Across
Why it happened
Attack class: Supply chain / dependencyControl of the domain, not the protocol.
What would have stopped it
- Put the domain under registry lock with strict account recovery at the registrar.
- Monitor DNS and certificate changes for the app domain with automatic alerts.
What the score saw
Our pre-hack assessment of Across focused on its contracts and code practices and did not measure domain or registrar security, so this attack surface was missed. The contracts it did assess were not touched.
Score dimensions
- Operational securitymissed
- Supply chainmissed
On November 10 an attacker took over the across.to website address by tricking Across's domain registrar, Namecheap, and sent visitors to a fake copy of the app. Users who connected a wallet and signed approvals or permits there lost about 350,000 dollars across six chains, according to GoPlus, with one Aave depositor losing about 305,000 dollars. Across's contracts, bridge liquidity and API users were not affected, and Across says every affected user will be made whole. The stolen funds were bridged to Ethereum, swapped to ether, and moved on to other wallets.
Through a hijacked across.to, a victim signed a permit that let the attacker wallet and a drainer fee wallet pull about 148.6 aWETH in one batch of transfers; the attacker withdrew it as ether and sent 146.27 ETH to a next wallet.
Attack flow
All 5 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Largest victim (source), Other victims (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker wallet (attacker), Drainer fee wallet (attacker), about $280K reached this step. Step 3, Cash out: Next wallet (exit), about $300K reached this step.
Step 1: Root control
- SourceLargest victim148.6 aWETH~ $305K0x42e7ab48...b8483c
- SourceOther victimsfive more chains~ $45K
Step 2: Drain
- AttackerAttacker wallet~ 119 aWETH from the largest victimplus bridged-in thefts0x2846e69d...a11fde
- AttackerDrainer fee wallet~ 30 aWETHabout 20 percent cut0x0c7c6561...e8d37b
Step 3: Cash out
- ExitNext wallet146.27 ETH inafter Aave withdrawal0x38D7E8B3...6E514c
Why each step worked
- Registrar social engineeringattacker changed where across.to pointed
- Signed permits and approvalsfake app asked for spending rights
- No registry lock on the domainmissing controla support-desk change was enough
- Hours to regain the domainmissing controlalerted in 15 minutes, restored about six hours later
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
The root cause was control of the domain, not the protocol. Across's contracts, bridge liquidity and API were never touched. The weak point was the registrar account for across.to: per Across, an attacker talked their way past Namecheap's account controls and changed where the domain pointed. From that moment, anyone who typed the real address or followed a trusted link reached the attacker's copy of the app, and nothing in the browser looked wrong. The fake app asked users to sign token approvals or permits, which hand spending rights to the attacker, and some users sent funds directly. Because permits are off-chain signatures, a victim may not see an on-chain approval until the funds are already gone. Across says its domain had established security controls in place and has promised a post-mortem explaining how they were bypassed. Loss estimates differ: GoPlus put user losses at about 350,000 dollars across six chains, and Bitquery's trace of nine wallets came to about 400,000 dollars, most of it a single Aave depositor's 148.6 aWETH. Across has not published its own figure.
Prevention analysis
A registry lock makes record and nameserver changes require out-of-band confirmation, so talking a support agent into a change would not have been enough.
Across noticed in about 15 minutes, but the domain stayed under attacker control for hours. Instant alerts plus a pre-arranged takedown path with wallets and the registrar shorten that window.
Most of the loss came from one permit signature. Clear warnings when a site asks for spending rights to an unknown address give users a last chance to refuse.
Similar incidents
Two weeks earlier, a registrar-level compromise of a vendor's DNS let attackers serve malicious code inside Polymarket's site. Same weak link: who controls a trusted domain's records.
Curve's front-end domain was redirected to a cloned site that asked users to approve a malicious contract. Same pattern: contracts safe, domain hijacked, users drained through approvals.
An attacker impersonated the team to the domain provider, took over DNS and served a drainer site. Same root cause: social engineering of the registrar or DNS provider.
Remediation
Timeline
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