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KITE Foundation (Kite AI)

August 5, 2026·Ethereum·Key Compromise
$13.3M
total loss
Statusrecovered

Why it happened

Attack class: Access control

Sixteen stolen keys each signed an ordinary transfer of legacy KITE.

What would have stopped it

  • Hold large token allocations in multisig or threshold custody instead of single-key wallets.
  • Generate and store each allocation key separately.

Not scored before the exploit

BlackHart had not scored KITE Foundation (Kite AI) before this exploit.

An attacker who held the private keys to sixteen wallets linked to the KITE Foundation moved 133.4 million KITE, about $13.3 million, out of them on Ethereum in a single twelve-second burst. The foundation paused the KITE token and its bridges about four hours later, before any of the stolen tokens were sold or moved again. It then issued a new KITE contract and migrated every legitimate balance 1:1, leaving the attacker's tokens behind in the paused old contract, so no holder lost funds. The KITE token code itself was not broken.

KITE token contract codesafe
Holder balancessafe(migrated 1:1 to the new contract)
Other chainssafe(bridges paused)
Sixteen allocation walletsdrained(133.4M KITE, about $13.3M, frozen and voided)
Exploit anatomy

Using sixteen stolen keys, including the largest drained wallet, the attacker moved 133.4 million KITE out of the legacy KITE token in sixteen transfers, until the foundation's Safe multisig froze the token.

The attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Sixteen allocation wallets (source). Step 2, Transfer: Legacy KITE token (hub), about $13.34M reached this step. Step 3, Frozen: Sixteen receiving addresses (exit).

  1. Step 1: Root control

  2. Step 2: Transfer

  3. Step 3: Frozen

    • Exit
      Sixteen receiving addresses
      never moved the KITE
      voided by the 1:1 migration
      0xa55df39a...cdadd6

Why each step worked

    • Single-key walletsno second signer on large allocations
    • Keys exposed togetherall sixteen signed within twelve seconds
    • No alert on dormant walletsmissing controlabout four hours before the pause
    • Multisig pause and token migration0x725e318e181d7e1bb26c0d77ddc58ff6ba463fd8
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
The attacker gained the private keys of sixteen wallets holding legacy KITE on Ethereum. Each wallet had been funded with KITE and a little ether in late June 2026 and had never sent a transaction before. How the keys were obtained has not been disclosed.
2.
At 16:37:35 UTC on August 5, 2026, the attacker signed one ordinary ERC-20 transfer from each of the sixteen wallets across two consecutive blocks, moving about 95 percent of each balance, 133,425,391.74 KITE in total (about $13.34 million), to sixteen fresh addresses. The largest single transfer moved 24,705,806.4 KITE.
3.
About four hours later, at 20:39:35 UTC, the KITE Foundation's Safe multisig paused the legacy KITE token on Ethereum and the foundation paused its cross-chain bridges. None of the sixteen receiving addresses had moved any KITE before the pause, so nothing reached an exchange or a DEX.
4.
The foundation took a balance snapshot at Ethereum block 25,692,498 (01:05:23 UTC, August 6), deployed a new audited KITE ERC-20 contract and migrated legitimate balances 1:1, excluding the addresses it confirmed as attacker-controlled. The stolen 133.4 million legacy KITE were left in a paused contract and were never honored in the new token.

Root cause

This was a key compromise, not a smart contract bug. Sixteen single-signer wallets holding large legacy KITE balances on Ethereum were controlled by plain private keys, and one party obtained all sixteen keys at once. The attacker did not need any flaw in the KITE token: each theft was an ordinary transfer() signed by the wallet's own key, which the token correctly honored. The on-chain pattern points to keys created or stored together: every wallet had been set up in late June 2026, none had ever sent a transaction, and all sixteen signed within twelve seconds of each other, each moving the same 95 percent share of its balance. Two controls limited the damage. The legacy token had an owner-controlled pause held by a Safe multisig, which the foundation used about four hours after the first transfer, before any stolen KITE was sold or bridged. The foundation then re-issued the token from a snapshot and excluded the attacker's addresses, which voided the theft. The KITE Foundation has not said how the keys were exposed.

Prevention analysis

Hold large token allocations in multisig or threshold custody instead of single-key wallets.

With a second independent signer on each wallet, stealing one set of keys would not have been enough to move the tokens.

Generate and store each allocation key separately.

All sixteen wallets were drained in the same twelve seconds, which means one exposure reached every key. Separate key ceremonies and storage would have limited a leak to one wallet.

Alert on any first transfer out of dormant allocation wallets.

The pause came about four hours after the transfers. Real-time alerts on wallets that should never move would have cut that window to minutes.

Similar incidents

Polymarket (2026)

Operational wallets controlled by single private keys were drained after the keys were exposed. Same root cause: large balances behind keys with no second signer.

Fogo Foundation (2026)

Foundation-held token wallets were used to send a large slice of supply to an attacker, and the team neutralized most of it by stopping movement at the protocol level.

Remediation

1.The KITE Foundation paused legacy KITE transfers on Ethereum and its cross-chain bridges on August 5, 2026.
2.The foundation deployed a new, independently audited KITE ERC-20 contract and migrated legitimate balances 1:1 from the block 25,692,498 snapshot, excluding attacker-controlled addresses. Exchanges completed their own migrations.done
3.The foundation released a manual review form for holders whose original wallets were compromised or who received an incorrect amount.done
4.Pending: a public account of how the sixteen keys were exposed and how allocation keys are now held.pending
5.Other token issuers should keep an emergency pause behind a multisig and move large allocations out of single-key wallets.

Timeline

2026-06-26First of the later-drained wallets is funded with legacy KITE and a little ether.
2026-08-05Sixteen wallets each sign one transfer, moving 133.4 million KITE to sixteen fresh addresses across two blocks.
2026-08-05KITE Foundation Safe multisig pauses the legacy KITE token on Ethereum; cross-chain bridges are paused.
2026-08-06Migration snapshot block 25,692,498, taken while the token is paused.
2026-08-06KITE Foundation announces it detected and contained an attack and that the affected tokens are frozen.
2026-08-19Foundation publishes the incident update: compromised wallet addresses, a new KITE contract and a 1:1 migration that excludes the attacker.
2026-08-28Foundation opens a manual review form for holders whose wallets were compromised.
KITE Foundation security monitoring. DeFiLlama hacks database. BlackHart on-chain reconstruction
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