KITE Foundation (Kite AI)
Why it happened
Attack class: Access controlSixteen stolen keys each signed an ordinary transfer of legacy KITE.
What would have stopped it
- Hold large token allocations in multisig or threshold custody instead of single-key wallets.
- Generate and store each allocation key separately.
Not scored before the exploit
BlackHart had not scored KITE Foundation (Kite AI) before this exploit.
An attacker who held the private keys to sixteen wallets linked to the KITE Foundation moved 133.4 million KITE, about $13.3 million, out of them on Ethereum in a single twelve-second burst. The foundation paused the KITE token and its bridges about four hours later, before any of the stolen tokens were sold or moved again. It then issued a new KITE contract and migrated every legitimate balance 1:1, leaving the attacker's tokens behind in the paused old contract, so no holder lost funds. The KITE token code itself was not broken.
Using sixteen stolen keys, including the largest drained wallet, the attacker moved 133.4 million KITE out of the legacy KITE token in sixteen transfers, until the foundation's Safe multisig froze the token.
Attack flow
All 4 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Sixteen allocation wallets (source). Step 2, Transfer: Legacy KITE token (hub), about $13.34M reached this step. Step 3, Frozen: Sixteen receiving addresses (exit).
Step 1: Root control
- SourceSixteen allocation wallets133,425,391 KITE~ $13.3M across 16 wallets0x76ec06a2...5235fe
Step 2: Transfer
- HubLegacy KITE token16 ordinary transfers95% of each balance0x90456725...2e16be
Step 3: Frozen
- ExitSixteen receiving addressesnever moved the KITEvoided by the 1:1 migration0xa55df39a...cdadd6
Why each step worked
- Single-key walletsno second signer on large allocations
- Keys exposed togetherall sixteen signed within twelve seconds
- No alert on dormant walletsmissing controlabout four hours before the pause
- Multisig pause and token migration0x725e318e181d7e1bb26c0d77ddc58ff6ba463fd8
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
Root cause
This was a key compromise, not a smart contract bug. Sixteen single-signer wallets holding large legacy KITE balances on Ethereum were controlled by plain private keys, and one party obtained all sixteen keys at once. The attacker did not need any flaw in the KITE token: each theft was an ordinary transfer() signed by the wallet's own key, which the token correctly honored. The on-chain pattern points to keys created or stored together: every wallet had been set up in late June 2026, none had ever sent a transaction, and all sixteen signed within twelve seconds of each other, each moving the same 95 percent share of its balance. Two controls limited the damage. The legacy token had an owner-controlled pause held by a Safe multisig, which the foundation used about four hours after the first transfer, before any stolen KITE was sold or bridged. The foundation then re-issued the token from a snapshot and excluded the attacker's addresses, which voided the theft. The KITE Foundation has not said how the keys were exposed.
Prevention analysis
With a second independent signer on each wallet, stealing one set of keys would not have been enough to move the tokens.
All sixteen wallets were drained in the same twelve seconds, which means one exposure reached every key. Separate key ceremonies and storage would have limited a leak to one wallet.
The pause came about four hours after the transfers. Real-time alerts on wallets that should never move would have cut that window to minutes.
Similar incidents
Operational wallets controlled by single private keys were drained after the keys were exposed. Same root cause: large balances behind keys with no second signer.
Foundation-held token wallets were used to send a large slice of supply to an attacker, and the team neutralized most of it by stopping movement at the protocol level.
Remediation
Timeline
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