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Across

November 10, 2026·Ethereum·Other
$350K
total loss
StatusConfirmed
View the Across score →

Why it happened

Attack class: Supply chain / dependency

Control of the domain, not the protocol.

What would have stopped it

  • Put the domain under registry lock with strict account recovery at the registrar.
  • Monitor DNS and certificate changes for the app domain with automatic alerts.

What the score saw

776Damascus, scored May 16, 2026

Our pre-hack assessment of Across focused on its contracts and code practices and did not measure domain or registrar security, so this attack surface was missed. The contracts it did assess were not touched.

Score dimensions

  • Operational securitymissed
  • Supply chainmissed

On November 10 an attacker took over the across.to website address by tricking Across's domain registrar, Namecheap, and sent visitors to a fake copy of the app. Users who connected a wallet and signed approvals or permits there lost about 350,000 dollars across six chains, according to GoPlus, with one Aave depositor losing about 305,000 dollars. Across's contracts, bridge liquidity and API users were not affected, and Across says every affected user will be made whole. The stolen funds were bridged to Ethereum, swapped to ether, and moved on to other wallets.

Across smart contractssafe
Bridge liquiditysafe
API and integrator userssafe
Users who signed on the fake sitedrained(about 350,000 dollars across six chains, Across says it will repay)
Exploit anatomy

Through a hijacked across.to, a victim signed a permit that let the attacker wallet and a drainer fee wallet pull about 148.6 aWETH in one batch of transfers; the attacker withdrew it as ether and sent 146.27 ETH to a next wallet.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Largest victim (source), Other victims (source). Step 2, Drain: Attacker wallet (attacker), Drainer fee wallet (attacker), about $280K reached this step. Step 3, Cash out: Next wallet (exit), about $300K reached this step.

  1. Step 1: Root control

    • Source
      Largest victim
      148.6 aWETH
      ~ $305K
      0x42e7ab48...b8483c
    • Source
      Other victims
      five more chains
      ~ $45K
  2. Step 2: Drain

  3. Step 3: Cash out

Why each step worked

    • Registrar social engineeringattacker changed where across.to pointed
    • Signed permits and approvalsfake app asked for spending rights
    • No registry lock on the domainmissing controla support-desk change was enough
    • Hours to regain the domainmissing controlalerted in 15 minutes, restored about six hours later
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
At about 18:45 UTC on November 10 an attacker took control of the across.to domain through a social engineering attack on Across's registrar, Namecheap, per Across, and pointed it at a phishing copy of the Across app.
2.
Visitors who connected a wallet were asked to sign token approvals or permits, and some were led to send funds directly, per GoPlus. Across was alerted within about 15 minutes; SEAL 911 flagged the domain to major wallets and Cloudflare later removed its DNS records.
3.
The largest loss: one Aave depositor signed a permit on the fake site, and at 20:09 UTC about 148.6 aWETH, about 305,000 dollars, was pulled from the wallet in four transactions, split roughly 80 to 20 between the attacker wallet 0x2846e69d3298e99eddf2fd8116e952844da11fde and a drainer fee wallet 0x0c7c656126aa62625fdd8051eb69dc14aee8d37b.
4.
The attacker withdrew the aWETH from Aave as ether, bridged in smaller thefts from other chains through Relay, and moved 146.27 ETH onward to 0x38D7E8B3C9561Caf096C06C62c7561F8ab6E514c at 20:17 UTC.
5.
Across regained the domain with help from Namecheap's founder and said at 01:16 UTC on November 11 that all systems were restored. GoPlus estimated about 350,000 dollars stolen across six chains; Across says all affected users will be made whole.

Root cause

The root cause was control of the domain, not the protocol. Across's contracts, bridge liquidity and API were never touched. The weak point was the registrar account for across.to: per Across, an attacker talked their way past Namecheap's account controls and changed where the domain pointed. From that moment, anyone who typed the real address or followed a trusted link reached the attacker's copy of the app, and nothing in the browser looked wrong. The fake app asked users to sign token approvals or permits, which hand spending rights to the attacker, and some users sent funds directly. Because permits are off-chain signatures, a victim may not see an on-chain approval until the funds are already gone. Across says its domain had established security controls in place and has promised a post-mortem explaining how they were bypassed. Loss estimates differ: GoPlus put user losses at about 350,000 dollars across six chains, and Bitquery's trace of nine wallets came to about 400,000 dollars, most of it a single Aave depositor's 148.6 aWETH. Across has not published its own figure.

Prevention analysis

Put the domain under registry lock with strict account recovery at the registrar.

A registry lock makes record and nameserver changes require out-of-band confirmation, so talking a support agent into a change would not have been enough.

Monitor DNS and certificate changes for the app domain with automatic alerts.

Across noticed in about 15 minutes, but the domain stayed under attacker control for hours. Instant alerts plus a pre-arranged takedown path with wallets and the registrar shorten that window.

Make wallets show permit and approval spenders in plain terms.

Most of the loss came from one permit signature. Clear warnings when a site asks for spending rights to an unknown address give users a last chance to refuse.

Similar incidents

Polymarket (October 2026 vendor DNS hijack)

Two weeks earlier, a registrar-level compromise of a vendor's DNS let attackers serve malicious code inside Polymarket's site. Same weak link: who controls a trusted domain's records.

Curve Finance (2022 DNS hijack)

Curve's front-end domain was redirected to a cloned site that asked users to approve a malicious contract. Same pattern: contracts safe, domain hijacked, users drained through approvals.

Galxe (2023 DNS hijack)

An attacker impersonated the team to the domain provider, took over DNS and served a drainer site. Same root cause: social engineering of the registrar or DNS provider.

Remediation

1.Across took its front end and API offline, worked with SEAL 911 and Cloudflare to block the malicious site, and regained the domain with Namecheap's help by early November 11.
2.Across says all affected users will be made whole and has promised a post-mortem; a claims process had not been published as of this writing.
3.Users who connected to across.to on November 10 should revoke approvals and permits granted that day, for example with Revoke.cash, and send wallet addresses and transaction hashes to Across's official account.
4.Protocols should place their app domains under registry lock, require hardware-key login and strict recovery at the registrar, and monitor DNS changes around the clock.

Timeline

2026-11-10Attacker takes control of the across.to domain through social engineering of the registrar.
2026-11-10Across is alerted, about 15 minutes in, and starts taking the site offline.
2026-11-10Largest theft: about 148.6 aWETH pulled from an Aave depositor who signed a permit on the fake site.
2026-11-10Attacker moves 146.27 ETH onward after withdrawing the aWETH from Aave.
2026-11-10Across says a social engineering attack on Namecheap gave a bad actor control of its domain.
2026-11-11Across says the domain is back under its control and all systems are restored.
2026-11-11GoPlus estimates about 350,000 dollars in user losses across six chains.
2026-11-12Bitquery publishes a revised trace of about 400,000 dollars from nine wallets.
Across (detection and response), SEAL 911 (wallet blocklisting), Cloudflare (DNS takedown), Namecheap (domain recovery), GoPlus (loss estimate and drainer analysis), Bitquery (wallet trace), BlackHart (on-chain verification)
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