X100
Why it happened
Attack class: Governance attackSenate seats followed live frozen balances, so flash-loaned tokens won control and a treasury swap ran in the same transaction.
What would have stopped it
- Snapshot voting power in an earlier block
- Timelock between seat change and treasury action
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored X100 before this exploit.
An attacker took about $4.7 million from X100 on Ethereum. X100 gave Senate seats to the largest current frozen balances, so a flash loan was enough to win seats, and a treasury swap then ran in the same transaction. Published figures differ slightly: Blockaid puts the loss at $4.85 million over 2 transactions and Chainalysis describes 3 transactions. No recovery has been reported.
The attacker used flash-loaned tokens to win Senate seats and ran a treasury swap in tx, all in a single transaction.
Attack flow
All 4 on-chain stepsThe attack in 2 steps. Step 1, Root control: X100 treasury (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker (exit), about $4.75M reached this step.
Step 1: Root control
- SourceX100 treasuryswapped by Senate action~ $4.7M
Step 2: Drain
- ExitAttackerreceives treasury value~ $4.7M
Why each step worked
- Seats follow live frozen balancesno snapshot, no timelock
- Flash-loaned tokensborrowed for one transaction
- No delay before treasury actionmissing controlswap ran in the same transaction as the seat win
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
X100 gave Senate seats to the largest current frozen token balances. The count used live balances, with no snapshot taken in an earlier block and no timelock between gaining a seat and using it. Because tokens can be borrowed for the length of one transaction, anyone could briefly hold the largest balance, win seats, and use the Senate's powers over the treasury before repaying the loan. Per the published analyses, the treasury swap ran in the same transaction as the seat win. The design assumed holding tokens meant lasting commitment, but nothing in the rules required the tokens to be held for any time at all.
Prevention analysis
Seats assigned from balances recorded before the proposal could not be won with tokens borrowed inside one transaction.
A delay would have let the team pause and respond before any treasury swap could run.
Requiring a second approval for swaps would have stopped a single transaction from moving treasury value.
Similar incidents
Control over funds went to a cheaply acquired voting majority, with no effective delay between winning control and using it.
Remediation
Timeline
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