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Polymarket

June 25, 2026·Polygon·Other
$3.1M
total loss
StatusConfirmed
View the Polymarket score →

Why it happened

Attack class: Supply chain / dependency

Trust in outside code on the front end.

What would have stopped it

  • Pin vendor scripts to reviewed versions with integrity checks and a strict content security policy.
  • Keep third-party scripts out of pages that request signatures.

What the score saw

646Forged, scored May 22, 2026

Our pre-hack assessment of Polymarket already rated operational security as its weakest area after the May wallet compromise, but it measured key custody and alerting, not the outside scripts running on its website. Its supply-chain review looked only at smart-contract dependencies, so this attack surface was missed.

Score dimensions

  • Supply chainmissed
  • Operational securitypartly flagged
  • Adversarial resiliencepartly flagged

An attacker compromised a third-party vendor script on Polymarket's website, and the tampered code tricked high-value users into signing transfers of their pUSD balances to attacker wallets. About 3.1 million dollars was taken from 11 accounts on Polygon, according to AMLBot. Polymarket's smart contracts and other users' funds were not affected, and Polymarket said it removed the vendor code and refunded affected users in full. The stolen funds were bridged to Ethereum, swapped to about 1,893 ETH, and later split across about a dozen new wallets.

Smart contractssafe
Users who did not sign the promptsafe
Market settlementssafe
Signing users' pUSDdrained(about 3.1 million dollars from 11 accounts, refunded by Polymarket)
Exploit anatomy

A compromised vendor script on Polymarket's website got victims to sign transfers that Polymarket's own relayer executed, starting with 446,539 pUSD to an attacker wallet; the proceeds were bridged to Ethereum and gathered as 1,892.9 ETH in a consolidation wallet.

The attack in 4 steps. Step 1, Root control: Victim deposit wallets (source). Step 2, Relayed theft: Attacker wallet 1 (attacker), Attacker wallet 2 (attacker), Attacker wallet 3 (attacker), Other attacker wallets (attacker), about $1.89M reached this step. Step 3, Swap & bridge: Relay bridge (bridge), about $3.1M reached this step. Step 4, Consolidation: Consolidation wallet (exit).

  1. Step 1: Root control

  2. Step 2: Relayed theft

  3. Step 3: Swap & bridge

  4. Step 4: Consolidation

Why each step worked

    • Compromised vendor scriptoutside JavaScript ran inside polymarket.com
    • Valid user signaturesvictims approved transfers the page asked for
    • Relayer executes any valid signature0x00000000000Fb5C9ADea0298D729A0CB3823Cc07
    • No check on large transfers to new addressesmissing controlwhole balances left in one request
    • No script integrity controlmissing controlno pinned version or integrity check on the vendor file
    • Late public detectionmissing controlstatement came about nine hours after the first theft
Full forensic detail

Step-by-step reconstruction, root cause, counterfactuals, remediation, and disclosure timeline.

Exploit anatomy

1.
A third-party vendor script loaded on Polymarket's website was compromised and replaced with malicious code aimed at Polymarket users, per Polymarket's statement and Source Defense's analysis. Polymarket has not named the vendor.
2.
The script targeted high-value accounts and pushed them to sign an authorization that sent their pUSD balance to an attacker wallet. Polymarket's own gasless relayer then executed the signed request. The first confirmed theft moved 446,538.67 pUSD from a victim's deposit wallet to attacker wallet 0x51Cf782223289C05568F9F7Dede8CB1bC2f9c5Ca at 05:51 UTC.
3.
More thefts followed through the morning into other attacker wallets, including 538,064 pUSD from three victims into 0xC771A30a7c1aCA828eeEF7B822ac864a64cBaAe2 and 227,468 pUSD from two victims into 0x7BCECe0d8fd92ECCf39Bc35242c6D9aAc0aA75A6. AMLBot counted 11 victim wallets and about 3.1 million dollars in total.
4.
The attacker converted the pUSD to USDC.e and bridged it to Ethereum through Relay, then swapped it to ether. Six attacker wallets sent a combined 1,892.9 ETH to one consolidation wallet, 0xe65b1C586757c5510B60F998Eebb14C1eF71E1eD, between 12:28 and 13:28 UTC.
5.
On June 26 the consolidation wallet sent 1,788.5 ETH to 0x975268a2a71e4A7e282B962Ec0b1Ee01d3778aC0, which split it across about a dozen new wallets on July 19.

Root cause

The root cause was trust in outside code on the front end. Polymarket's website loaded JavaScript from a third-party vendor, and that vendor's code was compromised and replaced with a drainer aimed at Polymarket users. Because the file ran inside Polymarket's own page, its signing prompts looked like they came from Polymarket. Victims signed authorizations that sent their pUSD to attacker wallets, and Polymarket's gasless relayer executed those requests through the Deposit Wallet Factory exactly as it would a real user request. No smart contract was broken and no key was stolen: every transfer carried a valid user signature. What failed was the integrity of the website itself, with no pinned version or integrity check on the vendor file, plus a relayer that applied no policy check to large transfers to never-seen addresses. Polymarket says it detected the problem, removed the dependency and refunded affected users in full. On-chain, the proceeds were bridged from Polygon to Ethereum and consolidated as 1,892.9 ETH, matching the roughly 3.1 million dollar loss that AMLBot and PeckShield reported.

Prevention analysis

Pin vendor scripts to reviewed versions with integrity checks and a strict content security policy.

A swapped vendor file would have failed its integrity check and never run, and a tight policy on where scripts can load from would have blocked a nested library from a new source.

Keep third-party scripts out of pages that request signatures.

Marketing and analytics tags do not need to run where users approve transfers. Sandboxing them away from the trading and signing pages removes their ability to prompt for signatures at all.

Add relayer policy checks on large transfers to new addresses.

A hold or second confirmation on transfers of a whole balance to a never-seen address would have stopped or slowed the largest thefts, which each moved hundreds of thousands of dollars in one request.

Similar incidents

Across (November 2026 domain hijack)

Users were sent to a tampered front end and tricked into signing approvals that drained their wallets. The contracts were never touched; the trusted web surface was.

Ledger Connect Kit (2023)

A widely used front-end library was replaced with a drainer, and every dApp that loaded it showed malicious signing prompts. Same class: third-party JavaScript running inside a trusted site.

Bybit and Safe wallet interface (2025)

Injected JavaScript in a signing interface made a malicious transaction look legitimate, and valid signatures did the rest. Same lesson: the front end is part of the security boundary.

Remediation

1.Polymarket removed the affected dependency, contained the issue and said it was contacting impacted users and refunding them in full.
2.Pin every third-party script to a reviewed version, serve it with integrity checks, and enforce a strict content security policy so new script sources cannot load.
3.Keep marketing and analytics code off pages that request signatures, or sandbox it so it cannot reach the wallet or signing flow.
4.Add policy checks in the gasless relayer for large transfers to new addresses, with a hold or extra confirmation above a threshold.
5.Users who signed unexpected requests on Polymarket around June 25 should review their account activity and contact Polymarket support.

Timeline

2026-06-25Attacker wallets on Polygon receive gas money from the FixedFloat exchange, minutes apart.
2026-06-25First confirmed theft: 446,538.67 pUSD leaves a victim's deposit wallet for attacker wallet 1, executed by Polymarket's relayer.
2026-06-25Attacker converts the stolen pUSD to USDC.e and bridges it to Ethereum through Relay.
2026-06-25Largest single theft into attacker wallet 2: 508,517.99 pUSD.
2026-06-25A victim publicly reports that their account was drained.
2026-06-25Proceeds start landing in one Ethereum consolidation wallet; 1,892.9 ETH arrives from six attacker wallets within the hour.
2026-06-25Specter Analyst flags the drain on X.
2026-06-25Polymarket says a third-party vendor was compromised and injected a malicious script into its front end, that the dependency was removed, and that affected users will be refunded in full.
2026-06-25PeckShield reports about 3 million dollars stolen and bridged to Ethereum as about 1,893 ETH.
2026-06-26Consolidation wallet moves 1,788.5 ETH to a second wallet.
2026-06-27AMLBot updates the tally to about 3.1 million dollars from 11 wallets.
2026-07-19The second wallet starts splitting about 1,888 ETH across about a dozen new wallets.
Polymarket (detection and containment), Specter Analyst, PeckShield and Bubblemaps (early loss estimates), AMLBot (final tally), Source Defense (script analysis), ChainPatrol (address reporting), BlackHart (on-chain trace)
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