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Verus-Ethereum Bridge

July 23, 2026·Ethereum·Bridge Exploit
$7.5M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Bridge exploit

The bridge accepted a signed but unbacked import: the Ethereum contract and Verus disagreed about the same data, and nothing checked that the payout matched value locked on Verus.

What would have stopped it

  • Reconcile every payout against value locked on the source chain.
  • Use one canonical encoding that both chains must parse identically.

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Verus-Ethereum Bridge before this exploit.

An attacker drained about $7.54 million from the Verus-Ethereum bridge, the second time the same contract was emptied in 66 days. They got the bridge's Ethereum contract to pay out ETH, tBTC, DAI, USDC, USDT, scrvUSD, EURC and MKR for a transfer that never happened on Verus, even though every signature checked out. Bridge reserves on Ethereum were hit, which left Verus-side bridged ETH and tBTC only partly backed; Verus has said it will repay holders with restitution tokens. The attacker swapped everything to about 3,916 ETH and put it all through Tornado Cash within two hours.

Verus chain consensussafe(no keys stolen, no cryptography broken)
VRSC on Verussafe
Bridged ETH and tBTC on Veruspartially affected(backing reduced; restitution tokens promised)
Bridge reserves on Ethereumdrained(about $7.54 million drained)
Exploit anatomy

A fresh wallet sent an import to the Verus-Ethereum bridge that released about $7.54 million in one transaction to a receiving wallet, which swapped it to ETH and deposited about 3,916 ETH into Tornado Cash.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Unbacked import: Verus-Ethereum bridge (bridge). Step 2, Swap: Receiving wallet (hub), about $7.54M reached this step. Step 3, Mixer: Tornado Cash (exit).

  1. Step 1: Unbacked import

    • Bridge
      Verus-Ethereum bridge
      1,137 ETH, 71.5 tBTC, stablecoins, MKR
      ~ $7.54M in one transaction
      0x71518580...cD7F63
  2. Step 2: Swap

  3. Step 3: Mixer

Why each step worked

    • Ethereum side read signed data differently from Verusvalid notary signatures, inconsistent interpretation
    • No check that payout matched value locked on Verusmissing controlsame class of flaw as the May drain
    • No holding period on large payoutsmissing controlrelease settled instantly
    • Bridge refilled before an independent reviewmissing controlrecovered funds returned two weeks earlier
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
A fresh wallet with no visible link to the May attacker posted two notarization updates to the bridge's Ethereum contract. The data carried genuine notary signatures, but the Ethereum contract interpreted it differently from Verus nodes.
2.
Four minutes later a single import transaction paid out reserves that had never been sent from Verus: 1,137.45 ETH, 71.50 tBTC, 220,357 DAI from the bridge's Sky position, 149,275 USDC, 78,301 USDT, 92,784 scrvUSD, 31,476 EURC and 59.43 MKR, about $7.54 million in total.
3.
Within half an hour the receiving wallet swapped the tokens for ETH through the Relay aggregator, ending with about 3,916 ETH.
4.
Between 04:45 and 05:30 UTC the wallet deposited about 3,916.1 ETH into Tornado Cash, mostly in 100 ETH deposits.

Root cause

The Verus-Ethereum bridge releases Ethereum reserves when it receives an import from Verus that is backed by a notarized summary of the Verus ledger. The checks it ran, notary signatures and Merkle proofs, all passed, per Blockaid, CertiK and Halborn. What failed was consistency between the two sides: the Ethereum contract could read the signed data differently from Verus nodes, and it did not confirm that the value it paid out matched value actually locked or exported on Verus. That let a transfer that Verus never made be honored on Ethereum. No key was stolen and no cryptography was broken, per Verus. Blockaid tied the attack to the same contract, entry path and class of flaw as the May 2026 drain of about $11.6 million, which means the earlier fix did not close the underlying gap; Verus later said it was not quite the same bug. This repeat came 66 days after the first, after Verus had moved recovered funds back into the bridge. As of the latest public updates Verus had not reopened the bridge, its planned Ethereum contract upgrade was still pending, and no independent audit had been commissioned, so the details of the flaw are deliberately kept general here.

Prevention analysis

Reconcile every payout against value locked on the source chain.

Valid signatures only prove that data was signed, not that it moves real value. A check that each release matches value exported from Verus would have rejected an import that Verus never sent.

Use one canonical encoding that both chains must parse identically.

The loss came from the Ethereum contract and Verus nodes disagreeing about the same signed data. Rejecting anything ambiguous on both sides removes that whole class of attack.

Hold large payouts for a review window before release.

The drain settled in one transaction. Verus's own planned fix, an 8 to 12 hour holding period in which witnesses can halt a transfer, would have given time to stop it.

Get an independent review before refilling a bridge after an exploit.

Recovered funds went back into the same contract two weeks before the second drain. An outside review of the May fix, before restoring reserves, could have caught that the gap was still open.

Similar incidents

Verus-Ethereum Bridge (May 2026)

The same bridge contract lost about $11.6 million in May to an import the Ethereum side read differently from Verus. Same class of flaw, different attacker, and the fix in between did not hold.

Syscoin Bridge (2026)

Syscoin's relay read a burn proof differently from Syscoin Core and released 5 billion SYS that were never burned. Same root: two layers of one bridge disagreeing about what signed data says.

Nomad Bridge (2022)

Nomad accepted messages that were never sent and paid them out from reserves. Same outcome: the destination chain released funds without proof that the source chain locked them.

Remediation

1.Verus has released node updates and a root-cause write-up and says it is evaluating an Ethereum contract upgrade with a holding period for payouts; as of the latest public updates the upgrade was pending and the bridge had not reopened.done
2.Verus said it would replace 99.9% of the lost currency with restitution currency, as it did after May; no recovery of the stolen ETH has been reported.
3.Users should not send funds through the Verus-Ethereum bridge until a contract upgrade ships and is reviewed by an independent auditor, and should follow Verus's official guidance on bridged balances.
4.Bridges of this design should reconcile every payout against value locked on the source chain, reject ambiguous encodings, and pause automatically after any release that is not matched on the other side.

Timeline

2026-05-18First exploit of the same bridge contract drains about $11.6 million.
2026-05-22May attacker returns 4,052.4 ETH and keeps about 1,350 ETH as a bounty.
2026-07-08Verus moves recovered ETH back into the bridge contract, per rekt.news.
2026-07-23A fresh wallet posts the first of two notarization updates to the bridge contract.
2026-07-23Single import transaction pays out about $7.54 million in ETH and tokens.
2026-07-23Attacker begins swapping the tokens to ETH through Relay.
2026-07-23First Tornado Cash deposit; about 3,916.1 ETH is mixed by 05:30 UTC.
2026-07-23Blockaid and CertiK alerts are reported publicly.
Blockaid (detection). CertiK (loss estimate and fund tracing). Halborn and Merkle Science (analysis). Backward Labs (analysis)
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