Polymarket
Why it happened
Attack class: Supply chain / dependencyA hijacked monitoring script acted with users' open sessions, selling positions and moving funds through the gasless relayer.
What would have stopped it
- Pin third-party scripts to reviewed versions and check their integrity before they run.
- Sandbox monitoring and analytics tags away from the logged-in trading session.
What the score saw
Our assessment of Polymarket was not rescored after the June vendor attack, and its supply-chain review still looked only at smart-contract dependencies, so third-party website scripts stayed outside what we measured. It did rate operational security as the weakest area, which is where front-end script controls belong.
Score dimensions
- Supply chainmissed
- Operational securitypartly flagged
- Adversarial resiliencepartly flagged
Attackers took over the domain records of DebugBear, a website monitoring vendor whose script ran on Polymarket's international site, and used it to serve malicious code. For about an hour on October 29, users who had the site open had positions sold and funds moved without their consent, about 2.7 million dollars from 726 wallets according to Polymarket. Polymarket's contracts were not exploited, and it has returned 3.9 million dollars to traders, including payments for losses during the trading pause. The stolen funds were converted to POL on Polygon, and most of it still sits in three attacker wallets, with part bridged to Ethereum.
A hijacked monitoring script on Polymarket's site used open sessions to move victims' funds through Polymarket's relayer, starting with a first theft into the attacker wallet, which gathered about 28.6 million POL and split it into three wallets, the largest being this one.
Attack flow
All 5 on-chain stepsThe attack in 3 steps. Step 1, Root control: Victim deposit wallets (source). Step 2, Relayed theft: Polymarket Exploiter 1 (attacker), about $2.64M reached this step. Step 3, Dispersal: Split wallet A (exit), Split wallet B (exit), Split wallet C (exit), about $1.72M reached this step.
Step 1: Root control
- SourceVictim deposit wallets726 wallets with an open session~ $2.7M
Step 2: Relayed theft
- AttackerPolymarket Exploiter 1~ 28.6M POL by 18:03 UTC~ $2.64M0x3F99139F...dFfc18
Step 3: Dispersal
- ExitSplit wallet A18.6M POL in15.3M POL still held0xe4C4C39C...f41EC6
- ExitSplit wallet B4.3M POLnever moved0x53925878...b9962C
- ExitSplit wallet C5.7M POL in4.2M POL still held0xc91ee057...E19b60
Why each step worked
- Vendor domain hijackedDebugBear DNS records changed through its registrar
- Third-party tag with session accessmonitoring script ran inside the logged-in page
- Relayer accepts session requests0x00000000000Fb5C9ADea0298D729A0CB3823Cc07
- No step-up check on large outflowsmissing controlpositions sold and funds moved without a fresh confirmation
- No script integrity controlmissing controlno pinned version or integrity check on the vendor file
Full forensic detail
Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.
Exploit anatomy
safeBatchTransferFrom(address,address,uint256[],uint256[],bytes)tx:0xf77f91ae...eb5e99Root cause
The root cause was, for the second time in four months, outside code running inside Polymarket's website. Polymarket embedded a real user monitoring script from DebugBear, a performance vendor. DebugBear says its DNS records were compromised through its domain registrar, which let the attacker serve their own file from the vendor's hostnames. Polymarket's page loaded it with full access to the user's logged-in session. For users who had the site open, the code sold positions and moved funds, and Polymarket's gasless relayer executed those requests through the Deposit Wallet Factory as if the users had made them. No smart contract was exploited and no private key was stolen. What failed was the trust boundary of the front end: a third-party tag could act with the user's session, there was no pinned version or integrity check on the file, and large outflows needed no extra confirmation. Polymarket's own figure is about 2.7 million dollars from 726 wallets; Bitquery counted 737 accounts and 985 withdrawals in about an hour. Polymarket reports it has returned 3.9 million dollars in total, including 1.19 million dollars for losses during the trading pause.
Prevention analysis
A file swapped through a hijacked vendor domain would have failed the integrity check and never executed, whatever the vendor's DNS said.
A performance script has no need to reach a user's session or trading client. Isolating it would have left the malicious version able to measure page speed and nothing else.
A step-up check on full-balance withdrawals or bulk position sales would have stopped silent drains from sessions that were simply open in a browser tab.
The June attack came through the same kind of dependency. A full review of every third-party script after June would likely have removed or contained this one.
Similar incidents
Same platform, same class four months earlier: a compromised third-party script on the official site pushed users into signing transfers, and the relayer executed them.
A registrar-level compromise let an attacker control what a trusted domain served, and users who trusted the site were drained. Here it was the vendor's domain, at Across it was the protocol's own.
A trusted third-party front-end library was replaced with a drainer and ran inside many dApps at once. Same lesson: every outside script on a signing page is part of the attack surface.
Remediation
Timeline
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