO on BNB Chain after an attacker gained control of the project's single admin account. They gave themselves the trading and withdrawal roles, minted 99 million TSR tokens, swapped them for stablecoins from the protocol and withdrew them. The TSR price fell about 99% and the proceeds were bridged to Ethereum and mixed through Tornado Cash. The team has not published an explanation or compensation plan.

Holders who did not sell before the mintsafe(not drained, but the TSR price collapsed)
Protocol stablecoin balancedrained(about $2.49 million withdrawn)
TSR holdersdrained(price down about 99%)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker used an admin account to reassign roles in the protocol contract, then minted 99 million TSR of the TSR token, swapped it in this trade and moved the proceeds to the attacker wallet.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Role takeover: TesseraDAO protocol contract (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker wallet (attacker), about $2.49M reached this step. Step 3, Mixer: Tornado Cash (exit).

  1. Step 1: Role takeover

    • Source
      TesseraDAO protocol contract
      roles reassigned to the attacker
      99M TSR minted
      0x6f2b45b9...4904cb
  2. Step 2: Drain

  3. Step 3: Mixer

    • Exit
      Tornado Cash
      about 1,285 ETH deposited
      after bridging to Ethereum

Why each step worked

    • Single admin key with every power0x61a23e0eba09096ffeb954aa8a93c3079e87cf17
    • No multisig, timelock or revoked rightsmissing controladmin rights never removed
    • No mint cap or outflow limitmissing controlentire pool drained in two withdrawals
    • Alert came about 19 hours latermissing controlno on-chain monitoring of role changes
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
Per Rekt and QuillAudits, an admin account that held every privileged role over the protocol was used to reassign the trader and withdrawer roles and ownership to the attacker's wallet.
2.
The attacker minted 99 million TSR tokens into the protocol contract using its own mint function.
3.
The protocol's trade function then swapped the new TSR for about 2.48 million BSC-USD from the pool.
4.
The attacker withdrew the proceeds, bridged them to Ethereum and sent about 1,285 ETH through Tornado Cash, per PeckShield. The TSR price fell about 99%.

Root cause

Per Rekt's analysis, a single admin key held total control over TesseraDAO: it could mint TSR, assign roles, transfer ownership, trade and withdraw, with no multisig, timelock or second approval, and the admin rights were never revoked. QuillAudits said the attacker obtained the key and then used the protocol's own functions. Rekt does not establish whether the key was stolen or handed over. With that one key the attacker did not need any code flaw: it reassigned the roles to its own wallet, minted 99 million TSR, swapped it for stablecoins held by the protocol and withdrew them. The audit the project cited was never completed, per Rekt, and the team has not published a post-mortem.

Prevention analysis

Multisig and timelock on admin roles

Requiring several signers and a delay on ownership and role changes would have given holders time to react.

Revoking unused admin rights

Dropping the mint and role powers once launched, as the project's own materials claimed, would have removed the path.

Mint caps and outflow limits

A cap on new supply and on stablecoin withdrawals would have limited the drain to a fraction of the pool.

Similar incidents

Crypto DAO Pro vault (2026)

Privileged actions were reachable by an account that should not have held them.

Ostium (2026)

A single privileged signer was compromised, and the protocol trusted it without a second check.

Remediation

1.The team has not published a post-mortem or an official statement as of Rekt's reporting.
2.Holders should treat the TSR token and related TesseraDAO contracts as compromised, because QuillAudits observed the admin account still acting on other related contracts.
3.Projects should move admin roles behind a multisig with a timelock and renounce mint powers that are not needed.

Timeline

2026-06-01Admin roles reassigned, 99 million TSR minted and swapped, and proceeds withdrawn (time unknown).
2026-06-02Specter posts the first public alert, and QuillAudits and PeckShield publish breakdowns.
2026-06-04Rekt asks the team whether it will disclose; the team posts no acknowledgment.
Specter (first alert). PeckShield (amounts and Tornado Cash trace). QuillAudits (transaction breakdown). Rekt News
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