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Wanchain Cardano Bridge

July 21, 2026·Cardano·Signature Replay
$10.0M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Signature replay / forgery

The validator signed a message with ambiguous field boundaries, so a small authorization could be matched to a much larger redemption.

What would have stopped it

  • Unambiguous encoding of signed messages
  • Per-redemption amount limits and rate caps

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored Wanchain Cardano Bridge before this exploit.

Attackers drained about 515 million NIGHT tokens, roughly $10 million per DeFiLlama and up to $13 million in some reports, from Wanchain's Cardano to BNB Chain bridge. BlockSec Phalcon traced it to the bridge's validator signing a message made of 14 variable-length fields joined with no separators, so one signature for about 3,110 NIGHT could be reused for redemptions of hundreds of millions. The tokens were sold on decentralized exchanges and NIGHT fell more than 30%. Wanchain took the bridge offline, and the Midnight Foundation said its own network and validators were not affected.

Midnight Network validators and consensussafe(per the Midnight Foundation)
Wanchain validator keyssafe(not reported compromised)
Bridge treasurydrained(about 515 million NIGHT, about $10 million)
NIGHT holdersdrained(price down over 30% in a day)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker reused one valid redemption authorization against the bridge's TreasuryCheck validator on Cardano to redeem far more NIGHT than it covered. The published sources give no transaction or wallet details.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Signature reuse: TreasuryCheck validator (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker wallets (attacker), about $10M reached this step. Step 3, Sale: Decentralized exchanges (exit).

  1. Step 1: Signature reuse

    • Source
      TreasuryCheck validator
      one authorization for about 3,110 NIGHT
      reused for over 203M NIGHT
  2. Step 2: Drain

    • Attacker
      Attacker wallets
      about 515M NIGHT received
      from the bridge treasury
  3. Step 3: Sale

    • Exit
      Decentralized exchanges
      NIGHT sold
      price down over 30%

Why each step worked

    • 14 fields joined without separatorsdifferent inputs produced the same signed hash
    • Serialization function not used in signed hashmissing controlfunction already in the contract
    • No per-redemption amount capmissing controlone transaction moved over 203M NIGHT
    • Exchanges moved to freeze linked walletsreported after the sale began
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
Per BlockSec Phalcon's analysis, the bridge's TreasuryCheck validator on Cardano signed redemption requests over a message built from 14 variable-length fields.
2.
Because the fields were joined without separators or length markers, different field combinations produced the same bytes and the same hash.
3.
The attacker reused a signature that authorized about 3,110 NIGHT to approve redemptions of far larger amounts, over 203 million NIGHT in one transaction.
4.
About 515 million NIGHT was taken from the bridge treasury and sold on decentralized exchanges. Wanchain took the bridge offline.

Root cause

Wanchain's Cardano to BNB Chain bridge holds NIGHT in a treasury controlled by an on-chain validator called TreasuryCheck, which releases funds when validators have signed a redemption. Per BlockSec Phalcon, the signed message was built by joining 14 variable-length fields end to end with no delimiter or length marker. Different sets of field values could therefore produce an identical byte string and hash, so one genuine authorization could be matched to a different, much larger redemption. BlockSec notes the contract already included Cardano's data serialization function but the signature hash path did not use it. Wanchain's validator keys were not compromised, per reports, and the Midnight Foundation said its own network was not affected.

Prevention analysis

Unambiguous encoding of signed messages

Using length prefixes or the platform's serialization for every field would have made each signed message map to exactly one redemption.

Per-redemption amount limits and rate caps

A cap on how much one redemption or one hour could release would have turned a treasury drain into a small loss.

Independent review of the signature path

A review focused on how the signed hash is built would likely have caught fields joined without separators.

Similar incidents

Secret Network Axelar bridge (2026)

A bridge accepted a message it should not have and released funds on the other side.

Aztec Connect (2026)

A verifier accepted input that did not match what was actually authorized.

Remediation

1.Wanchain suspended bridge operations and disabled the affected bridge, per its notice as reported.
2.Wanchain said it is preparing a detailed technical analysis; a patched validator has not been confirmed in the sources reviewed.
3.Bridges that sign concatenated fields should switch to an unambiguous encoding and add per-transaction release limits.

Timeline

2026-07-21Treasury drained of about 515 million NIGHT (time not given in sources; one outlet cites 14:46 to 14:55 UTC on July 20).
2026-07-21Wanchain confirms the incident and takes the bridge offline (time approximate).
2026-07-22Further analysis published citing BlockSec Phalcon.
BlockSec Phalcon (root cause analysis). Midnight Foundation (scope statement)
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