Access Control
Permission models, admin surface, reentrancy protection, and authorization boundaries. #1 exploit vector by dollar loss in DeFi history.
How This Score Is Built
Permission models, admin surface, reentrancy protection, and authorization boundaries. #1 exploit vector by dollar loss in DeFi history.
Scoring Tree
Score Composition
Modifiers: onlyOwner, onlyAttesterManager, onlyTokenController, whenNotPaused; attester enable/disable and threshold changes are unilateral by attesterManager with no delay
TokenMessengerV2 is itself an upgradeable proxy (AdminUpgradableProxy, impl 0x555e...3ec8) — owner can rotate logic; no on-chain timelock observed
ChainSecurity (2025-03-24) confirms a 2-step pattern for transferring high-importance roles (avoids lockout), though it notes the 2-step pattern is NOT applied to the proxy admin role
attesterManager (V2: 0xc16b...c95a) can enableAttester/disableAttester and setSignatureThreshold; combined with the attester set this is effectively a cross-chain mint authority
Live mitigation confirmed on-chain: signatureThreshold=2 with 2 enabled attesters (0x725b...3F96, 0x52Ed...bCeF) — a single compromised attester key cannot forge a mint; both must sign
Per-contract owner/pauser/rescuer/tokenController roles all read on-chain (distinct addresses per role and per contract — role separation, not a single key)
Evidence Chain (1 files)
Score History
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