BlackHart
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X100

October 24, 2026·Ethereum·Governance Attack
$4.7M
total loss
StatusConfirmed

Why it happened

Attack class: Governance attack

Senate seats followed live frozen balances, so flash-loaned tokens won control and a treasury swap ran in the same transaction.

What would have stopped it

  • Snapshot voting power in an earlier block
  • Timelock between seat change and treasury action

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored X100 before this exploit.

An attacker took about $4.7 million from X100 on Ethereum. X100 gave Senate seats to the largest current frozen balances, so a flash loan was enough to win seats, and a treasury swap then ran in the same transaction. Published figures differ slightly: Blockaid puts the loss at $4.85 million over 2 transactions and Chainalysis describes 3 transactions. No recovery has been reported.

Funds outside the X100 treasurysafe(not named as lost in the published analyses)
X100 treasurydrained(about $4.7 million lost)
Token holdersdrained(treasury value drained)
Exploit anatomy

The attacker used flash-loaned tokens to win Senate seats and ran a treasury swap in tx, all in a single transaction.

The attack in 2 steps. Step 1, Root control: X100 treasury (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker (exit), about $4.75M reached this step.

  1. Step 1: Root control

    • Source
      X100 treasury
      swapped by Senate action
      ~ $4.7M
  2. Step 2: Drain

    • Exit
      Attacker
      receives treasury value
      ~ $4.7M

Why each step worked

    • Seats follow live frozen balancesno snapshot, no timelock
    • Flash-loaned tokensborrowed for one transaction
    • No delay before treasury actionmissing controlswap ran in the same transaction as the seat win
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
The attacker flash-borrowed a large amount of X100 tokens and froze them to appear as the largest balances.
2.
X100 awards Senate seats to the largest current frozen balances, with no snapshot and no timelock, so the borrowed tokens won seats immediately.
3.
With control of the Senate, the attacker ran a treasury swap in the same transaction, moving treasury value to the attacker.
4.
The flash loan was repaid in the same transaction and the proceeds stayed with the attacker.

Root cause

X100 gave Senate seats to the largest current frozen token balances. The count used live balances, with no snapshot taken in an earlier block and no timelock between gaining a seat and using it. Because tokens can be borrowed for the length of one transaction, anyone could briefly hold the largest balance, win seats, and use the Senate's powers over the treasury before repaying the loan. Per the published analyses, the treasury swap ran in the same transaction as the seat win. The design assumed holding tokens meant lasting commitment, but nothing in the rules required the tokens to be held for any time at all.

Prevention analysis

Snapshot voting power in an earlier block

Seats assigned from balances recorded before the proposal could not be won with tokens borrowed inside one transaction.

Timelock between seat change and treasury action

A delay would have let the team pause and respond before any treasury swap could run.

Treasury actions need separate approval

Requiring a second approval for swaps would have stopped a single transaction from moving treasury value.

Similar incidents

Term Finance (2026)

Control over funds went to a cheaply acquired voting majority, with no effective delay between winning control and using it.

Remediation

1.Governance systems that award power from live balances should move to snapshot-based voting and add a delay before treasury actions.
2.Users of similar designs should check whether control can be gained and used in one transaction, and withdraw if so.

Timeline

2026-10-24Attack transaction on Ethereum: flash-loaned tokens win Senate seats and a treasury swap runs.
2026-10-24The same transaction repays the flash loan and leaves the proceeds with the attacker.
Phalcon (BlockSec). ExVul. Chainalysis
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